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STEFFEN ABELE, KLAUS FROHBERG 
 
 
Subsistence agriculture is probably the least understood and the most neglected 
type of agriculture. In a globalised, market-driven world, it remains at the same 
time a myth and a marginal phenomenon. 
Empirically, subsistence agriculture for a long time seemed to be restricted to 
developing countries, with only a few cases reported in Western Europe 
(CAILLAVET and NICHELE 1999; THIEDE 1994). Governmental support offered to 
subsistence agriculture was mainly done through agricultural development 
policies, the main objective being to have subsistence farmers participate in 
markets. The strategy was to make farmers produce more by introducing new 
technologies and consequently bring their output to the market. Failures of such 
attempts were numerous, yet attempts to understand the failures were few. This 
lack of understanding led to the change of politics towards already developed 
and market-oriented systems, hence to the neglect and marginalisation of 
subsistence-oriented systems.  
This picture changed when subsistence agriculture started to appear right at the 
door of the European Union: With the fall of the Iron Curtain, subsistence 
agriculture in Eastern Europe turned out to be an urgent case. Suddenly, there 
were and still are a large number of vulnerable small scale farmers, many of 
which will, at least by the date of EU enlargement, be entitled to receive funds 
from the CAP and thus compete with western farmers. Moreover, these poor 
rural people were subject to social discrimination, as no one likes to have a poor 
house right next to him in his neighbourhood. 
One of the now quite numerous attempts to address the problem of subsistence 
agriculture in Eastern Europe was a workshop held at the Institute of 
Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) in May 2001. 
It gathered scientists from Western and Eastern Europe to discuss problems of 
subsistence agriculture, ways of analysing such systems and approaches to 
overcome subsistence agriculture. Steffen Abele, Klaus Frohberg  II
The workshop's overall objective was to contribute some answers to the main 
questions regarding subsistence agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe, but 
also everywhere else on the globe. These questions are: What is the definition of 
subsistence agriculture, and what are its characteristics? Is there a conclusive 
theoretical approach research can rely on? Is subsistence agriculture really a 
problem or is it, as so many other economic phenomena, just another efficient 
equilibrium? And if it is agreed upon among scientists to be a problem, what are 
possible solutions? 
We shall provide a brief overview of these issues and how they are addressed in 
the following contributions. Let us therefore start with the definition of 
subsistence agriculture. 
One of the major problems in dealing with subsistence agriculture is defining the 
term as such. Many of the authors in this book offer a definition, amongst them 
HEIDHUES and BRÜNTRUP, VON BRAUN and LOHLEIN, as well as LERMAN. It seems 
that the preferred definition of subsistence agriculture relates it to the share of 
marketed produce. The lower this share, the higher is the degree of subsistence 
orientation. Still, this definition is a relative one, as it can be assumed that there 
is no longer "one hundred percent" subsistence agriculture, either in Eastern 
Europe or elsewhere in the world. This assumption should be kept in mind, as it 
is important for the following theoretical discussion. 
The assessment of the characteristics of subsistence agriculture based on the 
above definition provides a link to theoretical aspects and political options to 
develop this form of agriculture. The first and most prominent characteristic is 
the high degree of own consumption of produce, mostly more than 50 percent. 
Subsistence farms are small (although smallness does not necessarily imply 
subsistence farming, as, for example, suburban horticulture farms may be small 
but quite market-oriented and efficient), and they have low capital endowment, 
which often contributes to low competitiveness. They also suffer from 
remoteness to urban centres and have poor access to markets, be it in physical 
terms (roads as well as other transportation routes and telecommunication 
infrastructure), or in terms of accessing factor markets, especially capital 
markets (which is a prerequisite for starting market-oriented production), and 
low on- and off-farm income. The latter especially shows an important aspect: 
Off-farm income opportunities are scarce and of low revenue for subsistence 
farmers (see especially the macro-economic assessment by VON  BRAUN and 
LOHLEIN). This hints that macro-economic conditions are also important factors 
driving subsistence agriculture (which will be important for both the theoretical 
and the political discussion). We will find these characteristics throughout the 
contributions.  KEGEL provides a case study on the problems of defining 
subsistence agriculture in Georgia. KOVÁCS gives a geographically based index 
system to categorize farming systems in Romania. Another question is the one 
whether farming systems in transition countries are really subsistence-oriented, Introduction  III
and if yes, to what degree. The latter question is especially closely related to the 
definition of subsistence agriculture, as LERMAN points out. In YEFIMOV's 
argumentation, we will find that the lack of market attendance found, especially 
in the former Soviet Union countries, is due to the institutional set-up of former 
Soviet agriculture, which, in terms of institutional economics, used hierarchies 
instead of markets to organise production and commodity exchanges. But that 
means that they do exchange products and factors, so are they really 
subsistence-oriented in the narrow sense of above, or do they just use other 
institutions to interact with the outside world? NEDOBOROVSKYY gives an 
appealing quantitative description of such hierarchy-integrated systems. 
The next problem is to provide a theoretical framework for subsistence 
agriculture. In theory, subsistence is seen as just an early stage of development 
that will perish once Ricardos' comparative advantages are perceived and result 
in wealth-generating trade (ROSE and SAUERNHEIMER 1995). Newer approaches 
provide different theoretical models to subsistence agriculture which are 
somewhat contradictory to each other; a broad scope of them is given by 
HEIDHUES and BRÜNTRUP. One of the theories described is based on the 
assumption of inverse supply reaction due to satisfactory behaviour in 
production which does not go beyond consumption needs, or (assuming that 
some share of the produce is marketed) liquidity requirements. This behaviour is 
seen as caused by strong preferences for leisure and has been brought up by 
authors like Chayanov, cited by HEIDHUES and BRÜNTRUP. Yet, this should be 
discussed critically, as incorporating leisure implies that people would reject 
higher incomes for the same labour input for the sake of more leisure and thus 
act irrationally in the strict sense of the homo oeconomicus model. Nonetheless, 
backward sloping supply functions have been explained by authors who point 
out that short-term post-harvest sales may increase with decreasing prices due to 
liquidity constraints, but that in the longer run, even subsistence farmers will 
react positively to increasing prices (HENZE 1994; ABELE 2001).  
Another, argument strengthened by HEIDHUES and BRÜNTRUP is the transaction 
cost approach, which says that high transaction costs in marketing make selling 
unattractive, and keep people from buying expensive products, which adds up to 
self-produced consumption. This may be so, and one could even add mere 
transportation costs to the list of trade impediments. But, at least as far as 
transaction costs and the resulting margins are concerned, one could as well 
assume that, when supply decreases, and farmers turn to their own subsistence 
production, traders would offer higher prices to producers and lower prices to 
consumers. This would then cover the transaction costs or reduce the margins, 
respectively, for consumers. Consequently, transaction costs can only be seen as 
a temporal explanation for subsistence agriculture. 
The next issue raised by HEIDHUES and BRÜNTRUP is that risk keeps subsistence 
farmers from developing their business, be it production risk based on climatic Steffen Abele, Klaus Frohberg  IV
factors or market risks based on price volatility. But it seems that risk has to be 
considered as a two-way process, affecting and being caused by subsistence 
agriculture: autarchy is prone to production risks that cannot be buffered by 
functioning markets. In fact, this argument may rather hold for developing 
countries in the tropics than for of mid-European climate. However, PETRICK 
and TYRAN show, in their contribution about Polish subsistence farmers, that 
market-oriented farmers are less risk averse than subsistence-oriented farmers. 
This is most probably because market-oriented farmers can afford to take risks – 
they are covered by markets, cash reserves earned from markets or based on 
credit lines from banks. Both MISHEV and KOSTOV and KOPEVA and NOEV 
emphasize the function of subsistence agriculture to buffer hardships arising 
from the economic transition process. This means that subsistence agriculture 
can also be seen as insurance against economic risks – albeit a fragile one. The 
latter argument brings us back to the macro-economic environment of 
subsistence farmers that has already been addressed above: subsistence 
agriculture is applied because there are no alternatives. To conclude this section, 
we may come back once again to H EIDHUES and BRÜNTRUP who discuss this 
"fuzziness" of theoretical approaches to subsistence agriculture and the research 
gaps that still exist. The decisive point in their discussion is the statement about 
the presumed non-economic behaviour of subsistence farmers, which they prove 
to be wrong. In the words of Ruttan, "They claim that one has to understand 
economic systems before judging them." 
One of the first steps of organising this workshop was to justify why subsistence 
agriculture is a problem at all. Some authors see subsistence agriculture as a 
sustainable economic system because of its autarchy (DOPPLER 1991). Others 
would argue that it cannot be a problem because if it were inefficient, it would 
not exist. Finally, a third group would argue that subsistence agriculture is no 
problem at all but rather a solution, as it provides relief from the curses of 
globalisation and modernisation. In fact, the subsequent contributions to the 
seminar will prove that all of them are wrong. In the first place, the organisers of 
the seminar argued that subsistence agriculture is critical for two reasons: 
First, autarchy is prone to production risks that cannot be buffered by 
functioning markets. This has already been discussed in the theory section. The 
second argument raised by the organisers was that subsistence agriculture yields 
lower incomes than market-oriented agriculture. It is again PETRICK and TYRAN 
who point out the relationship between income on- and off-farm and subsistence 
orientation: Subsistence farms seem to have a lower agricultural income than 
market-oriented farms, but they also seem to have lower income from off-farm 
employment. LERMAN comes to the same conclusions. The same phenomenon is 
picked up on the macro-economic level by VON BRAUN and LOHLEIN, who prove 
that the lower the national income is, the higher is the number of subsistence Introduction  V
plots. It is thus easy to conclude that subsistence farmers are overall 
disadvantaged, and that subsistence agriculture really is a problem. 
The next point to discuss is the future of subsistence agriculture: in the 
contributions from Central Europe by PETRICK and TYRAN, as well as NOEV, 
ways of getting out of this stage of farming are discussed: investment in 
agriculture and subsequent farm growth will help subsistence farmers to become 
market-oriented. The same findings are highlighted for both Central European 
and Central Asian countries assessed by LERMAN. He also describes ways and 
solutions for the development of subsistence farmers, namely, improved access 
to input and output markets, but also to credits as well as services (especially 
extension) to ensure the potential for farm size growth. This also requires the 
proper functioning of factor markets, both land and labour, as both factors have 
to be re-allocated during the commercialisation process. Organisations are seen 
as a crucial factor of farmers' empowerment, as they may strengthen farmers' 
positions on markets, and they may also provide the utilization of economies of 
scale without the need to re-allocate factors. A last point to improve agriculture 
and make it more market-oriented is given by WEHRHEIM and WOBST: They 
claim an improvement of institutions, namely markets and trade policies, would 
foster trade and reduce transaction costs, so that incentives for farmers would be 
given to producing and marketing more of their product. 
Making farms more efficient is a necessary but not a sufficient solution to the 
problem of subsistence agriculture. As many of the authors will show, 
subsistence agriculture is also driven by a lack of alternative income sources, 
mainly in rural areas but also in urban sites. YEFIMOV points out that Russian 
subsistence farmers might as well resist a restructuring of post-Soviet 
agriculture, because that would, even while making agriculture more efficient, 
make them lose their only income source, as there is no alternative in Russian 
rural areas. That leads to the point that creating income alternatives in rural areas 
is a decisive prerequisite for overcoming subsistence agriculture. This argument 
is strengthened by the analysis of VON BRAUN and LOHLEIN as cited above. 
But how to address this? NUPPENAU's contribution provides an overview: better 
linkages of agriculture to the downstream sector will increase both primary 
production profits and create off-farm jobs, thus increasing economic wealth in 
rural areas. This might be feasible, but it has to be stated that this cannot be done 
by agricultural policies alone. Structural policies must aim to develop rural 
areas, improve infrastructure and the climate for investments, and finally create 
a favourable environment for the downstream sector and other industries that 
will provide a labour market for those who have to quit agriculture. Structural 
policies also have the task of facilitating factor mobility, which is a crucial point 
for rural development. 
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But let us now leave the introductory remarks and go for a journey through 
Eastern Europe and its subsistence farming systems. We will start with the 
keynotes, which discuss theoretical approaches of subsistence agriculture, and 
possible institutional and political solutions. We will then go from the West to 
the East, starting in Poland, down to the Balkans, crossing over to Central Asia 
and ending up in Russia, where the most interesting systems, but also a 
tremendous pace of change, are found. By travelling this way, we shall, so is the 
hope of the editors, find some answers to the questions raised above, and also 
find some sympathy for those who have to struggle for their livelihood by 
farming their small plots. These people probably need the assistance of scientists 
and politicians more than anybody else. 
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SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPMENT: 
ITS ROLE IN PROCESSES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
 
 




Subsistence agriculture is closely linked to a low level of economic 
development. We find it both in today's less developed countries and in the early 
stages of industrialised countries. Typically, subsistence agriculture is 
characterized by a low-external input level and low productivity (per land and/or 
per labour). In these situations agriculture is generally the dominant economic 
activity, thus allowing subsistence and agriculture to appear identical. 
The term "subsistence agriculture" is used synonymously with such concepts as 
traditional, small scale, peasant, low income, resource poor, low-input or low 
technology farming. Many of these concepts are also used in non-economic 
disciplines with very different meanings. Thus, it is difficult to give a generally 
accepted definition of subsistence agriculture – the definitional problems will be 
discussed below. 
Whatever the terms used to describe subsistence agriculture, the attributes 
ascribed to it are predominantly negative, at least in the agricultural economics 
literature (ROGERS 1970; SEAVOY 2000). Subsistence-oriented agriculture is said 
to lack efficiency of resource use for various reasons:  
•  The priority given to satisfy family needs implies foregoing the benefits of 
comparative advantage, specialisation and division of labour. It assures only 
a low standard of living for subsistence farmers and their families; 
•  Formal credit and external inputs are rarely used in subsistence production. 
Simple technologies, lack of entrepreneurship and absence of specialisation 
keep land and labour productivity low; 
•  Markets are supplied only if there are surpluses from subsistence production, 
which occurs mainly in good harvest seasons. Subsistence agriculture, 
therefore, cannot be relied upon to provide a continuous food supply to urban Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  2
populations. Also, such production patterns trigger high price instability on 
food markets; 
•  Subsistence agriculture displays low responsiveness to policies and is 
therefore difficult to influence through developmental policies. 
In summary, farming oriented towards subsistence is usually seen as 
synonymous with backwardness and inefficiency, holding down economic 
growth and economic performance. 
Consequently, governments have tried to change or eliminate subsistence 
agriculture: Colonial and post-colonial governments in many developing 
countries have tried to force peasants into markets by poll taxes, imposed labour 
and cropping practices and mandatory deliveries. Marxism-Leninism has 
systematically suppressed peasantry. 
In this paper we will argue that, although subsistence agriculture may at first 
appear to be an impediment to economic growth, it often is the only way for 
rural people to survive under extremely difficult and risky conditions. 
Subsistence can be seen as an effective strategy to cope with high transaction 
costs and risks and uncertainties that threaten poor families' survival. 
Subsistence agriculture can even play an important role in stabilising fragile 
economies. Policies need to take these aspects into account and instead of 
neglecting or even fighting subsistence agriculture, they need to address the 
underlying reasons for the drift into subsistence and open viable ways for 
farmers to increasingly join markets. 
In the following, we will a) review the changing role of traditional (subsistence) 
agriculture in overall development, theory and practice over the last few 
decades, b) discuss issues regarding the definition of subsistence agriculture, as 
the concept of subsistence itself is unclear and often a major source of 
misunderstanding and confused analysis, c) discuss within the framework of the 
main theoretical concepts the numerous factors which can contribute to the 
emergence and persistence of subsistence agriculture, and d) draw conclusions 
for policies and further research. The emphasis will be on developing countries 
where most of the research on subsistence agriculture has been done. Where we 
see parallels, we will make references to the situation in transformation 
countries. 
2 TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
Developmental economists of the 1950s did not view agriculture as an important 
contributor to economic growth (JOHNSTON 1970). They knew little about 
tropical agriculture and there was no substantial body of empirical literature to 
draw from (LITTLE 1982). Development economists' thinking in the 1950s and 
1960s was dominated by the dualistic model of development, which was based 
on W.A. LEWIS' influential article titled "Economic Development with Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in Processes of Structural Change  3
Unlimited Supplies of Labour" (LEWIS 1954). LEWIS presented a theoretical 
model of economic growth with two sectors – a modern, mostly industrial sector 
and a traditional, mostly agricultural sector, which was largely comprised of 
subsistence farming. Growth and development took place through the transfer of 
labour from the subsistence sector, where the marginal productivity of labour 
was low, to the modern sector, where marginal productivity of labour was high 
and where the reinvestment of profits was driving economic expansion and 
creating new employment opportunities. 
The minor role attributed to agriculture in economic growth was reinforced by 
Prebish's and Singer's thesis of declining terms of trade for countries exporting 
largely primary products. Also, HIRSCHMAN's book "The Strategy of Economic 
Development" (HIRSCHMAN 1958), which advanced the unbalanced growth 
model with the concept of "linkages" as the central instrument necessary to 
induce the investment process, did little to draw attention to agriculture; 
agriculture lacked the direct stimulus to spur investments in other sectors 
through linkage effects. 
Other reasons for the scant attention given to agricultural research and 
particularly subsistence farming include: 
•  Agriculture, and particularly subsistence agriculture, are seen as low 
productivity sectors that lack the dynamism to act as the motor of economic 
development; 
•  Subsistence farmers' behaviour often appears "mysterious" to economists; 
they seem to behave irrationally, or at least in ways not consistent with the 
principles of economic theory; 
•  The science of economics and its analytical tools are based on the existence 
of markets which are outside of the range of subsistence; 
•  Research is difficult because statistics about subsistence are not available or 
unreliable; 
•  Subsistence farming is seen, even derided, as being traditional and resistant 
to change and innovation, thus barring it from being a preferred target group 
for development practitioners and policy makers. 
It was only relatively recently in the process of development research that 
greater attention has been given to agriculture and subsistence farming. This was 
triggered by recognizing that without agricultural growth, the lack of food, 
resulting in increasing amounts of foreign exchange spent on food imports, 
would tend to choke the development process. Moreover, the increasing number 
of failures of development programs, which too often were based on 
modernization approaches and innovation technologies, without taking 
subsistence farmers' resource constraints, institutional and infra-structural 
limitations and traditional cultural values adequately into account, also played a 
role.  Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  4
That the neglect of agriculture in the industrialization models was theoretically 
inconsistent and would inevitably lead to the strategies' failure, was pointed out 
early on by agricultural economists. JOHNSTON and MELLOR argued already in 
1961 that agriculture had an important role to play in a country's development. It 
could provide – apart from labour – capital and foreign exchange; even more 
importantly, it would need to supply the food necessary for an expanding 
industrial and urban sector and it would be an important market for the industrial 
sector's output (JOHNSTON and MELLOR 1961). 
The subsequent discussion was instrumental for economists' thinking about 
agriculture in development: it stimulated interest in looking at the inter-
dependencies between agricultural and industrial growth and also stressed the 
importance of an improved understanding of agriculture itself as well as the 
process of agricultural change (MELLOR and MUDAHAR 1992). Moreover, the 
discussion had an important impact on the agricultural economics research 
approach, i.e., it encouraged movement away from a priori theorizing towards 
empirical research (STAATZ and EICHER 1998).  
Within this line of thinking it was THEODORE  W. SCHULTZ' seminal work 
"Transforming Traditional Agriculture" (1964) that gave small farmer research a 
major impetus. The influence of T.W. SCHULTZ's book for research on 
subsistence farming can hardly be overstated; it highlighted the importance of 
understanding small farmers' ecological, economic and institutional environment, 
which determines and explains their behaviour and decision making as rational 
and efficient. SCHULTZ's "efficient but poor" hypothesis of small farmer behaviour 
triggered a major shift in research from macro-strategy thinking into micro-
behaviour research. 
From the historical perspective, agricultural research has gone through further 
ups and downs in development thinking. SCHULTZ's (1964) emphasis on the 
technology constraints that lock farmers into operating at low levels of 
productivity encouraged major investments in agricultural research and 
technology development.  
Many agricultural research centres were involved in developing high yield crop 
varieties that laid the foundation for what has become known as the Green 
Revolution, an innovation package comprising new seeds, fertilizers, water and 
plant protection. The Green Revolution had a two-fold effect on subsistence 
farming research and thinking. On the one hand, as a scale neutral and divisible 
technology, it was also suitable for introduction into existing small-scale 
farming systems. It allowed subsistence farmers to increase market production 
while maintaining the level of subsistence production necessary to feed their 
own family. On the other hand, as it required external inputs, the institutional 
and policy environment became important. Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in Processes of Structural Change  5
The lack of farmers' response to innovation packages and the concomitant 
failure of many agricultural development projects, most notably those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, led to a shift in attention to the policy and institutional 
environment. Policy research made it increasingly clear that the earlier emphasis 
on industrialization models had led to "urban bias" policies that discriminated 
against agriculture. In many developing countries, agriculture was heavily taxed, 
both directly through export taxes and indirectly through pricing and trade 
protection mechanisms and overvalued exchange rates.  
Beginning in the early 1980s the pendulum swung back towards placing major 
emphasis on macro-policy and structural adjustment. Macro-economic 
stabilization, privatisation, trade and exchange rate liberalization and fiscal 
discipline all had major impacts on economic growth. At the same time it 
became apparent that these policy changes also implied costs and that the costs 
in most countries were unevenly distributed and often heavily borne by the poor. 
Income distribution, poverty and food insecurity moved to centre stage. 
Research into the social dimension of structural adjustment, the causes of 
persistent poverty and increasing attention to the degradation of natural 
resources moved part of the attention back to the micro level. Farmers' 
ecological basis and natural resource endowment, as well as their institutional 
and socio-cultural environment are emerging as key determinants of their 
livelihood.  
At the same time, on the macro-level, emphasis has also shifted to include, aside 
from the economic policy area, the importance of the political scene. The 
importance of good governance, a fair and enforceable legal and administrative 
framework and the role of civil society have been brought to the forefront. In the 
new concepts such as the comprehensive development framework, the macro 
framework as well as the functioning of small farmers' environment at the 
micro-level are important for improving rural livelihoods. Government at all 
different levels, the private sector and the numerous social structures of civil 
society, are all seen as necessary to fight poverty and move development 
forward. 
3 SUBSISTENCE IS A FUZZY CONCEPT: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
By using the term "subsistence" in the development debate, one descends a 
slippery slope. There is no copyright for the term "subsistence" in any one 
discipline. Early interdisciplinary attempts to discuss subsistence economy 
found that "the most frequent (conceptual difficulty) concerned the various 
notions of 'subsistence' and different levels of analysis or aggregation" 
(WHARTON 1970). It is important to understand these disciplinary differences 
since agricultural economics is not the only discipline that has a stake in the 
discussion and formulation of development policies. Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  6
But even within the economic disciplines the term subsistence is used with 
different meanings. We want to highlight three sources of ambiguity: a) 
subsistence is used as a concept of market-integration but also as a concept for 
measuring the standard of living, b) subsistence orientation can be measured 
from the point of view of consumption but also of production, and c) adding to 
these conceptual ambiguities, any subsistence indicator can move along a 
gradient from almost 100% to practically zero. Drawing the line between 
subsistence and market orientation always involves a certain arbitrariness. 
It would go beyond the purpose of this presentation to discuss the different 
definitional concepts. We will limit ourselves to classifying the definition most 
commonly employed in the agricultural economics discipline, which relates to 
the share of production devoted to a family's own consumption. For a more 
detailed presentation of the different conceptual definitions within the 
economics discipline please refer to Annex 1 of the paper. In agricultural 
ecomomics, the share of production devoted to the family's own consumption is 
most often used as the criterion of subsistence farming. Thus, a farmer who 
"predominantly" produces for his or her own family's consumption is labelled a 
subsistence farmer. If he produces predominantly for the market, he is 
considered a commercial farmer. Where to draw the line is arbitrary – often the 
50% line is used. 
4 DETERMINANTS OF SUBSISTENCE PRODUCTION 
Any policy effort that aims at changing subsistence agriculture requires an 
understanding of its determining factors. Experience has shown that "programs 
of directed change designed to reach peasants are likely to fail unless based 
upon understanding of the values, attitudes, and motivations of this audience" 
(ROGERS 1970).  
With development, technological change, urbanisation and industrialisation, 
improvements in infrastructure and transport, etc., markets for agricultural 
products and rural labour have emerged. International trade has also encouraged 
market production, technology development and the increase of productivity. 
Moreover, government policies have actively supported the switch from 
subsistence to market production, often by force (colonialist, socialist and many 
independently developing countries). But despite the long existence of such 
markets and efforts, billions of rural people have remained in a (partial) 
subsistence economy. In former socialist countries it even seems that a re-
emergence of a "secondary" subsistence economy is visible.  
Thus, what are those strong forces that keep rural people in subsistence, and 
even induce others outside of agriculture to get "back to the roots"? Subsistence 
agriculture is ubiquitous and dependent on internal and external factors; they are Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in Processes of Structural Change  7
inevitably multifaceted. In Figure 1 the determinant factors have been grouped 
into three categories: 
1.  Country external factors that are given for each country (such as a country's 
ecology, climate, history, culture and international environment);  
2.  The farm external and country internal factors, such as government policies, 
institutions, markets etc., which can be influenced by the country itself but 
are exogenous for the individual household;  
3.  The farm/household internal factors, i.e., factor endowment and farm-family 
specific characteristics. Farm/household decisions are influenced by all 
categories of factors. Many of these factors are interlinked and influence each 
other.  
In the following, we will focus on those factors and theories which capture the 
most important of these determinants of subsistence production: these are 
Chayanov's model of peasant production; farm/household models with 
simultaneous production, consumption and leisure optimisation; transaction 
costs and market failures; and risk and risk aversion models. 
  
Figure 1:  Determinants of Subsistence Versus Market Orientation 
Source: Own  design. 
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5 MODELS OF SUBSISTENCE PRODUCTION 
Most prominent among the theories of subsistence production is the leisure 
model by Chayanov (THORNER et al. 1966). His theory is based on quantitative 
research of Russian peasant agriculture in the 1920s. The fundamental 
hypothesis is that peasants have a high marginal propensity for leisure even if it 
means sacrificing additional income, i.e., they prefer to reduce the hardship of 
manual work. This behaviour can lead to a backward bending supply curve 
which has been found in some studies in developing countries (compare PÜTZ 
1991). 
An extreme variant of Chayanov's propensity for the leisure approach is the 
hypothesis of a satisfying strategy, in which households work only to achieve a 
certain minimum level of consumption; they aim at maximising leisure. Such 
behaviour plays a dominant role in the alternative subsistence literature 
mentioned above; it automatically leads to a backward bending supply curve.  
Chayanov's theory has been found useful in explaining farmers' behaviour in 
some areas, particularly in Africa (DURRENBERGER 1984). However, it assumes 
the absence of a labour market (ELLIS 1988). Whether Chayanov's model is 
relevant for the emergence of subsistence production in transformation countries 
is doubtful given that in many former socialist countries peasant agriculture 
plays only a minor role and labour markets do exist. In terms of the linkages 
shown in Figure 1, Chayanov's model focuses on history – the social 
environment, output markets, (the absence of) labour markets, household 
preferences and the labour economy. 
A further elaboration of the Chayanov model of peasant behaviour is the 
farm/household model of new home economics. It also integrates consumption 
choices into decisions related to a household's time allocation. It maximizes the 
utility of three types of goods: self- and market-produced goods, home-produced 
goods for household consumption like fuel searching, water carrying, cooking, 
house repairing, child raising, etc., (the so called Z-goods), and real leisure. 
Z-goods are home-produced goods. A backward bending supply curve for 
agricultural products is possible if there is no labour market. 
In most model specifications the household usually interacts with a labour 
market, i.e., it can buy or sell labour at the prevailing wage rate. The existence 
of a wage rate gives an externally determined value to time and leads to a 
separation of production and consumption.  
For transition economies, the existence of a labour market with effective wage 
payments may be a crucial factor that contributes to (partial) subsistence 
production. Labour markets are often imperfect, with widespread open or hidden 
unemployment, non-payment of salaries, etc. Salaries are often low and not 
protected against inflation and purchasing power erosion. Wages may fall below Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  10
the subsistence level and force those who have the opportunity (access to land 
and basic inputs) into subsistence production. Decision analyses must be capable 
of taking these considerations into account. These models capture the linkages 
between labour markets, household preferences and labour economy (in Figure 1). 
Rural farm/household interactions with markets are generally subject to high 
transaction costs, particularly under conditions of underdeveloped market 
infrastructure such as those typically found in developing countries. They 
originate in imperfect information, transportation, negotiation, monitoring and 
supervision, motivation, coordination, management, etc. A comprehensive 
approach to analyse the impact of transaction costs on self-sufficiency is 
presented by DE JANVRY and SADOULET (1992) (see Figure 2). "The result (of 
transaction costs) is that there exists a price band that creates a gap between the 
effective price received for items sold and the effective price for items 
purchased. There exists a range of products and factors for which equilibrium 
between supply and demand occurs within the price band. In this case, the 
shadow price is higher than the sale price and lower than the purchase price, 
with the result that neither sale nor purchase are desired, and there is self-
sufficiency in this commodity or factor". Seen in this way, a commodity is not 
by its nature a tradable or non-tradable one, and a farm is not defined as 
subsistence or market-oriented by its production or consumption structure, but 
by prices and transaction costs specific to each decision unit. 
DE JANVRY and SADOULET (1992) identify five basic cases that illustrate when 
farmers will participate in the market and under what conditions they will 
behave as subsistence producers (see Figure 2): farmers are net sellers if the 
supply conditions allow production at costs below the lower price band (q(p)
5 in 
Figure 2); they are net buyers if the internal costs are above the higher price 
band (q(p)
1); for those situations in between, farmers will neither buy nor sell, 
but are regarded as self-sufficient. 
This concept allows an analysis of how a certain policy measure, by changing 
transaction costs, affects supply response. It can, for instance, explain why many 
subsistence households do not reduce their production of self-consumed 
commodities and increase purchases when the market price falls (the effective 
purchase price does not drop under the internal cost price) or why market 
production is not increased by upward price shifts (the effective sale price does 
not surmount the internal shadow price), and why an aggregated supply response 
is much lower than that of individual farm/households (only a part of farms 
comes out of the price band). 
The DE JANVRY/SADOULET model of subsistence production is more suitable to 
the real world of small farmers and rural populations than those classical 
approaches to agricultural development which disregard institutional issues and 
imperfect markets. Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in Processes of Structural Change  11
Figure 2:  Supply Response under Price Bands for Units with Different 
Supply Functions 
Source: According  to  DE JANVRY and SADOULET (1992). 
An important reason for the dominance of subsistence production often is the 
lack of market access for outputs, inputs and consumption goods. In Figure 2, 
this would mean that the price P* is extremely low. This may be due to 
extremely high transaction costs and trade risks that are prohibitive for 
agricultural supply from remote areas to find market outlets. Today, in a highly 
integrated international market for agricultural products and subsidisation of 
exports by many industrialised countries, such a situation has become a serious 
market threat for the landlocked African countries. It could also be a relevant 
scenario for transformation countries if it is cheaper to supply the urban centres 
from the international market rather than from own rural areas. These trends 
may be reinforced if rural infrastructure continues to degrade. 
Subsistence production may be the result of inaccessible consumption goods. If 
there is no access to consumer good markets,  the  incentive to produce 
marketable surpluses is low (AZAM and BESLEY 1991). Several studies show 
that in Africa's early colonial times, farmers had no incentive to produce as they 
had no access to consumption goods considered useful. The colonial powers 
introduced (poll) taxes with the objective of creating a need for farmers to earn 
monetary income (ELWERT and FETT 1982). In today's world many consumer 
goods are easily accessible even in remote areas. The explanatory power of this 
model in today's world is rather limited (linkages shown in Figure 1 are location, 
(policy) – input markets, output markets – consumer goods markets – household 
utility). 
Inadequate access to technology inputs and rural finance markets may constitute 
a constraint for farmers to produce for the market. The lack of appropriate 
















Effective Sale PriceFranz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  12
agriculture in developing countries, particularly in marginal areas where green-
revolution technology packages are not working (DOMMEN 1988; BROMLEY and 
CHAVAS 1989).  
Closely linked with the existence of technologies is the access to necessary 
inputs and credit. In developing countries input and credit markets are often 
inaccessible for small farmers and/or distorted by policy intervention (BOSC and 
FREUD 1996; DELGADO 1995). Credit access is often limited by lack of physical 
collateral (land), high transaction costs (particularly information) and distorted 
credit markets. With no access to suitable technologies, inputs and rural finance, 
farmers remain at a low level of productivity and have high production costs; in 
Figure 2, supply curves would be far to the left and few farms would be 
producing for the market linkages shown in Figure 1: history, policies – capital 
market, input markets – farm capital and technology) 
Subsistence production may be the result of taxation. Farmers focus on 
subsistence if prices for agricultural products, particularly exports, are depressed 
by heavy taxation. Typically, in colonial and post-colonial Africa, producer 
prices for important export crops have been taxed to the extent that variable 
costs and labour are no longer covered. Under those incentive structures, 
farmers often return to subsistence production (HEIDHUES and WEINSCHENCK 
1989; GHAI and SMITH 1987; FALGON 1988; MAXWELL and FERNANDO 1989). 
6 BEHAVIOUR OF SUBSISTENCE PRODUCERS: RISK COPING STRATEGIES  
Risk behaviour of farms/households has been widely researched. A common and 
consistent result has been that poor farmers have been found to be extremely 
risk averse (BINSWANGER 1980). This can be generalised for most human 
behaviour in situations where the consequences of risk are serious or life 
threatening. 
The models of risk behaviour (see Annex 3) show that subsistence agriculture 
can be interpreted as the protection of a household against extreme and 
unpredictable risks, particularly risks that may endanger a household's survival 
or expose it to hunger. In these situations, the implications at stake for an 
unfavourable event (income loss, lack of food provision, lack of basic social 
security – in effect risk of hunger and starvation) are so far reaching that they 
justify extremely risk averse behaviour. Subsistence agriculture may be 
inefficient in terms of return to labour, investment or other factor input, but it 
assures survival and a basic standard of living without, however improbable, 
disastrous consequences. 
Resource poor farmers in developing countries have been observed to choose 
from a wide variety of risk coping strategies involving both agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities. While in transition countries rural people move into 
subsistence agriculture, in developing countries they come from that position. It Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in Processes of Structural Change  13
may be hypothesised that both will search for an optimum of income and 
security that follows similar objectives. 
What then, are the options for subsistence households to cope with the various 
risks they are exposed to given their ecological, infra-structural and institutional 
environment? Farmers' options to cope with risk may be categorized in five 
groups. Strategies and activities subsumed under the five headings are in many 
ways interlinked and even dependent on each other; they may reinforce or 
counteract each other. 
Figure 3:  Food Security and Survival at Risk – Options to Secure a 
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Source: Own  design. 
1.  The first group of coping strategies is directed at the diversification of farm 
production activities. A whole range of highly sophisticated actions can be 
observed, often testifying to farmers' intimate knowledge of their soils' 
characteristics, such as fertility, moisture holding capacity, erodibility, etc. 
Farmers may try to increase production, either through expanding cultivated 
land or through introducing productivity enhancing technologies or 
management changes. They may plant early or late depending on observed 
rainfall and weather patterns; they vary crops within and between fields; they 
adjust their cropping pattern and leave fields fallow; they vary the seeding 
rate and mulching/manuring pattern, etc. It is this fine-tuned and 
sophisticated resource management that leads THEODORE  SCHULTZ to 
conclude that outsiders could, at the given level of technology, add little to 
efficient resource allocation. These "poor but efficient" farmers could only be 
moved to higher levels of production by technological change, i.e., by 
research, innovation development and actions to get farmers to accept them. 
2. Farm households regularly save and build assets for various reasons. A key 
motive is "to provide for emergencies" (JUNG 1987; see also RUTHERFORD 
2000). Also, food storage is an often-observed risk coping strategy, although 
climatic and storage technology may limit its applicability. Other asset Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  14
building strategies include accumulating livestock as a multipurpose asset, 
which serves as productive investment, income diversification, risk 
insurance, and source of energy. Planting trees may serve similar functions. 
Jewellery and clothes are frequently found as forms of saving in the absence 
of secure ways of storing money.  
3.  Establishing and strengthening links to markets can be an important strategy 
for dealing with risks. Access to knowledge, credit, and input and output 
markets is a precondition for raising productivity.  
Credit markets, apart from their vital role in enabling the acquisition of 
investments and modern inputs, often play a special role in dealing with 
stressful situations. Access to credit can be an important and efficient 
instrument to help bridge short-term, temporary food stress situations. 
Without credit access, households may be forced to sell their equipment, 
animals or other means of production to survive. With access to credit, 
households can avoid losing their productive assets, and recovery after 
stressful situations is faster (ZELLER et al. 1997). Credit access has also been 
found to be more efficient than national or regional food aid or emergency 
support programmes, as credit is a flexible instrument that allows tailoring 
the credit to the specific needs of individual households and thus avoids the 
administrative costs and leakages of wholesale support programmes. 
4.  A particular form of asset building as a risk coping strategy is the formation 
of human and institutional capital. Children are sent to school, particularly to 
secondary or tertiary education, to be able later on to assist their families in 
overcoming stressful situations. This can also be considered as a 
diversification strategy out of agriculture.  
Solidarity networks are probably the most important insurance institutions 
for subsistence households. Particularly in rural areas, many types of 
ceremonies, invitations and reciprocal exchange of gifts serve the purpose of 
building mutual solidarity networks. Other expressions of social security 
institutions are working groups, savings and credit groups, renting livestock 
and land at reduced costs, gifts, visits, adoption of children, etc. Building 
solidarity networks entails high opportunity costs in the form of the time 
necessary to form and maintain them. GROH (1986) argues that most labour 
inefficiencies found in traditional societies can probably be explained by the 
time-intensive efforts required for maintaining solidarity networks. 
Social networking is an effective insurance against individual risks such as 
farm-related production short-falls, sickness or death of family members, 
fire, theft, etc. Against collective and positively covariant risks, such as 
widespread droughts and floods, war, massive market collapse, etc., it is less 
effective. Their effectiveness increases, however, with sectoral and spatial 
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A serious but often neglected problem of informal solidarity networks is the 
free riders syndrome or the "abuse" of solidarity (people may work less and 
rely on help, and they may hide, dissimulate or misrepresent their situation of 
need or affordability). The most important response of networks is to have 
contingent security to ensure a survival or subsistence level. Another 
efficiency problem of solidarity networks is that "accumulation wealth 
constitutes both a curse and a blessing for the mutual insurance system", 
(FAFCHAMPS 1992) since wealth constitutes a personalised insurance and 
permits the better off, who are in principle the most valuable elements for the 
system, to escape it. 
In summary, despite many mechanisms for reducing the incentive problem 
such as insuring only a minimum subsistence level, heavily penalising 
misuse, stigmatising escape from solidarity duties, networking along family 
and neighbourhood linkages in order to reduce monitoring costs, and 
landlord-client types of relations which allow to include poor and wealthy in 
the same network, the fact persists that mutual solidarity systems tend to 
reduce the level of production. 
5.  Diversification of household activities may extend beyond the farm 
production domain and include off-farm employment in agriculture or non-
agricultural activities, often linked to temporary or long-term migration. This 
is favoured by the fact that farm/household and social security networks are 
inefficient at dealing with covariant risks at the local level. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Subsistence is an imprecise concept. In this paper we use the concept of 
subsistence production to imply a farm/household production dominated by 
agriculture and producing predominantly for its own consumption needs. 
However, in different contexts subsistence is used with different meanings and 
has become a term burdened with prejudices and misinterpretations. Is it a 
consistent use of the term subsistence if we hear that 90% of the potato market, 
in Russia for example, is supplied by "subsistence farmers"? Perhaps we should 
avoid the term in favour of more neutral concepts such as "small scale" farming. 
If the term "subsistence" is used, it needs to be clearly defined and placed in its 
material and behavioural dimensions to avoid confusion and elicit prejudices.  
The existence of a subsistence sector may have different origins. In the early 
stages of economic development it is caused by the absence of markets, low 
technology levels and division of labour. It conforms to and is part of traditional 
behaviour. Where subsistence agriculture coexists side by side with commercial 
agriculture it can be explained as a response to high transaction costs and very 
risky environments. The distortions of markets for inputs, outputs, consumer 
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when analysing subsistence production. Subsistence agriculture constitutes a 
low-level but secure survival strategy.  
In consequence, subsistence agriculture is not only an indicator of poor market 
performance and high transaction costs, it also fulfils important functions which 
should not be neglected. Despite its low efficiency it may be the most rational 
answer to an adverse environment. Strategies to improve the efficiency of 
subsistence-oriented agriculture should be based upon the understanding of the 
factors underlying farmers' decisions. A special "non-economic" mentality often 
associated with subsistence production should not be presumed or should be 
empirically underscored – we would argue with RUTTAN (1988) that "one should 
try to understand economic phenomena before making judgements about them". 
Some of the elements of this analysis are:  
•  Farms and households in subsistence-oriented agriculture have to be seen as 
an interdependent and simultaneous allocation of production and 
consumption;  
•  High transaction costs for input, output and particularly food commodities 
can explain subsistence behaviour; 
•  Risks in agricultural production and off-farm employment, in consumer 
goods, credit and security markets, as well as uncertainty stemming from past 
and future policy interventions should be taken into account explicitly; 
•  We have not discussed the issue of intra-household aspects of subsistence 
agriculture, but in many cases they are of prime importance – particularly the 
gender orientation of labour allocation and decision making must be 
considered for research, technology and policy options (ELLIS 1988; 
QUISUMBING 1993; UDRY et al. 1995; FALCON 1996).  
A policy orientation against subsistence farmers' interests will fail. Even 
relatively effective coercive instruments and institutions in colonial times were 
hardly ever successful, and in poor countries with a weak government, as well as 
in democratic societies with a strong rural population, this will even be less 
likely.  
In contrast, if subsistence producers are considered as rational, technological and 
institutional options should be designed to cater to their objectives. According to 
our discussion, these should aim at: 
•  Reducing transaction costs (infrastructure, market institutions, legal security, 
information, transport, etc.); 
•  Improving stability in farm input and output markets, particularly of those 
relevant for survival, but also in the off-farm sector (employment and wages) 
and the macro-economy; 
•  Supporting reliable finance and social security development; 
•  Developing technologies which conform with the objectives, needs and 
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Since improvements of key economic variables are difficult to discern in a 
highly variable environment, and since decisions about issues of survival will be 
governed by strong risk aversion, it must be accepted that responses of 
subsistence farmers will be sluggish. New institutions must gain confidence over 
a longer period before they have proven their sustainability and efficiency. It is 
probable that many subsistence farmers will rely on subsistence production at 
least in the medium term before they (re)turn to more market reliance. Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  18
ANNEX 1 
The three main sources of ambiguity about subsistence will be further discussed 
here: 1) subsistence is used as a concept of market-integration but also as a 
concept for measuring the living standard, 2) subsistence orientation can be 
measured from the point of view of consumption but also of production, and 3) 
any subsistence indicator can move along a gradient from almost 100% to 
practically zero. 
1) Subsistence can have both a meaning of material consumption in the context 
of the definition of subsistence level but is also used in the meaning of a 
certain way of production (subsistence production) which subsumes certain 
typical behaviours.  
In classical economic texts (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus), subsistence is 
basically understood as a material consumption basket that is necessary for 
(working) people to make a living and to reproduce themselves. This 
subsistence level is, however, higher than the sheer existence minimum 
(SHARIF 1986), it is a "basic need" consumption basket which can only be 
defined with respect to a certain society and time. If, in addition, immaterial 
needs are included such as freedom, social security or cultural identity, it is 
hardly an operational concept. 
The alternative approach to "subsistence" is the way of earning subsistence 
needs, or subsistence production. Particularly in non-economic contexts 
(anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, politics), production, 
exchange and consumption are not simply economic acts subject to optimal 
allocation of resources but embedded in social norms of behaviour. Thus, the 
economic decision includes non-material issues such as reproduction, social 
considerations, leisure preference or religious beliefs. Modern feminism has 
added the intra-household perspective of women producing mainly 
reproductive services. Women's role and value depends on the appreciation 
of these essential subsistence goods which is subject to social considerations. 
All these behavioural components are often seen as inherent to subsistence 
production and as different from market production where produced goods 
are exchanged on an anonymous market.  
Although modern economics sometimes tries to include these issues in 
diverse utility functions (leisure, household Z-goods, risk premiums, etc.), 
there are certain limits, particularly in defining a common measure of utility 
in the absence of (uniform) prices for most if not all of the goods and 
services in the absence of anonymous markets for them. Also, the notions of 
power and exploitation are rather uncommon in classical economics. 
The divergence of concepts can be very large, to the extent that 
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one would assume that subsistence economy is always based on subsistence 
agriculture due to the fact that for low-income households, food alone makes 
up for much more than 50% of total consumption value, in some non-
economic approaches subsistence production can consist entirely of non-food 
products which are marketed. What counts for the classification in these 
cases is that the income level is low (e.g., slum population) or that the 
objective of production is not profit maximisation but consumption 
satisfaction (see for example MIES (1995) or BENNHOLDT-THOMSEN (1981)). 
If agricultural economics wants to effectively participate in the political 
debate, it has to take this competition for definition into consideration. 
Whatever the case is in non-economic disciplines, most development and 
agricultural economists understand subsistence economy as a model of 
behaviour. There is a frequent connotation that the decisions of the 
subsistence economic subjects follow a special logic which is different from 
the classical income maximising "homo oeconomicus". For example, the list 
of attributes compiled by ROGERS  (1970) cites: 1. Mutual distrust in 
interpersonal relations, 2. Lack of innovativeness, 3. Fatalism, 4. Low 
aspirational levels, 5. A lack of deferred gratification, 6. Limited time 
perspective, 7. Familism, 8. Dependency upon government authorities, 9. 
Provincialism, 10. A lack of empathy. Economic textbooks amply discuss the 
special economic logics ascribed to subsistence farmers (UPTON 1987; ELLIS 
1988).  
Given the strong social values in which economic decisions are embedded in 
subsistence economies, research often doesn't focus on individual decision 
makers, as does classical economics, but on larger social units (households 
with complex productive and reproductive functions, families, groups, clans 
or villages). SCOTT  (1976) talks about "moral economies" for the mix of 
economic calculus and social embeddedness which is included in any 
transaction. 
2) In the frame of a seminar of agricultural economists, one would think that a 
more precise definition would be easier to find. We exclude purely 
behavioural definitions and look at the facts – the distribution of agricultural 
production between market and farm/household consumption. If a certain 
minimum or maximum share is exceeded, we talk about subsistence 
orientation. But even for such a seemingly simple concept the definitional 
problems do not end. This stems from the fact that subsistence intrinsically 
links production and consumption issues. But there is a fundamental 
difference between the subsistence orientation of household consumption and 
that of production. 
According to whether share of self-produced goods in the household's total 
consumption is taken as the measure of subsistence, or the share of 
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different situations. A small example may illustrate this (Table 1): A 
relatively large mechanised Asian monoculture rice farmer (A) who can 
cover 50% of his family's food consumption with only 10% of his production 
is in a clearly different position from a manually operating African farm 
family (B) which needs two thirds of its diversified production to cover more 
or less 50% of its consumption needs, and from an East European part-time 
(C) farmer who satisfies 50% of his family's consumption needs by 100% of 
his Datscha food production but who (or his wife) disposes of a basic salary 
for the satisfaction of non-food consumption.  
Table 1:  Degree of Subsistence Dependence According to Whether 
Measured by Production, Consumption or Income for Three 
Example Farm/Households 
  Aa Ab  B  C 
Value of Subsistence Production/Consumption  10,000 10,000  10,000 10,000
Value of Sales  90,000 90,000  5,000 0
Value of Total Production  100,000 100,000  15,000 10,000
Value of Inputs and Hired Labour  40,000 80,000  0 0
Cash Farm Income  50,000 10,000  5,000 0
Off-farm Income  0 0  10,000 10,000
Total Income  60,000 20,000  25,000 20,000
Subsistence Consumption as % of Total Production Value  10 10  67 100
Subsistence Consumption as % of Total Income = Consumption 17 50  40 50
Source: Own  design. 
Farmer A is subsistence-oriented as far as food consumption is concerned, 
but not if measuring the share of production sale. Whether he is a subsistence 
farmer with respect to income will depend on the use and costs of external 
inputs – in case Aa he has a relatively low input/output relation and would be 
classified as market-oriented, whereas in case Ab his high input costs would 
reduce his total consumable income to such a degree that his self-produced 
consumption would qualify him as a subsistence farmer. In cases B and C, 
classification as subsistence essentially depends on the amount of off-farm 
income.  
All three farmers will have rather different reactions toward market signals, 
internal and external input use, credit utilisation or innovation adoption. It 
has been argued that probably the share of external in total input use is a 
better indicator for subsistence decision making than output indicators 
because it better grasps the dependency on external markets, risk of failure 
and indebtedness and other key issues (MIRACLE 1968). 
3)  The third major source of misunderstanding in the discussion about 
subsistence economies is already introduced above – subsistence is not equal 
to autarky. Since the first beginnings of trade in the stone-age there has 
existed an almost universal continuum of dependency between self-produced 
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not rely at least partially on trade, be it by barter, monetary barter or real 
open market exchange. In consequence, subsistence agriculture is not a 
categorical classification but one of dimension and pattern of exchange.  
Another issue of importance is the variability of subsistence degree. 
Particularly in rain fed agriculture, yields fluctuate strongly, to the order of 
several hundred percent, and in developing countries with little market 
integration prices also vary widely both within a year and across years. Price 
changes may be related to national production but often are determined by 
reasons outside the national agricultural sector (sector, trade and macro 
policies, foreign countries' production and trade policies, etc.). Thus, the 
degree of subsistence for any chosen indicator will strongly vary over the 
years.  
Finally, the mode of market production is an important analytical issue. 
MIRACLE (1968) argues that there is an evident difference in the decision 
making situation between a farmer who sells a production surplus in 4 out of 
10 years averaging 20% in the long run, and one who plans to and actually 
sells 20% each year. The first one would be badly advised to use a 
production credit as long as it is not assured that even during the worst years 
he can produce at least the extra-crop to repay his debt, whereas for the 
second the question of external input is less problematic.  
Consequently, one could suppose that there is a continuum of decision logic 
between subsistence and market-oriented farming. This is, indeed, sometimes 
argued for (UPTON  1987; SCOTT  1976) when describing the decisions for 
food versus cash crops or other market productions
1. This mix of rationales 
makes empirical analysis very difficult since many actions can be interpreted 
from the point of view of both "worlds". As will be argued in Annexes 2 and 
3, it can be assumed that subsistence behaviour is determined not by average 
year.s outcomes but by extremely bad years.  
To summarize the unclear nature of the concept, one could conclude as 
MIRACLE  (1968) does, that the term "subsistence" should be abolished. 
DOPPLER (1992) for example, labels only farmers with less than 10% market 
production "subsistence farmers", whereas between 20% and 90% he uses the 
term "transitory". Of course, this merely displaces the classification problem 
into this transitory class of farm/households for which diversity is at least as 
big as if using the 50% subsistence level, but it has the benefit of avoiding 
the co-notions implied by the term "subsistence". Only location-specific 
definitions and the transparent development of multiple indicator indices can 
help to make useful classification and analysis of farm/household systems 
with strong subsistence components. 
                                           
1  Similarly, women's reproductive and social roles for a household's survival within modern economy can be 
interpreted as a partial continuation of subsistence economy (MESMER 1986). Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  22 
ANNEX 2 
Exposé: Risk in Development 
An essential feature of developing countries is their extreme insecurity and risk 
exposure. Risk not only concerns production and price but also most other 
factors of decision making – imperfect farm and non-farm, input and consumer 
commodity markets, off-farm employment and wages, contracts and institutions 
themselves. We think that risk and risk aversion are probably the most 
determining factors for explaining subsistence production in transition countries.  
In their model (see Figure 2 of main text), DE JANVRY and SADOULET (1992) 
take into account the effects of production and price risks as changing the 
effective sale and purchase prices. When assuming risk aversion, which is 
typical for human beings with high stakes at risk, they come to the following 
conclusions: "Uncertainty in both production and price compound in inducing a 
decline in production for all categories (of farm/households), except for the net 
buyers with large purchases. A higher correlation between price and quantity, 
which occurs in segmented markets, corrects this adverse effect in inducing 
higher production. The mechanisms by which this occurs are, however, 
markedly different for different types of producers." 
Thus, already for a restricted set of risk sources and assumptions it can be shown 
that risk reduces market production and fosters subsistence orientation. We want 
to make clear here that the dimensions of risk for low income people in 
developing countries are extreme and severe: 
•  The often assumed negative correlation between production and prices (e.g., 
LELE 1982), which implies a relatively reduced income variability compared 
to both pure price and production variability, may be true for aggregated 
production and segmented markets, but for an individual farm/household 
production is certainly much less correlated with prices because it depends 
on many household-internal factors. Hence, correlation between individual 
production and aggregate price level tends to be low;  
•  Relying on off-farm employment and related wage payments are themselves 
a source of considerable risk for households. Delayed wage payments and 
lay-offs are observed in both transition and developing countries. 
Infrastructure deficiencies may impede job execution and cause further wage 
layoffs. Beyond a certain limit households will consider dependency on 
wages as a survival risk;  
•  Input, output, service and credit markets often fail;  
•  Insurance systems are unreliable or absent;  
•  Policy and its impact on the above mentioned factors is unpredictable and a 
major source of uncertainty. The institutional environment is often 
inadequate and fragile (markets and their institutions, property rights, 
cooperative law, financial institutions, etc.) and the macroeconomic Subsistence Agriculture in Development: Its Role in Processes of Structural Change  23
environment is unstable (inflation, exchange regime and rate, government 
budgets, tax regimes, etc.). The civil society is not yet strong enough to 
prevent policy from making erratic changes which can completely turn 
upside down own plans. 
It is generally accepted that risk and risk aversion reduce the efficiency of 
production through the attempts to reduce the negative effects of risky 
outcomes. Examples are high crop diversification, reduced levels of investment, 
inputs, and innovations, lower credit demand (for an overview of the numerous 
issues of risk in agriculture, see HARDAKER et al. 1997). 
ANNEX 3 
Exposé: Modelling Risk Behaviour 
Two basically different models of risk aversion are competing variability 
reduction and disaster avoidance.  
Variability reduction is the more elaborate and more widespread concept of risk 
averse behaviour analysis, with the expected utility theory of NEWBERRY and 
MORGENSTERN (1943) as its centre piece. It is based on several assumptions, the 
most crucial of which in our context is that for every distribution of a risky 
outcome an individual is supposed to have a secure level with the same utility. 
We would argue that for a situation where survival of the household is at stake 
and where subsistence production offers effective protection this axiom does not 
hold. In this case, a risk-neutral decision maker would not win on average if 
survival is endangered on negative deviations of production below the minimum 
existence level. Such decision makers would, thus, simply not survive in the 
long run. Even if it is not sheer survival that is at risk but "only" hunger periods 
or the sale of (productive or other) assets, farmers may subjectively judge such 
outcomes to be unacceptable. Indeed, risk aversion elicitation games and tests 
repeatedly show that risk aversion increases with the level of risk involved, and 
that particularly for extreme probabilities and outcomes people do not classify 
decisions according to utility theory (TVERSKY  and KAHNEMANN  1982; 
SHOEMAKER 1982; BRÜNTRUP 1997). 
The most uncompromising disaster avoidance behaviour is the "Maximum" 
decision strategy. It arranges production in a way that assures the maximum 
possible outcome in the most adverse of possible situations. This is a 
conservative decision rule with a substantial loss of efficiency over time. 
However, there are other more flexible formulations of disaster prevention risk 
strategies such as lexicographic ranking with subsistence production first, 
minimum regret, Hurwicz and Laplace rules, focus loss or penalisation of 
negative deviation (UPTON 1987; HAZELL and NORTON 1986). 
Subsistence agriculture is thus to a large extent a protection of the household 
against the above mentioned unpredictable risks. The implications at stake for an Franz Heidhues, Michael Brüntrup  24 
unfavourable event (income loss, lack of food provision, lack of basic social 
security – in effect risk of hunger and starvation) are so far reaching that they 
justify extremely risk averse behaviour. Subsistence agriculture may be 
inefficient in terms of return to labour, investment or other factor input, but it 
assures survival and a basic standard of living without, however improbable, 
disastrous conditions (Linkages in Figure 1: All elements are concerned).  
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INSTITUTIONS AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE: 







THE ONLINE EDITION OF ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA defines subsistence farming 
as "a form of farming in which nearly all of the crops or livestock raised are 
used to maintain the farmer and his family, leaving little, if any, surplus for sale 
or trade… Subsistence farms usually consist of no more than a few acres, and 
farm technology tends to be primitive and of low yield." 
This definition generalizes the long experience of agricultural economists in the 
under-developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. And yet it is 
closely echoed in what we see in the individual farming sector in transition 
countries. Box 1 portrays individual farms as a subsistence sector, and although 
written with Kyrgyzstan in mind, it reflects the prevailing view of individual 
farming in all transition countries.  
Box 1:  Subsistence Agriculture in Kyrgyzstan 
Most village families practice subsistence agriculture and are allocated small 
parcels of land to produce food for their families. These plots are often barely 
sufficient to feed each family, and the purchase of seed and fertilizer is often 
too expensive. Even if a surplus can be produced, it is difficult to transport it to 
markets. The lack of machinery means that the labour is mainly carried out by 
family members. Most villages lack basic facilities to process wool, preserve 
fruit, and add value to their crops. 
Source: KYRGYZSTAN COMMUNITY BUSINESS FORUM. 
The above profile suggests that subsistence farms are small, use mainly family 
labor, lack machinery, face difficulties in purchasing inputs and marketing their 
products (assuming that they generate a marketable surplus), and do not add 
value to primary commodities. For our purposes, the overriding characteristic of Institutions and Technologies for Subsistence Agriculture: How to Increase Commercialization  29
subsistence farms is that they produce food for the family and have no 
commercial orientation. This is the vicious circle that we need to break: how can 
individual farmers in transition countries start producing a sizable surplus that 
can be sold for cash or traded for manufactured goods?  
2 IS THERE SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES? 
Survey results indicate that on the whole, individual farms in transition countries 
are far from pure subsistence operations. The majority of farms categorized as 
individual – household plots and independent peasant farms – sell at least some 
of their output. The proportion of output sold by these farms is quite significant, 
averaging between one-third and one-half of total production (Table 1). In a 
sense, this is a continuation of trends established during the Soviet period, when 
farm products from household plots were always sold in local town markets. No 
data are available for a rigorous comparison of individual farm sales before and 
after 1990, yet intuition suggests that the level of commercialization of 
individual farms has increased. In the pre-transition era, common wisdom said 
that "one-third of household plots sell one-third of their production," while 
Table 1 suggests that today the formula is "two-thirds of household plots sell 
one-half of their production." A higher proportion of individual farms sell a 
larger proportion of their output.  
Table 1:  Level of Commercialization in the Individual Sector 
  Percent of "Sellers"  Percent of Output Sold by "Sellers"
Armenia  80 40 
Georgia  64 40 
Moldova   – Small Private Farms  83 48 
    –  Household  Plots  60 31 
Ukraine   – Household Plots  60 50 
Belarus    – Household Plots  76 22 
Poland  72 52 
Source: WORLD BANK SURVEYS (1998-2000). 
Some would disagree with the interpretation of Table 1 as being a picture of 
commercial orientation of individual farms in transition countries. These critics 
would claim that 30%-40% of "non-seller" farms is a very high proportion and 
actually proves a subsistence orientation. They would further argue that only 
50% of farm output is sold, so families largely consume the food produced on 
their farms, instead of purchasing food in the marketplace. So is the glass half 
full or half empty? Individual farms in transition countries are certainly far from 
the level of commercial operation as we understand it in market economies. But 
having said that, we must acknowledge that their commercial activities are not 
negligible and that on the whole, the picture that emerges from Table 1 is 
definitely different from that described in Box 1 or in the  ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA definition of subsistence agriculture. Zvi Lerman  30 
Figure 1:  Commercialization of Household Plots and Small Individual 
Farms in Moldova 
Source: LERMAN (2001). 
Individual farms in transition economies span the whole organizational 
spectrum, from pure subsistence operations which sell no farm products to fully 
commercial operations that sell more than 80% of their output. Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of farms in Moldova by the percentage of output sold. The figure 
represents the level of commercialization of small individual farms that are 
typically regarded as subsistence operations: these are the household plots and 
the small- or medium-sized registered peasant farms with up to 100 hectares 
(data is from a WORLD BANK SURVEY conducted in the autumn of 2000; for 
details see LERMAN (2001)). Consistent with the data in Table 1, only one-third 
of the farms do not report any sales. Most of the remaining farms show a fairly 
uniform distribution of commercialization level, ranging from 10% to 60% of 
output sold, and a substantial percentage of farms report sales of more than 60% 
of output.  
The focus of our discussion is thus how to increase the readiness of individual 
farms to sell and increase the percentage of output sold among the "sellers". 
Figure 2 is a standard input-output diagram adapted to farming. We will 
examine what needs to be done with the main input streams – land, purchased 
inputs, machinery, credit, know-how – if the objective is to increase the share of 
output that goes through the commercial sales channel. 
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Figure 2:  A Schematic Input-Output Diagram for Farms 
Source: Own  depiction.   
3 MORE LAND MEANS HIGHER COMMERCIALIZATION 
We have used farm survey data from a number of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries to analyze the determinants of the decision to 
sell among individual farmers. MATHIJS and NOEV (2002) carried out a similar 
analysis of individual farms in four Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs). Table 2 is one of the outputs of this type of analysis, and presents the 
comparative profiles of "seller" and "non-seller" farms in Armenia, where large 
corporate farms do not exist and agriculture is entirely comprised of 
smallholders. The Armenian smallholders are conventionally regarded as 
subsistence farmers, although we have seen in Table 1 that fully 80% engage in 
commercial sales. 
The sellers are characterized by larger land holdings, a larger amount of fertile 
irrigated land, and more animals. Sellers also command a larger pool of potential 
family labor, and a significantly higher percentage of the heads of household 
work full time on the family farm. Finally, sellers allocate much larger amounts 
of money to payment for mechanical field services (both in absolute terms and 
per hectare). Interestingly, some variables that a priori would appear relevant to 
the decision to sell are not significantly different between the two categories of 
households. For example, the average distances to the main delivery location or 
point of sale and the average road conditions are virtually identical for sellers 
and non-sellers. Moreover, the product mix is practically the same and the 
educational endowment is not different. The picture emerging from the profiles 
of Table 2 is confirmed by logistic regression: the probability that a household is 
a "seller" increases with the amount of land endowment, the number of animals, 












Upstream DownstreamZvi Lerman  32 
Table 2:  Armenia: Comparative Characteristics of Sellers and Non-
sellers 
  Sellers (1,104)  Non-sellers (264) 
Land, ha  2.3 1.4 
Irrigated Land, ha  0.44 0.24 
Animals, standard head  2.2 1.0 
Family Size  5 4 
Number of Farm Workers  4 3 
Full Time Occupation on Farm, in percent  63 45 
Annual Cost of Mechanical Field Services, dram/ha  19,500 8,900 
Per cent Crops in Product Mix  60 59 
Household Heads with Higher Education, in percent  13 12 
Household Heads with Secondary Education, in percent  59 62 
Source: LERMAN and MIRZAKHANIAN (2001). 
The specific profile components and regression results vary from country to 
country, not only because of local differences, but also because of differing 
availability of particular variables. Thus, no data on farm machinery were 
available in Armenia, whereas in Moldova this proved to be one of the 
significant factors in the decision to sell. While geographical location had no 
impact in Armenia, it was found to be a highly significant factor in Moldova, 
where commercialization declined rapidly with the distance from the capital. 
The product mix was the same for "sellers" and "non-sellers" in Armenia, 
whereas in Moldova we witnessed a distinct adjustment of the cropping pattern 
in "seller" farms (more sunflower, grapes, and vegetables as the main cash 
crops). Yet farm size as measured by land emerges clearly and consistently in all 
countries as the major determinant of the decision to engage in the sale of farm 
products. Seller farms are larger and use greater inputs of productive resources. 
They accordingly produce more output and have a greater saleable surplus after 
satisfying the family's consumption needs. Small farms produce just enough to 
satisfy family consumption: to have saleable surplus output, the farm must be 
larger than some minimum size. 
Figure 3:  Share of Output Sold and Consumed, by Farm Size in 
Moldova 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between the level of commercialization 
and farm size for a sample of individual farms in Moldova that participated in a 
WORLD  BANK SURVEY in the autumn of 2000 (LERMAN 2001). The sample 
included household plots and a wide range of registered peasant farms, spanning 
a wide range of sizes, from a few tenths of a hectare to more than 500 hectares 
in exceptional cases. The level of commercialization consistently increased with 
the increase of farm size: the proportion of output sold rose from less than 15% 
for the smallest farms up to 1 hectare, to 45%-50% for farms of more than 100 
hectares. The percentage of output consumed by the farmer's family 
correspondingly declined from nearly 60% for the smallest farms to about 20% 
for the largest entities (the two proportions do not add up to 100% because some 
of the output is used as intermediate inputs on the farm and some is stored for 
future consumption and sales). 
The very fact that sellers engage in additional income-generating commercial 
activities leads to a striking difference in level and composition of family 
income. Sellers enjoy much higher total incomes, and the difference is basically 
attributable to cash earned from sales of farm products. In Moldova, net farm 
sales (revenues less costs) contribute 290 USD to "seller" families, and their 
average income is 1,240 USD per year, compared with 980 USD for "non-
seller" farms (LERMAN 2001). In Poland, farms larger than 50 hectares selling a 
high proportion of their output generate family incomes of about 100,000 zloty 
per year, compared with 20,000 zloty for farms of up to 10 hectares that sell a 
much smaller proportion of their output (CSAKI and LERMAN 2002). As a result, 
the importance of the farm for family welfare increases markedly with the 
increase in the level of commercialization observed in larger farms. This effect 
is illustrated in Figure 4 (Moldova) and Figure 5 (Poland), which show how the 
share of income from farm sales in total family income increases in larger farms, 
which are characterized by higher commercialization. 
Figure 4:  Structure of Family Income by Farm Size in Moldova 
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Figure 5:  Structure of Family Income by Farm Size in Poland 
Source: CSAKI and LERMAN (2002). 
Individual farmers apparently recognize the advantages of operating a larger 
farm. WORLD BANK SURVEYS in transition countries reveal a clear pattern of 
willingness to increase farm size. In Armenia, 20% of individual farmers 
expressed the desire to double their land holdings from 2 hectares to 4 hectares. 
In Moldova, 58% of rural households would similarly like to double their plots 
to somewhere between 1-6 hectares, and another 13% would like to operate 
more than 6 hectares (an increase of 5 to 10 times the current size). In Poland, 
11% of farms actually increased their holdings by nearly 40% on average 
between 1997 and 1999 (from 19 hectares to 27 hectares). 
4 LAND MARKET INSTITUTIONS NEEDED FOR FARM ENLARGEMENT 
We have shown that, among individual farmers, farm size has a strong positive 
impact on the degree of commercialization and on family incomes. Everywhere 
in the world, farm sizes are increased through land market transactions, which 
include buying and selling and, no less importantly, leasing of land. The land 
markets enable land to flow from passive to active owners, (e.g., from 
pensioners to farmers) or from less efficient to more efficient producers, thus 
increasing the overall productivity of this resource and improving farm 
efficiency. 
Relatively little empirical information is available on the development of land 
markets in transition economies. The legal framework for land transactions is 
generally in place, but in many countries the buying and selling of land is 
restricted by various legal provisions which are not conducive to the emergence 
of vigorous markets for land sales. PROSTERMAN and HANSTAD (1999) provide a 
detailed review of these restrictions in some transition countries. Although there 
is definite evidence of the buying and selling of land in all transition countries, 
including the CIS, the overall impression is that agricultural land markets are 
very thin, with relatively small and infrequent transactions. According to very 
rough (and probably highly subjective) estimates prepared for the European 
Union (DALE and BALDWIN 1999), the frequency of land transactions is around 
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2.5% in Hungary and around 1% in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Latvia, 
Poland, and Slovenia (this percentage is the ratio of titles transferred to the total 
number of titles in cadastral registries). These estimates of transaction 
frequencies are substantially lower than the EU average transfer rate of 7%. A 
recent survey by SCHULZE and TILLACK (1998) estimates that farmers' buy-and-
sell transactions in 1995-1996 entailed about 1.7% of farm land in Poland, 
0.15% in the Czech Republic, and 0.25% in Slovakia. Although a 1998 Phare 
ACE survey in Hungary found that a substantial proportion of land in individual 
farms was actually acquired through purchase transactions
1, only 5% of Polish 
farmers in a 2000 WORLD BANK SURVEY report buying or selling land in the last 
five years (CSAKI  and LERMAN 2002). CIS farmers interviewed in numerous 
WORLD BANK SURVEYS have thus far failed to provide any positive indication of 
buy-and-sell transactions in land. Even in Armenia, where buying and selling 
land has been completely legal since 1992, two large surveys covering 6,000 
farms in 1996 and 1998 did not detect any significant transfers of land 
ownership through market mechanisms.  
But land market transactions are not limited to the buying and selling of land. 
Land leasing and other forms of transferable use rights are important 
components of land markets throughout the world, and they acquire particular 
prominence in transition economies in view of administrative and political 
restrictions on buy-and-sell transactions. Thus, in Russia, land leasing appears to 
be much more common than buying and selling: according to Goskomstat 
national surveys, 33% of peasant farmers report the existence of land leasing 
transactions, while only 6% have knowledge of buy-and-sell transactions of 
land.  
In developed market economies, many farmers are "operators" and not 
"landowners": they cultivate land that they do not own. Thus, farmers in 
Belgium, France, and Germany rent more than 60% of the land they cultivate, 
while the overall "tenancy rate" in the 15 countries of the European Union is 
40% (LERMAN et al. 2002). In Canada, 30% of farmed land is not owned by the 
farmers, and in the USA, only one-third of farmed land is fully owner operated: 
another 55% is a mixture of own land with land leased from others and 10% is 
cultivated by farmers who do not own any land. In both Europe and North 
America, land leasing is definitely conducive to larger farms. In Europe, the 
average farm size is almost 40 hectares in countries where farms operate with 
more than 30% of leased land, compared with 18 hectares in countries where 
farms have less than 30% of leased land; in Canada farms with leased land are 
40% larger than farms operating with owned land (224 ha and 164 ha, 
respectively); and in the USA, farms operating with a mixture of owned and 
                                           
1 M ATHIJS, E. (without year): Private Communication. Zvi Lerman  36
leased land are more than three times as large as farms that use owned land only 
(358 ha and 112 ha, respectively).  
Leasing also emerges as a mechanism for the augmentation of individual farms 
in transition countries (Table 3). Although the percentage of individual farms 
that lease land is relatively small, farms reporting some leased land are 
significantly larger than farms that rely entirely on owned land. This is 
consistent with the experience of market economies described above. 
Table 3:  Leasing of Land by Individual Farmers in Transition Countries 
  Percent of Farms Total Size, ha  Leased Land, ha  Farms Without 
Leased Land, ha 
Armenia  14 2.6 1.0 1.3 
Georgia  2 8.7 7.8 0.7 
Moldova   1996  6 16.9 13.5  2.8 
    2000  51 196 191  3.7 
Romania  7 4.1 1.7 3.0 
Bulgaria  9 4.8 3.3 1.1 
Hungary  8 19.6  8.8  3.4 
Poland  17 25.7 11.9  7.3 
Sources: WORLD BANK SURVEYS for Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, and Poland; Phare ACE surveys 
conducted by the Catholic University of Leuven for Bulgaria and Hungary (LERMAN et al. 2002). 
The state should desist from restricting the development of land transactions, be 
it buying and selling or leasing. The role of the state is to create an institutional 
and technical framework that supports land markets. The impact of a conducive 
framework is clearly shown in the case of Moldova in Table 3: the changes in 
the legal and political environment between two WORLD BANK SURVEYS (1996 
and 2000) increased the frequency of land leasing among individual farmers 
from 6% to 50%. The rule of law, or more specifically, the availability of 
contract enforcement mechanisms, is probably the most important component of 
the framework required for the development of land markets in general and land 
leasing in particular. Individuals will be understandably reluctant to lease out 
their land unless there are strong guarantees that they will retain their ownership 
rights even though they do not cultivate the land personally. Leaseholders, on 
the other hand, will not necessarily take the best care of the leased land if they 
may lose it at any time through arbitrary administrative actions. In addition to 
contract enforcement, the state should provide adequate registration and titling 
arrangements to ensure the existence of proper ownership and transfer records, 
including records of lease agreements and mortgages where necessary. These 
records are necessary to support any contract-enforcement mechanism. Last but 
not least, the state should ensure maximum simplicity and transparency of all 
procedures related to land transactions: excessive red tape and rigid bureaucratic 
attitudes, so deeply embedded in the socialist heritage, should be eliminated. Institutions and Technologies for Subsistence Agriculture: How to Increase Commercialization  37
5 MARKET SERVICES FOR COMMERCIAL OPERATION 
However important it may be, land is only one component of the operating 
environment that encourages commercialization. Given land, farmers should be 
able to produce, which requires channels for the delivery of knowledge, inputs, 
and machinery to the farms (see Figure 2). Once the harvest is in, farmers should 
be able to sell it, which requires access to marketing channels. 
In the past, the traditional individual sector – household plots – was generously 
supported by the local collective or cooperative enterprise, which actually 
provided all upstream and downstream services. In this way, the large farm 
enterprise substituted for the missing market channels and enabled the "one-
third" commercialization level of the household plots. The traditional role of the 
collective farm in relation to the household plots is illustrated in Table 4, which 
is based on the latest farm survey for Belarus. Belarus has remained frozen in 
time among the transition countries, and still provides a faithful picture of the 
pre-1990 situation with regard to household plots in the socialist world. 
Table 4:  Traditional Role of Collective Farm vis-à-vis Household Plots 
  Percent of Farm Enterprises  
Help with Fieldwork on Household Plot  91 
Plowing, Tillage  67 
Inputs   
Fertilizers, Pesticides, Herbicides  15-20 
Seeds, Feed, Young Animals, Veterinary Services  60-70 
Marketing  56 
Extension: Access to Specialists  n.a. 
Source: WORLD BANK SURVEY in Belarus, 1999 (CSAKI et al. 2000). 
Although some of the deep symbiosis between household plots and local farm 
enterprises still persists (SCHREINEMACHERS 2001), the individual sector today 
largely has to fend for itself in the new market environment, however imperfect. 
WORLD BANK SURVEYS in CIS provide consistent evidence that the individual 
sector – both household plots and peasant farms – is shifting its business from 
farm enterprises and state-affiliated channels to private traders, wholesalers, and 
retail markets. This observation is equally valid for both product sales and farm 
supply purchases.  
The main difficulties that individual farmers experience in their attempts to sell 
farm products are documented in Table 5. Farmers universally complain of low 
prices received; they often complain of the difficulties of finding a buyer for 
their products; they experience serious problems with transporting their products 
to the market (except in Poland); and, in the two countries where asked, 
individual farmers indicate that their output is too small to sell. With regard to 
farm inputs, the universal complaint is that the prices are too high, although 
physical availability as such (i.e., finding a supplier) is not a problem. Zvi Lerman  38
Table 5:  Marketing Difficulties Reported by Individual Farmers 
(Average Scores Over All Commodities) 
 Armenia  Georgia  Moldova  Poland 
Low Prices  42 36 75 51 
No Buyer  34 20 30 14 
Transport  38 48 25  3 
Untimely Payments  15 8  17  15 
Meeting Quality Standards  13 n.a.  12  8 
Small Volume  n.a. n.a.  30  16 
Source: WORLD BANK SURVEYS (1998-2000). 
All these are typical problems of smallness (Box 2). They are not unique for 
transition countries: family farmers all over the world experience similar 
problems, although admittedly they are less acute in a functioning market 
environment. In addition to difficulties with sales and inputs due to lack of 
bargaining power (prices) or restricted physical access to markets (finding a 
buyer, transport), the problems of smallness are also reflected in the shortage of 
machinery (which is too expensive to buy for a small farmer) and restricted 
access to credit (lack of collateral, high transaction costs for small loans).  
Box 2:  Smallness is a Universal Problem, Not Only in Transition 
•  Buying inputs – higher prices for small quantities; small quantities not 
always available at any price; shipping small quantities complicated; no 
bargaining power to negotiate better terms. 
•  Selling to processors – hard to sell in small quantities; difficult to meet 
quality standards; no bargaining power to negotiate better terms. 
•  Physical access to markets – transport to markets sometimes impossible, 
difficult meeting entry threshold (either formal or informal). 
•  Buying machinery – too expensive for a small producer; cost-ineffective for 
a small farm. 
•  Negotiating credit – lack of collateral, high transaction costs on small loans, 
high interest rates. 
5.1  Service Cooperatives and Machinery Pools 
The standard solution for the problems of smallness in market economies is to 
establish a farmers' service cooperative. Both theory and world experience 
suggest that service cooperatives are established to correct for market failure, 
i.e., when private entrepreneurs are reluctant to enter into a particular area for 
various reasons (spatial dispersion, remoteness, narrow product requirements) 
and as a result, farmers are faced with missing services (COBIA 1989). Service 
cooperatives cure the problems of smallness by endowing small individual 
farmers with the benefits of collective operational size; they assure access to 
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Cooperative machinery pools relieve the individual farmer from the pressure of 
purchasing their own equipment. Service cooperatives also achieve overall risk 
reduction through portfolio diversification effects (ZUSMAN 1988). This 
improves their credit standing vis-à-vis the banks, thereby enabling them to 
negotiate access to loans and lower interest rates for their members. 
These advantages of joint action through cooperation in services (as opposed to 
cooperation in production) are borne out by long-term experience all over the 
world. In market economies, cooperatives are not the only institutional tool that 
farmers use. Many functions and services are handled competitively by private 
entrepreneurs, obviating the need for service cooperatives. In transition 
economies where the market environment is still underdeveloped and not fully 
functional, the benefits of cooperation appear to be self-evident. There is, 
however, a strong psychological resistance to cooperation bred from years of 
abuse of the whole concept by socialist regimes:  
The use of the word "co-operative" in Central and Eastern Europe will not only 
create the wrong impression, it will also create barriers to progress. The old 
style of co-operative or collective has no relevance in the new free-market 
approach (PLUNKETT FOUNDATION 1995). 
Despite this resistance, we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of 
cooperation among individual farmers in transition countries (Table 6). This is 
voluntary cooperation, often informal and sporadic, that stands in a stark 
contrast to the all-pervasive mandatory cooperation of the socialist era. 
Cooperation is quite strong in many areas, with the notable exception of 
processing and credit. Consistent with theoretical considerations, the level of 
cooperation is lower in Poland, where the market environment is substantially 
more developed than in the other countries (compare the difficulties with 
transport in Poland versus the other countries in Table 5). 
Table 6:  Cooperation Among Private Farmers  
 Russia  Ukraine Belarus Armenia  Moldova  Poland
Some Forms of Cooperation, in percent  74 82 60 44 30 20 
Consulting  58 64 33  9 10  8 
Marketing  33 24 13 10 11  8 
Input Supply  30  20 7 1 7 5 
Machinery  43 45 37 19 19  7 
Production Services  27 34 17 10 11  6 
Processing  8 6 0 1 7 2 
Credit  37  16  10 0 2 2 
Source: WORLD BANK SURVEYS (1994-2000). 
Machinery is understandably one of the major areas of cooperation among 
individual farmers in transition countries. Through cooperation, the actual 
access of individual farmers to machinery and machinery services is much 
higher than that suggested by machinery ownership rates. Thus, in Armenia only 
14% of farmers own farm machinery (either individually or jointly with their Zvi Lerman  40 
relatives and neighbours). Machinery pools and service cooperatives, however, 
ensure that fully 80% of individual farmers in this country have access to 
machinery or mechanical field services (LERMAN and MIRZAKHANIAN 2001). In 
Moldova, less than 30% of peasant farmers participating in the 2000 WORLD 
BANK SURVEY (LERMAN 2001) have their own machinery; another 40% have 
access to machinery through joint ownership (a kind of low-level cooperation) 
or rental; finally, over 30% buy mechanical field services (Figure 6). It is not 
clear how much of the machinery rentals and custom machinery services 
originate from cooperatives and how much from private rental companies (we 
have seen in Table 6 that about 20% of farmers have cooperation in machinery). 
Either channel provides an adequate solution to the problems of smallness and 
fixity, which prevent widespread ownership of farm machinery by individual 
farmers. If private entrepreneurs provide competitive machinery rentals and 
services, so much the better. If such services are not available from private 
companies, cooperatives can be established to fill the gap. 
Figure 6:  Sources of Machinery for Individual Farmers in Moldova 
Source: LERMAN (2001). 
5.2 Access  to  Credit 
In principle, farms, like all business entities, need access to two types of credit: 
long-term credit to finance investments in fixed assets and short-term credit to 
finance working capital requirements (i.e., to bridge the temporary gap between 
production costs and sales receipts). Conventional wisdom is that individual 
farmers in transition countries suffer from a severe shortage of credit, which is 
an obstacle to normal and efficient operation. To what extent this is true, and 
whether the borrowing of farmers in transition countries is different from the 
borrowing of comparable farmers in market economies cannot be empirically 
determined. To put the problem of credit into perspective, the writer can only 
cite one piece of evidence from personal experience. When a few years back the 
writer spoke to a commercial crop farmer in Texas, USA, about his borrowing 
and his relations with the banks, the answer was, "I finance everything out of 
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of small farmers being highly conservative and risk-averse individuals who do 
not wish to borrow. If this is the case in market economies, should we continue 
to emphasize the deficiencies of farm credit in transition countries? 
In any event, the incidence of borrowing among individual farmers varies 
widely from country to country (Table 7). What is common to all countries is 
that borrowing is mainly short-term and predominantly informal (from friends 
and relatives). Naive estimates of farmers' demand for credit based on simple 
survey questions about how much they would like to borrow reveal a very 
healthy appetite for future borrowing. The expressed demand for credit is four to 
five times the present level of borrowing and, most surprisingly, two to three 
times the present level of sales (Table 7). The latter ratio suggests that the credit 
demand estimates may be exaggerated. Another point to bear in mind is that 
farmers primarily signal a need for investment credit – there is no indication that 
they would like to borrow for current production expenses, i.e., for working 
capital.  
Table 7:  Do You Need Credit for Next Year? 
 Moldova  Georgia  Armenia 
Yes, in percent  60 50 53 
Amount, USD  1,300 3,000 1,000 
Sales, USD  450 1,250 400 
Desired Term, years  1-5 1-2 1-2 
Desired Rate, in percent  8 12-24  1-6 
Today's Borrowing       
Frequency, in percent  20 1 50 
Amount, USD  250 800 200 
Term  short  3 months  6-24 months 
Annual Rate, in percent  30 n.a.  2-10 
Credit from Relatives, Friends, in percent  96 100 94 
Source: WORLD BANK SURVEYS (1996-1998). 
Investment financing is a problem for farmers all over the world. But experience 
in market economies shows that farmers do not rush to the banks to finance 
every investment instantly with debt. Farmers wait until they have accumulated 
enough savings to buy or build, as needed. When credit is easily available 
through (generally subsidized) government sources, farmers, like everybody 
else, fall into the moral hazard trap of soft-budget constraints: they over-borrow, 
over-invest, and end up in serious trouble. There are plenty of examples of this 
all over the world, and the 1986 farm debt crisis in Israel is just one of them 
(KISLEV et al. 1991). To facilitate investment, farmers should be encouraged to 
be profitable and save "out of cash."  
If farmers are profitable and are willing to save money, working capital 
financing should not be a serious problem either. In any event, the maximum 
that is needed is a short-term loan to cover one year's production costs, 
repayable in full from the next season's sales receipts. In market economies, 
such loans are very often handled through channels that do not involve bank Zvi Lerman  42 
borrowing. First, there is the natural suppliers' credit that all farms use. Second, 
short-term financing can be raised through a variety of product-credit 
interlinkage arrangements: the farm pledges its future harvest against a bridging 
loan for working capital. Interlinkage arrangements are universally practiced by 
service cooperatives, which supply inputs and extend credit to their members in 
return for the promise of future delivery of members' harvest.  
A more sophisticated non-cooperative interlinkage scheme involves contract 
production, whereby a farmer undertakes to produce and deliver a certain crop 
to a marketer or a processor in return for a working-capital loan or inputs 
supplied in kind. There is evidence of such contractual arrangements in 
Romania, Poland, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia, where the buyer-financier is 
usually a large foreign corporation with a special interest in gaining a market 
share for its products (farm inputs) or securing a source of farm commodities for 
its marketing or processing operations (grain, grapes, vegetables).  
A very popular solution for rural credit problems advocated by international 
donors involves the establishment of credit unions. These are small specialized 
credit cooperatives that rely on mutual guarantee and strong peer pressure for 
successful operation. Their operation is not interlinked with input supply or 
product marketing: their charter is to lend money to their members for business 
needs (including farming). There are large numbers of such credit unions in 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and the Baltics, and efforts are underway to extend 
the network to Ukraine and Russia. The problem is that, by their nature, they are 
designed to make very small loans: somewhere between 50 USD and 100 USD. 
This is nowhere near what farmers perceive as their credit needs in Table 7, 
even if we discount their wishes by half. Credit unions may be an excellent 
solution for the development of small cottage industries or, indeed, for the 
support of subsistence farming. But they are too small for the purpose of moving 
from subsistence to commercialization.  
5.3  Extension and Education 
In the discussion of the profile of "commercial" farmers in Armenia (Table 2), 
we have noted that the farmer's formal education does not have a significant 
effect on the decision to sell. A similar result is observed in other countries 
(Moldova, Ukraine). This curious result is probably attributable to the generally 
low variability in the educational attainment of farmers who grew up during the 
Soviet period, with its universal and free access to schooling. Education and 
human capital in general are extremely important for the successful operation of 
a farm, especially when our thesis is that individual farms should be encouraged 
to grow in the interest of commercialization. After all, farms in market 
economies grow until the owner reaches the limit of his or her managerial 
capacity, which is clearly determined by a combination of personal intelligence, 
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Table 8:  Areas Where Small Farmers Need Technical Advice, in percent 
  Get Today  Want More 
Business Planning, Farm Management  48 31 
Agronomy and Livestock  49 62 
Processing Technologies  13 7 
Source: WORLD BANK SURVEY in Moldova, 2000 (LERMAN 2001). 
Farmers express a clear need for instruction and advice related to the preparation 
of business plans and farm management practices (Table 8). There is clearly 
nothing in their background that prepares them for these specific tasks that are 
essential in a market-oriented environment. Yet somewhat surprisingly, farmers 
also express a very strong need for technical extension services related to 
straightforward crop and livestock production. They seek advice concerning 
seed selection, fertilizer and pesticide application, crop rotation, and animal 
health. This clearly emerges from Table 8, which although based on a farm 
survey in Moldova is indicative of the needs of farmers in CIS and probably in 
other transition countries as well.  
In the past, household plots received all their technical advice and extension 
services from the large team of agro-specialists in the local farm enterprise. This 
mechanism does not function any more, and field visits in transition countries 
indicate that the delivery of extension to the farm level has indeed suffered 
considerably. Partial solutions include the establishment of private advisory 
services by former collective-farm specialists. A more comprehensive solution 
to instruction, technical advice, and extension services could be found in local 
cooperative frameworks. After all, member education is one of the traditional 
subsidiary tasks of farm cooperatives in all market economies. Yet we cannot 
ignore the fact that education and information are public goods, and 
governments certainly should play an active role in the rehabilitation and 
reanimation of the agricultural extension systems in transition countries. 
As with credit, however, the need for extension and education has to be put into 
proper perspective. Small farmers in transition countries are not illiterate 
peasants; they are educated people who spent all their lives working on large 
farms. Even if their formal job was a tractor driver or a milking-machine 
operator, they gained valuable multi-faceted experience from many years of 
work on the household plot. They essentially know how to farm even under the 
new conditions, without the strong traditional backing of the old farm enterprise. 
Extension can help to improve their performance and raise their profitability. In 
this way, extension should be conducive to greater commercialization. Yet small 
farmers in transition countries will continue to operate and develop even if 
extension systems are not fully in place for some time to come. Zvi Lerman  44 
6 CONCLUSION 
The concluding section prioritizes the various tasks that have been discussed in 
this paper. The absolute top priority is allowing farms to increase their size. 
Larger farms will produce more surplus, and this surplus will find its way to the 
markets. Farm enlargement requires an environment conducive to land markets 
and land transactions. This means the elimination of all restrictions on 
transferability of land, moral and legal support for contract enforcement, and 
finally land registration and titling systems.  
As a second priority, it is necessary to pay attention to the development of 
functioning market services, including input supply channels, product 
marketing, and processing. These tasks can be effectively handled through the 
establishment of service cooperatives until private entrepreneurs dare to step 
into the breach.  
As a third priority, we need to look at the question of farm finances in general, 
and rural credit in particular. Emphasis on profitability and savings provides a 
natural solution to financing the needs of small farms. Various interlinkage 
arrangements and contract production can provide an additional source of 
working capital for farms. The natural role of service cooperatives as 
interlinkage agents should not be forgotten. Programs for the full-scale 
revamping and development of functioning rural credit systems take a very long 
time and should be allowed to proceed in the background while other less 
comprehensive but more pragmatic solutions are being implemented. 
Finally, governments should start playing an active role in the provision of 
extension services. Cooperatives can provide a supportive shell for the delivery 
of these services with assistance and partial funding from the government. 
Modern agriculture cannot develop efficiently without science and research. 
Farmers cannot optimize their operations without information and professional 
education. Although less urgent than the other tasks enumerated above, 
extension and education are essential components for the future success of 
commercial agriculture in transition countries. 
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1 WHY POLICIES FOR THE SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE SECTOR? 
The transformation of the political and economic systems in Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) was driven by the desire to combine political 
freedom with improved living conditions. Market-oriented reform is the essence 
of transformation for the former socialist planned economies. However, 
considerable segments of Eastern European and the FSU economies are not 
moving swiftly toward market integration; instead, barter exchange, home 
production and subsistence continue to play important roles, especially in low 
income economies, a decade after the transition process began. This paper 
addresses the issue of subsistence agriculture, argues that it should be an area of 
policy attention and discusses policies that may be considered to increase 
efficiency in this smallest-scale agricultural sector.  
The sub-sector is marginal in terms of output and size per unit of holding and 
even total land allocation. In many Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC), however, it is very significant in terms of aggregate output and 
allocation of labor resources. Subsistence agriculture is a characteristic feature 
of developing, low income countries. Perhaps this is why it is surprising that it is 
a feature of the rural sector in almost every Central and Eastern European 
country, many of which are middle- rather than Low-income Developing 
Countries (LDC).  
When devising policy options it is tempting to simply replicate the same policy 
advice that is given to developing countries, but this would be too simplistic. 
Subsistence agriculture in CEEC differs from that of LDC, most importantly in 
the reasons for it. Moreover, even within the CEEC there are large differences in 
                                           
1  The authors would like to thank Sophia Davidova, Csaba Forgacs, Gertrud Schrieder and Ludwig Striewe for 
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the prevalence of subsistence agriculture, the factors promoting subsistence 
cultivation, and the constraints faced by those who wish to commercialize their 
production. 
In the early phase of economic transformation, market inefficiencies and market 
failures adversely affected food availability in many regions of the transforming 
economies, and even when they did not occur, populations perceived such food 
risks to exist. The scale of that production can be assumed to be driven by:  
•  the usual household demand determinants (income, prices),  
•  household resources (labor, access to land, and capital) and,  
•  the real or perceived risk of food insecurity households are facing.  
Estimating probabilities of scarcity has been difficult for households, owing to 
information deficiencies and a lack of experience with market systems. This 
may be one underlying cause of a significant part of the population continuing to 
produce some of their own food parallel to the market, which is not yet 
"trusted".  
In addition to the short term shock events resulting from price liberalization, 
parts of Eastern Europe and the FSU experienced the well-known long and 
drawn-out economic transformation process. Average real incomes declined for 
many, inequality rose and the employment situation worsened. The traditional 
social security system has malfunctioned due to budget constraints, and the poor 
are often not reached by the system due to ineffective targeting criteria. For a 
broad segment of the Eastern European and FSU population, insurance against 
risks has become more and more a matter of individual and family action. 
Diversification of income sources through multiple job holding and own food 
and agriculture production and marketing has risen in importance.  
However, home production should not be viewed just as a short-term transition 
phenomenon. It has a long tradition in parts of Eastern Europe and the FSU 
(TSCHAJANOV 1923), but in the past it had often been constrained for various 
ideological and strategic reasons. There is no reason to discuss subsistence 
agriculture from an ideological perspective today. It is an economic reality and a 
function of underlying economic conditions in markets and social systems. So 
why consider policies for overcoming subsistence agriculture? Because in 
comparison to a well-functioning market economy there is reason to suspect that 
subsistence production entails significant misallocations of resources, especially 
of human time. However, such a "well-functioning market economy" is not yet a 
reality in many parts of the food and agriculture sector. So, what strategies and 
policies should be followed under these circumstances? There are two 
alternatives: 
1. A Laissez-faire approach: leave subsistence agriculture alone, let the 
market and economic transformation process take care of inefficiency 
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2. An active engagement approach: take an active public policy position, 
addressing market failure problems and providing public goods that 
enhance efficiency. 
We will take the second position. However, in so doing, we shall argue that it is 
not "overcoming", but rather it is increasing efficiency in the subsistence sub-
sector which should be a policy goal. Increased efficiency may partly result in 
overcoming subsistence agriculture. Also, it will not and should not be 
understood to overcome small-scale agriculture. We will conclude that policies 
addressed to that sub-sector are needed, but larger economic policy issues 
beyond the sub-sector will have to be considered too, in order to broadly 
increase economic efficiency.  
There are some 41 million subsistence farms in the CEEC and New Independent 
States (NIS) according to our rough estimates
2. This sub-sector deserves policy 
attention, because it is important from an economy-wide perspective for general 
market efficiency, for agricultural growth and stabilization, for insurance and for 
employment and leisure. All these factors differ a great deal among the CEEC. 
In recognition of this diversity, this paper will begin with a brief overview of the 
extent and structure of subsistence agriculture before discussing the various 
policy options available to rationalize and increase efficiency in small-scale 
subsistence agriculture. 
2 LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES' EXPERIENCE 
It is interesting to note that the policy and academic debate about the 
commercialization of subsistence farming took a very different route in 
developing countries than it currently does in most transition economies. Some 
of the related research and debate is still relevant for transition economies.  
Today, about 440 million farmers in developing countries still practice 
subsistence production to a significant extent.
3 In a global sense, due to 
unrealized gains from trade and specialization, this is a large enduring 
misallocation of human and natural resources, and, due to population pressure 
and natural resource constraints, it is becoming less and less viable.  
The general reasoning is that subsistence production for home consumption is 
chosen by farmers because it is subjectively the best option, given all their 
constraints. For the low income countries it can be concluded that specialization 
and commercialization of farming households within a more diversified 
economy is part of the development process. But there are concerns that the 
process bypasses the poor.  
                                           
2  In this paper, the definition of a subsistence farm is a farm which has 1 ha or less of land. 
3  Estimation from J. VON  BRAUN, E. KENNEDY (eds.) (1994): Agricultural Commercialization, Economic 
Development and Nutrition, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, p. 3. This section is very much based on sections of 
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The debate in developing countries, especially in the 1980s, asked, as 
commercialization takes place how are higher average incomes distributed 
among various economic and social groups? And, does higher household 
income necessarily lead to improved consumption for all household members? It 
was argued in a large body of literature that the commercialization of agriculture 
has mainly negative effects on the welfare of the poor. Reviews of related 
research by VON BRAUN and KENNEDY (1994) found that many of the studies 
from which these generalizations were extrapolated were conceptually flawed. 
Furthermore, comparative studies often disregarded potentially confounding 
factors, and just compared nutrition with and without cash crops, or were based 
on very small potentially biased samples.
4 Despite these shortcomings, this 
literature had considerable impact on development strategy thought. 
Nevertheless, some important research and policy issues remain. While 
specialization and the development of markets and trade that characterize 
commercialization are fundamental to economic growth, concerns and 
suspicions about adverse effects on the poor from the commercialization of 
subsistence agriculture persist and indeed influence policy. The principle 
advantages of market-oriented policies and the powerful forces of trade for 
development are unquestionable. However, the risks of policy and market 
failures, and household-level complexities are real, too, and need to be 
recognized as potential determinants of inefficiencies and inequities.  
Even with well-functioning factor and product markets, it is easy to construct 
scenarios in which some poor producers in low income countries lose due to 
commercialization. Such scenarios include the "agricultural treadmill", late 
access to new commercialization and technical options, and a host of "bad 
policies". Increased market supply facing highly inelastic demand is one such 
scenario in which some producers lose. The resulting agricultural treadmill – 
increased supply leading to lower prices – is a reality with important regional 
and international dimensions. However, its potentially serious damage is often 
diluted by in-built compensating effects. In particular, the favorable effects for 
consumers – especially given that the majority of the poor are net purchasers of 
food – should be taken into account when weighing the disadvantages of the 
agricultural treadmill for small non-adopters. Assessing the effects of 
commercialization and technical change from the perspective of producers only 
is misleading. Once the consumption effects and other general equilibrium 
effects are included in the assessment, the treadmill effects are usually seen to be 
diffused  (BINSWANGER and VON  BRAUN
  1991).
  Commercialization and 
specialization are usually introduced for commodities whose demand is elastic, 
often as a means of bypassing the problem of inelastic demand faced by 
traditional commodities. It is, therefore, difficult to construct scenarios in which 
                                           
4  For example, LAPPÉ, F.M., COLLINS, J. (1977): Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity, Houghton Mifflin 
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commercialization by itself – unaided by failures of institutions, policies, or 
markets – has adverse consequences.  
General lessons for the study of subsistence farming can certainly be shared at a 
methodological level. Modeling the commodity side of the transition process 
from subsistence- to market-orientation requires: (1) introducing the distinction 
of subsistence and market production at the level of resource use, including 
labor, (2) specifying the underlying causal determinants, such as risk aversion, 
preferences for tasks, and habits that may motivate a household to maintain a 
certain degree of self-sufficiency even at the cost of market income foregone, 
and (3) to assign a common non-monetary utility index to non-marketable 
household goods and services as well as market goods.
  
As principle driving forces of commercialization, macro and trade policies, 
market reform, rural infrastructure improvement, and the development of a legal 
and contractual environment in which farmers and processors may operate were 
identified. Policies related to these driving forces will very much influence the 
nature and impact on the poor of the agricultural commercialization process. 
High risks of farm households in poverty and high transaction costs are the basic 
reason for the high prevalence of subsistence farming. A general conclusion is 
that when subsistence farming will be phased out in many low-income countries 
due to developmental progress in the "driving forces", policy must facilitate a 
transition which does not unduly replace (old) subsistence-related production 
risks with (new) market and policy failure risks, the profiles of which the poor 
may be much less able to estimate. Avoidance of trade shocks and concern for 
appropriate scheduling of input and output market reform are important 
considerations in this respect. 
In summary, the set of policy issues that has been found important in LDC for 
maximizing the potential benefits and minimizing risks from agricultural 
commercialization include the following:  
•  promotion of technological change in subsistence food crops along with 
commercial crop production for household food security in areas with risky 
food markets; 
•  improvement of market infrastructure for food, non-food goods and services, 
especially in remote areas where a change in production towards non-foods 
may lead to a net food import balance and thereby drastic price changes; 
•  effective integration of the smallest farm households into cooperative 
schemes for commercialization and technological change; 
•  attention to land tenure and resulting land allocation problems when net 
returns to land increase substantially; 
•  establishment of effective rural financial institutions to generate savings and 
make credit available not only to scheme participants but also to the 
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Some of these issues, especially the attention to market infrastructure, land 
tenure, and rural finance, are also highly relevant for transforming small-scale 
subsistence farming into viable economic units of part-time farming in 
transforming economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
3 SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE TODAY 
3.1 The  Big  Picture 
Sociologists often define subsistence as minimum for survival, given certain 
standards. Economists view subsistence as a relative concept, in which 
consumption is related to own production. The commercialization of subsistence 
agriculture can take many different forms. It can occur on the output side of 
production with increased marketed surplus, but it can also occur on the input 
side with increased use of purchased inputs. Commercialization is not restricted 
to just "cash crops": the traditional food crops are frequently marketed to a 
considerable extent, and the so-called cash crops are retained, to a substantial 
extent, on the farm for home consumption. Finally, the commercialization of 
agriculture is not identical with the commercialization of the rural economy. The 
deviation between these two processes becomes all the more obvious when off-
farm nonagricultural employment already exists to a large extent in a certain 
setting.  
Ideally, we would like to have information on the two types of subsistence ratios 
– i.e., from a consumption and an input perspective – based on household 
surveys. However, they exist only for a few specific settings for particular years 
and are thus not designed to permit comparative studies. Therefore, we use 
changes in the number and size of small-scale farms over time as a rough 
approximation of subsistence farming and its trends. We use these 
approximations due to a lack of better data. The statistical services in CEEC 
should certainly pay more attention to the size and productivity of this sub-
sector. 
Subsistence agriculture is not a new feature of CEEC. During the socialist 
period, households engaged in agriculture frequently had access to small 
subsidiary household plots, which they could cultivate to supplement their own 
diets and use for their leisure. It was widely expected that, with transition to a 
market economy, the need for such subsidiary plots of rural households, and 
garden plots of urban families would disappear, as would their use. Instead, in 
most countries the prevalence of subsistence agriculture has actually increased 
in comparison to 1990 (for details see Table A in the Appendix).  
•  Taking the amount of agricultural land devoted to subsistence agriculture as 
an indicator of prevalence, we find that subsistence production has increased 
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•  If the number of subsistence farms is taken as a measure of prevalence, 
however, a different picture emerges; subsistence agriculture has increased 
only in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, the Ukraine and Uzbekistan, while 
all other countries experienced a decline in the number of subsistence farms.  
The first trend may indicate some gradual intensification. The latter trend may 
signal a mixed pattern of continued use of home production as a household 
mechanism to cope with risks, but it may also just result from different land 
policies. From just these two measures we see that there are different trends with 
respect to the development of subsistence agriculture which must be considered 
in the formulation of policy options. Certainly, the prevalence of subsistence 
farming did not change fast in most CEEC. Apparently, the sub-sector is rather 
resilient to the dynamics of transition. 
3.2  Different Trends of Subsistence Agriculture in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
In order to establish a more concrete picture of the nature and driving forces of 
subsistence agriculture in the region as a whole and for specific countries, we 
seek to answer three questions: 
1. Is the prevalence of the subsistence sector strongly related to levels of 
national per capita income? 
2. Is the change in prevalence of subsistence agriculture affected by 
economic growth trends, i.e., will growth lead to quickly overcoming the 
sub-sector? 
3. Have trends in the prevalence of subsistence agriculture been driven by 
land reform? 
Tendencies illuminating these three questions are derived from Table A 
(Appendix). We thus compare the prevalence of subsistence farming among 
countries, taking note of a country's position and trajectory on the typically U-
shaped transition curve (state and change of the economy), as well as the period 
of time during which land reforms occurred.  
Question 1: Level of per capita Income and Prevalence of the Subsistence 
Sector 
As subsistence agriculture is a feature of the developing, rather than the 
developed world, it is not unreasonable to expect a correlation between Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita and the prevalence of subsistence agriculture. 
The greater GNP per capita is, the smaller we would expect the subsistence 
sector to be. In order to test this, two indicators of the prevalence of the 
subsistence sector were devised: 
1.  number of subsistence farms per 1,000 of the population, 
2.  amount of subsistence land per capita.  Policy Options to Overcome Subsistence Agriculture in the CEECs  53
At first glance there appears to be little relation between these two indicators. 
Countries with a high number of subsistence farms do not necessarily have a 
larger amount of subsistence land per capita than countries with relatively few 
subsistence farms. To some extent this 'contradiction' can be explained by 
differing population densities, and differing amounts of agricultural land 
resources. The contradiction between the two indicators is reflected in the 
differing scatter-graphs produced when plotted against GNP per capita. While 
the number of subsistence farms appears to be negatively related to GNP per 
capita (see Figure 1 and Table 1), no strong relationship between GNP per capita 
and the amount of subsistence land can be established for the range of income 
observed here. Taking an unweighted average of countries above GNP per 
capita of 2,500 USD gives 76 farms per 1,000 of the population, while it is about 
twice as much (149) for those below 2,500 USD.
5 This may indicate that in the 
long run at higher income levels, the sub-sector would shrink, but large variance 
exists across income levels today. Land per capita in these farms, however, does 
not differ by national income levels: it is 0.11 in the countries above 2,500 USD 
and 0.15 – in the poorer group of countries. 
Table 1:  Prevalence of Subsistence Agriculture and GNP per capita, 
1999 
Country  GNP per capita in 1999 
USD
1 
No. of Subsistence 
Farms per 1,000 People 
Subsistence Land per 
capita (in ha) 
Slovenia (1997)
2  9,890 0.2  - 
Hungary (1996)
3  4,650 97  0.02 
Poland (1997)
4  3,960 26  0.03 
Estonia (1997)
5  3,480 89  0.15 
Belarus
6  2,630 149  0.14 
Lithuania (1997)
7  2,620 93  0.2 
Latvia (1997)
8  2,470 70  0.35 
Russia
9  2,270 105.6  0.04 
Romania
10  1,520 187  0.4 
Bulgaria (1997)
11  1,380 187  0.05 
Kazakhstan
4  1,230 141  0.03 
Ukraine
12  750 230  0.12 
Uzbekistan
13  720 86  0.02 
Georgia
14  620 185  0.16 
Note:  Number of subsistence farms per 1,000 people and subsistence land per capita were calculated using 
the data sources listed below. Please also refer to Table A in the Appendix. 
Sources: 
1 WORLD BANK (2000); 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998h); 
3 HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE 
AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2000); 
4 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998f); 
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(1998b); 
6 OECD (1998); 
7 E UROPEAN C OMMISSION (1998e); 
8 E UROPEAN C OMMISSION (1998d); 
9 GOSKOMSTAT – various years; 
10 R OMANIAN M INISTRY  OF A GRICULTURE  AND F OOD (2000); 
11 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998a); 
12 UKRAINIAN STATE COMMITTEE OF STATISTICS – various years; 
13 KHUSANOV (2000); 
14 G EORGIAN S TATE D EPARTMENT  OF L AND M ANAGEMENT  AS  IN RESAL 
(1999).  
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Figure 1:  Number of Subsistence Farms per 1,000 of the Population 







0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000


























































Source:  Own calculations using data in Table 1, above. 
Question 2: Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Growth Trends 
The data on the whole does not point towards a distinctive relationship between 
a country's position on the transition curve in the late 1990s and trends in the 
subsistence sector. The strongest relationship evidenced is between economic 
growth and the number of subsistence plots (Table 2). Countries that were on a 
recovery path with respect to GDP indices in 1999 and exhibit stability in the 
number of subsistence farms include Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia and 
Bulgaria. Lithuania and Belarus experienced both economic growth and a 
decline in the number of subsistence plots, as would be expected. However, in 
the Ukraine, which was subject to economic decline in the late 1990s, the 
number of subsistence plots has not changed, while in Russia their number has 
actually declined.  
The relationship between the proportion of agricultural land devoted to 
subsistence and economic growth trends is more ambiguous. Only one country 
that experienced recent growth also had a decline in the proportion of 
agricultural land, Bulgaria. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan exhibit no 
change in the proportion of land used for subsistence, whilst Georgia actually 
experienced an increase. The situation is by no means clarified with reference to 
those countries experiencing economic decline: while in Romania the proportion 
of land increased, as expected, in the Ukraine and Russia the proportion of land 
remained unchanged.  
As the economic situation improves we might expect the size of subsistence 
farms to increase, but this occurred only in one of the countries reviewed, 
Kazakhstan. This is consistent with the earlier cross-sectional comparisons in 
Table 1. Bulgaria experienced a decline in the average size of subsistence farms, 
while there was no change in Belarus, Lithuania and Uzbekistan. Indeed, the 
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economic trends, with farm size in Romania, Russia and the Ukraine remaining 
stable in the latter half of the nineties. It appears, therefore, that economic 
growth exerts an influence on the absolute number of subsistence farms, but its 
influence on subsistence farm size and the proportion of land taken up by them 
is marginal at best.  
Table 2:  Trends in the Number of Subsistence Plots 
Economic Growth
1  Subsistence Plots
2 
Country 
1990-94 1995-99 1990-94  1995-99 
Belarus  - +  ↔  ↓ 
Bulgaria  - + ↓  ↔ 
Georgia  - + ↑  ↔ 
Lithuania  - + ↓  ↓ 
Kazakhstan  - + ↑  ↔ 
Russia  - -  ↔  ↓ 
Ukraine  - - ↑  ↔ 
Uzbekistan  - + ↑  ↔ 
Notes:  ↔ < +/- 2 %;    ↑ > + 2%;     ↓ > - 2% 
Source: 
1 EBRD, Transition Report 2000, p. 65;  
2 Own calculations based on various data, see Table A in Appendix for details.  
Table 3:  Trends in the Percentage of Agricultural Land Devoted to 
Subsistence Production. 
Economic Growth
1  % Agricultural Land
2 
Country 
1990-94 1995-99 1990-94  1995-99 
Belarus  - + ↑  ↔ 
Bulgaria  - +  ↔  ↓ 
Georgia  - + ↑  ↑ 
Kazakhstan  - + ↑  ↔ 
Romania  - - ↑  ↑ 
Russia  - - ↑  ↔ 
Ukraine  - - ↑  ↔ 
Uzbekistan  - + ↑  ↔ 
Notes:  ↔ < +/- 2 %;    ↑ > + 2%;     ↓ > - 2% 
Source: 
1 EBRD, Transition Report 2000, p. 65;  
2 Own calculations based on various data, see Table A in Appendix for details. 
Table 4:  Trends in the Mean Size of Subsistence Farms 
Economic Growth
1  Mean Size
2 
Country 
1990-94 1995-99 1990-94 1995-99 
Belarus  - + ↑  ↔ 
Bulgaria  - +  ↔  ↓ 
Lithuania  - + ↑  ↔ 
Kazakhstan  - +  ↔  ↑ 
Romania  - - ↑  ↔ 
Russia  - - ↑  ↔ 
Ukraine  - - ↑  ↔ 
Uzbekistan  - + ↑  ↔ 
Notes:   ↔ < +/- 2 %;    ↑ > + 2%;     ↓ > - 2% 
Source: 
1 EBRD, Transition Report 2000, p. 65; 
2 Own calculations based on various data, see Table A in Appendix for details. Joachim von Braun, Daniela Lohlein  56
Question 3: Land Reform and Trends in Subsistence Agriculture 
Land reform occurred in virtually every country of Central and Eastern Europe, 
even if it only involved the distribution of paper shares. The redistribution of 
land that took place in the CEEC can be expected to have had a profound effect 
on the subsistence sector, increasing the number of people with access to land 
and increasing peoples' land shares, thereby enabling them to leave the 
subsistence sector. Certainly, as the cut-off point for subsistence farming in our 
data set was 1 ha, even a small increase in farm size would lead to these farms 
being graduated from the subsistence sector defined in this way. Hence, a strong 
correlation between land reform and changes in the subsistence sector seems 
reasonable to expect.  
The comparison of trends in subsistence agriculture with the occurrence and 
implementation of land reform reveals correlations between the two. In the 
majority of countries, the prevalence of subsistence agriculture tended to 
increase, or decrease, during the same period that land reform occurred. 
Although, with respect to the proportion of agricultural land under subsistence 
cultivation, these changes often occurred with a time lag. Indeed, in Bulgaria 
only the number of subsistence farms changed in the same period that land 
reform occurred. The lag between land reform and changes in the extent of 
subsistence farming can be attributed to delays in the implementation of reform.  
Thus, although land reform clearly had a great influence on the direction of 
trends in the subsistence sector, which is reflected in the stability of the sector in 
the latter half of the nineties, it cannot tell the whole story. Clearly, other factors 
also play a role; a role that will become more important over time as the effects 
of land reform fade.  
Table 5:  Trends in the Number of Subsistence Plots and Land Reforms 
Land Reform  No. Subsistence Plots
1 
Country 
1990-94 1995-99 1990-94 1995-99 
Belarus
2  √   ↔  ↓ 
Bulgaria
3  √  ↓  ↔ 
Georgia
2  √  √  ↑  ↔ 
Kazakhstan
4  √  √  ↑  ↔ 
Lithuania
3  √  ↓  ↓ 
Russia
2  √   ↔  ↓ 
Ukraine
2  √  ↑  ↔ 
Uzbekistan
5  √  ↑  ↔ 
Note:  This refers only to land reforms which had an impact on the subsistence sector, i.e., the 1993 reform in 
Belarus which affected household plots is included, but land reform in Russia is excluded as this has 
had a minimal impact on the extent of subsistence agriculture.  
Sources: 
1 Based on various data, see Table A in Appendix for details. 
Land Reform: 
2 L ERMAN (1997); 
3 S WINNEN and MATHIJS (1997); 
4 G RAY (2000); 
5 K HUSANOV 
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3.3  Overcoming Subsistence Agriculture – A Stated Policy Goal? 
We argued at the outset that policy approaches toward the subsistence sector 
could be distinguished into a "Laissez-faire approach" and "Active engagement 
approache". Reality seems to suggest that the former dominates. In some 
countries the extent of subsistence agriculture is so small to be almost 
negligible, e.g., Slovenia. Thus, policies aimed at overcoming subsistence 
agriculture may be redundant. In other countries, for example Hungary, 
subsistence agriculture is seen to be declining, and TANIC (2000) argues that 
over time subsistence farming will disappear of its own accord. Whether or not 
to introduce policies aimed at overcoming subsistence agriculture may, 
therefore, be a matter of the significance of the sector, national preferences and 
priorities. In a third group of countries, the need to commercialize small-scale 
agriculture is much more evident. In both Georgia
6 and Romania, land reform 
resulted in an agricultural sector dominated by small-scale subsistence farms. If 
these countries want to improve the performance of their agricultural sectors in 
general, they will have to implement measures which will assist in the 
commercialization of these farms.  
Before we go on to consider the major constraints to increasing efficiency in 
subsistence agriculture and possible policy solutions, a further distinction must 
be introduced. Just as the extent of subsistence agriculture is not uniform across 
Central and Eastern Europe, the nature of subsistence agriculture too varies 
between and within countries. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, two 
distinct types of subsistence agriculture exist:  
•  the urban population which have recourse to dacha gardens, and  
•  rural people who utilize their subsidiary household plots.  
The latter tend to be much larger than dacha gardens (0.36 ha compared to 0.08 
ha, GOSKOMSTAT 1999) and accordingly play a much greater role in food 
production. While significant in terms of calorie production and time allocation 
(THO  SEETH 1998), the significance of dacha food production as a survival 
strategy has been questioned by CLARKE (1999). Using household data from 
three sources CLARKE et al. (1999) shows that dacha food production 
contributes only a small amount to overall household food resources, which is 
worth 8% of the total expenditure on food. Moreover, there was no evidence that 
households lacking access to dacha gardens spent either a larger proportion of 
income, or a greater amount of money, on food. Research conducted by THO 
SEETH (1998) shows that while gardening is significant for urban populations it 
is the middle class who gain the most from this, as the poor generally do not 
have access to garden plots and are thus poor in terms of subsistence agriculture, 
                                           
6  In Georgia the vast majority of large-scale agricultural enterprises have collapsed, thus individual farms 
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too. In consideration of this, in the discussion below we will focus on subsidiary 
household plots.  
4 POLICY OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING EFFICIENCY IN SUBSISTENCE 
AGRICULTURE 
4.1 Conceptual  Overview 
Subsistence agriculture is generally driven by three sets of forces: 
•  food demand (income, prices, and taste),  
•  labor opportunity costs,  
•  missing markets in insurance, asset market malfunctioning and banking risk.  
Food demand is not the main driving force in transition economies: Risk 
(perceptions) and a lack of insurance probably play greater roles. On the whole, 
however, interactions between the four components shape the development of 
subsistence agriculture (see Figure 2). Thus, any policy framework which seeks 
to enhance efficiency in subsistence agriculture must consider all four of these 
factors.  
Figure 2:  Conceptual Links Between Driving Forces and Policies 
Source:  Authors' own design.  
The question of whether or not subsistence agriculture should be overcome must 
be economically evaluated. Such an evaluation has to focus on efficiency, 
including scale economies. Going back to T. W. SCHULTZ (1964), we argue that 
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then it is indeed high time to overcome subsistence agriculture. The policy 
measures to be considered broadly include investment in technological change 
and market integration. They may be grouped into the following four policy 
areas: 
1. Policies that decrease risks of markets (especially for labor) and 
rationalizing taxation;  
2.  measures to facilitate scale economies, either through cooperation in input 
and output markets or rural finance;  
3. land market-related actions, including the facilitation of land purchases 
and leasing, through land ownership and land rental laws and financial 
market actions;  
4. technology and research-based support forms the fourth vital component 
of a policy framework seeking to address efficiency in subsistence 
agriculture.  
4.2  Decreasing the Risks of Markets and Rationalizing Taxation 
Much of the appropriate policy actions are outside actions directly aimed at the 
subsistence sector. These relate to measures to decrease the risk of the food, 
labor and insurance markets. They are particularly needed in the low income 
countries, including Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia. Here, 
liberalization policies significantly increased household exposure to risk, which 
in turn increased their dependence on subsistence plots. The resilience of 
subsistence agriculture in Europe can largely be attributed to the economic crisis 
that CEEC experienced at the beginning of the Transition. As industrial output 
declined, unemployment grew and the social security system failed, people had 
to develop their own survival strategies; thus, they resorted to subsistence 
agriculture.  
Governments should develop policies that create alternatives to subsistence as a 
coping strategy. Such alternatives include market-related institution building and 
information, and strengthening labor laws to overcome non-payment of wages. 
In addition, taxation policies should be reviewed to eliminate disincentives to 
turn to the market. A few examples may illuminate the related problems and 
policy deficiencies: 
In a 1998 Russian survey about perceived effectiveness of household coping 
mechanisms, 35% of households considered "growing more on the land plot" as 
a very helpful strategy and 60% as somewhat helpful, which ranked this among 
the top three out of 16 alternative strategies.
7  
According to KOSTOV (2001), subsistence agriculture in Bulgaria is the buffer 
that protects the population from the effects of economic collapse, as manifested 
                                           
7  RLMS survey, as reported by LOKSHIN and YEMTSOV (2001, p. 20). Joachim von Braun, Daniela Lohlein  60
in the collapse of industrial employment, low wages and limited job 
opportunities. Secondary agriculture is the most important survival strategy in 
Bulgaria, with 28% of non-agricultural workers being involved in it and home 
production accounting for 23% of income in 1996 (CLARKE 1997a).  
In Romania too, subsistence agriculture has become a substitute for the now 
non-existent social security net. The small plots of land owned by the majority 
of the Romanian population are currently their only means to secure housing and 
food needs, according to BREITSCHOPF (2001).  
This situation contrasts sharply with that of Poland. Here, both the extent of 
poverty and subsistence farming are much smaller, a fact that may be attributed 
partly to the continued functioning of the social security system. The value of 
pensions, for example, has been maintained (CLARKE 1997b), thus pensioners 
have no need to resort to subsistence agriculture in order to secure their 
livelihoods.  
In light of the above, economic development and institutional innovation has the 
potential to substantially reduce subsistence agriculture in some CEEC through 
the strengthening of the social security net. The creation of both industrial and 
rural non-agricultural employment opportunities could do much to reduce 
reliance on the subsistence sector. High unemployment has resulted in a labor 
shift from industry to agriculture in many transition economies. The creation of 
rural non-agricultural employment opportunities is needed to decrease 
dependence on small holdings and increase rural incomes, thereby allowing 
some people to move out of agriculture, and others to expand production.  
Rigidities in labor markets can contribute to the entrenchment of subsistence 
production by limiting access to alternative sources for subsistence and risk 
coping. A recent study by FRIEBEL and GURIEV (2000), found that the practice of 
payment-in-kind acts to reduce labor mobility in Russia, as it effectively limits 
workers' ability to save sufficient cash to migrate. This line of argument can 
easily be extended to wage delays, another practice that is widespread in Russia. 
However, these practices do not only act to bind workers more tightly to 
enterprises, but also encourage subsistence agriculture. Under conditions of 
wage arrears and in-kind payments, the reliance of workers on home production 
of food increases substantially, and this reliance in itself can reduce labor 
mobility. Even when workers have saved sufficient cash to finance a move, they 
may not do so, as moving would entail the loss of the subsistence plot and the 
related investments made in it. In a risky employment environment there are no 
guarantees that in the new place of employment wage arrears would not occur, 
and in such a situation the migrant would be worse off than before as he/she has 
no opportunity to revert to subsistence agriculture.  
Tax incentives can have a substantial effect on the productivity and 
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tax revenues may increase. This can be illustrated by the case of Georgia, where 
a tax system that effectively reduces farmers' incentives to expand production 
has been in operation since January 1999. Farmers are liable to a range of taxes 
consisting of Value Added Taxes (VAT), income tax, property tax, a traffic fund 
fee and a land ownership fee. These taxes amount to 56% income for a typical 1 
ha farm, according to calculations made by the Fund for Georgian Private 
Farmers Assistance (KIRVALIDZE 1998). The tax burden is even larger for farms 
of 2 ha or more. These farms may need to hire labor, in which case they are 
liable to additional tax payments in the form of social insurance, medical 
insurance and an unemployment fund fee. Owing to the high total taxation 
burden, small farmers have little incentive to increase farm size, as a large 
proportion of the additional income earned will accrue to the government rather 
than themselves. Farmers' response to such heavy taxation has been bribery of 
tax officials to avoid paying the full complement of taxes. Alternative tax 
systems have been proposed which would reduce the overall level of taxation of 
small-scale agriculture. The Fund for Georgian Private Farmers Assistance 
proposed that small-scale agriculture should be exempt from all taxes except a 
land tax, which should be calculated according to the quality of land and its 
location (KIRVALIDZE 1998).  
In both Russia and the Ukraine the tax system is different, but once again it 
reduces farmers' incentives to move into the 'formal' agricultural sector i.e., 
transform their household plots into market-oriented farms. In the Ukraine, 
household plots operate under privileged tax conditions compared to the rest of 
the agricultural sector: VAT is not paid on produce sold, nor are deductions 
made to cover social security; however, private farms are liable to both 
(PUHACHOV 1999). Thus, expanding a household plot into a private farm 
involves considerable costs, and reducing these costs would presumably 
encourage more people to leave the subsistence sector. How to achieve this is 
not as clear cut; PUHACHOV  (1999) argues that removing taxes from private 
farms is not the answer, but it is doubtful whether making household plots liable 
to tax is. In Russia, the problem is similar to that in the Ukraine, but complicated 
by the fact that household plots can be expanded to a maximum of 6-12 ha by 
using one's land share to expand the household plot (OECD 1998). In Russia, 
household plots are practically exempt from income tax, and only have a small 
land tax levied on them, whereas independent farms are liable to a range of 
taxes, with the overall level of taxation being high (KALUGINA 2000). A shift of 
household farms from the informal to the formal sector would thus result in 
heavy tax liabilities. This, in conjunction with the cessation of aid from 
collective enterprises, significantly increases a farm's exposure to risk. As it is 
possible to cultivate up to 12 ha of land in the informal sector, there are no 
incentives to move production from the formal to the informal sector. Reforming 
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into the market has the potential to transform those household farms producing 
not only for subsistence.  
The broad-based policies to increase efficiency in subsistence farming should be 
embedded in comprehensive rural development strategies that give due attention 
to rural education, infrastructure and other public goods. 
4.3  Measures to Facilitate Scale Economies Through Cooperation and 
Rural Finance  
In addition to the highly relevant indirect policy measures to increase efficiency 
of subsistence farming discussed above, direct measures are also called for.  
Lack of access to input and output markets is a problem faced by smallholders in 
all CEEC, but one that is particularly pronounced in low income countries with a 
relatively large subsistence sector, e.g., Georgia and Romania. This somewhat 
paradoxical situation arises from the fact that both in Russia and the Ukraine 
many household plots still receive inputs from the agricultural enterprise they 
were formerly attached to. On the basis of a recent survey AMELINA (2000), 
examines the benefits that Russian peasants receive from associations with 
collective farm enterprises. She finds that from the point of view of the 
household, the benefits derived from association with a less-restructured 
enterprise are no less than the value of cash payments received by employees in 
a more restructured enterprise. The benefits of in-kind payments are primarily 
derived from the price-differential between the internal prices of in-kind 
compensations and their market price. Employees maximize their profits by 
using these in-kind transfers for private agricultural production. However, the 
situation with respect to output markets is slightly different. In Russia and the 
Ukraine, as well as Georgia and Romania, access to output markets is, for 
various reasons, low. In Russia marketing costs are high and inhibit market 
performance and domestic trade (KUHN 2001).  
Cooperative systems, which in principle could go a long way in addressing scale 
economy problems, are largely neglected in the smallest scale farming sector. 
This is particularly so in the countries of the FSU, and thus seems to be more a 
product of privatization strategies and the Soviet legacy than income levels and 
the prevalence of subsistence agriculture. In Russia and the Ukraine, agricultural 
privatization involved the distribution of paper shares rather than physical plots 
of land. As a consequence, the agricultural sector has not been subjected to deep 
reform and most agriculture effectively remains collectivized. In the Ukraine 
these collectives are largely managed by traditional centralized means, and little 
has changed for the members themselves (LERMAN and CSAKI 1998). In these 
two countries the majority of rural subsistence plots are still tied, in some way or 
another, to a particular collective enterprise. To withdraw land from the 
collective in order to join a cooperative does not seem sensible in such a 
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In Georgia the situation is very different. Here, physical plots of land were 
distributed and the former collective enterprises collapsed. The farms created by 
the reform are extremely small, on average 0.8 ha, but despite the obvious 
advantages, which could be achieved by forming cooperatives, there appears to 
be little inclination to do so. This is largely due to the negative experiences 
gained from Soviet collectives. In other countries which have experienced a 
growth in small-scale agriculture, the creation of cooperatives has occurred. For 
example, in Romania private households are pooling their resources by forming 
farm associations without legal title – note that the number of these farms has 
declined considerably in the last 4 years from 15,000 to 6,000 today (SCHRIEDER 
et al. 2000). For many of these diverse circumstances, however, a fresh approach 
toward building truly independent cooperative systems bottom up should be 
considered in order to capture economies of scale in the subsistence sector, at 
least on the input market side. The need for cooperation also relates to financial 
systems for the small holders. 
The lack of access to credit through inadequate financial markets constrains 
increased production as farmers lack the capital to invest in new technologies 
and improved seeds. In Romania, most small rural enterprises, both agricultural 
and non-agricultural, lack access to credit due to high collateral requirements. 
Collateral requirements reflect the high transaction and risk costs incurred by 
financial intermediaries operating in rural areas; in Romania they are currently 
as high as 160% of the value of the loan (BREITSCHOPF 2001). In practice, this 
means that a loan contract requires almost all farm assets as security. As the vast 
majority of Romanian smallholders are subsistence farmers, dependent on their 
farms for their livelihoods, even a very small probability of failure leads to a 
refusal of a loan contract by the farmer (BREITSCHOPF 2001).  
In some transition economies, state credits funds still form the major source of 
agricultural credit. However, this does not tend to increase smallholders' access 
to credit. In Russia, for example, the rural state credit system serves only large-
scale agricultural enterprises (YANBYKH 2000). Only a very small number of 
private farms receive subsidized loans from the Special Credit Fund, largely 
because the banks chosen for disbursing the funds have little experience in 
providing credit to small farms. As in Romania, collateral requirements are a big 
problem, between 120 and 150% of the value of the loan (YANBYKH 2000). 
Such requirements are too high for the majority of small farmers, let alone for 
those engaged in subsistence production.  
A possible solution to the rural credit problem could be rural credit cooperatives. 
The absence of a legal base for their development is, however, an effective 
constraint on their proliferation in some countries, e.g., Russia; for the 
undeveloped nature of rural credit cooperatives' legal base denies them access to 
central bank credits, contributing to their under-capitalization and inhibiting 
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4.4  Land Market Related Actions  
Lack of access to land is one of the classical constraints to the 
commercialization of subsistence agriculture. It can arise through a physical lack 
of land (due to population pressure), the concentration of land in the hands of a 
few, and non-functioning land and lease markets. In the CEEC and NIS, lack of 
access to land tends to be the result of inadequate land and lease markets. Lack 
of access to land seems to characterize all of the lower income economies 
regardless of the size of the subsistence sector. For example, in the Ukraine 
recent surveys indicate that some 5-8% of the rural population wish to take up 
private farming, i.e., potentially 150,000 additional private farms could be 
created (PUHACHOV 1999). This is a substantial number considering the small 
number of private farms currently operating in the Ukraine, 35,500. However, 
the lack of access to land inhibits the creation of private farms, and the 
expansion of already existing private farms (half of these are under 10 ha). 
Lease markets in particular are under-developed mainly due to the low 
profitability of leasing. The July 1992 Law on Payment for Land states that lease 
payments are not allowed to exceed the amount of tax on the corresponding plot 
of land (LERMAN  and CSAKI 1998). This is a major disincentive for private 
owners to lease land as they will collect only just enough to cover their tax 
obligation. Removing this constraint would enable farms to achieve scale 
economies by increasing in size. 
Small-holder agriculture in Georgia provides a good illustration how a lack of 
access to land can have negative consequences for the entire agricultural sector. 
Land reform in Georgia resulted in the distribution of physical plots of land to 1 
million families, or 73% of the population (DIDEBULIDZE 1997). However, the 
newly created farms are too small for commercial production with an average 
size of just 0.84 ha. This is partly due to the substantial size of the non-reformed 
sector, 40% of which intensively uses agricultural land, and partly a result of the 
large number of reform beneficiaries. In order to produce crops for the market 
these small farms need access to additional land, but such access is currently 
constrained by the absence of a land market and the non-transparency of the 
lease market. Land markets currently do not function in Georgia, as sale 
requirements include possession of a land title. But distribution of these titles is 
still incomplete, having only begun in mid-1999. Therefore, in the short to 
medium term, farmers must turn to lease markets in order to obtain additional 
land for cultivation. Lease markets are primarily concerned with state land, i.e., 
land not distributed in the land reform, and the amount paid for leasehold is low, 
consisting, in general, of the land tax levied on the leased plot. So why do the 
majority of smallholders complain of a lack of access to land? This is at least 
partly the consequence of the non-transparent nature of the lease process. In 
order to lease land farmers must make an application to the village council. If 
the proposal is approved, it is submitted to the District Administration for final Policy Options to Overcome Subsistence Agriculture in the CEECs  65
approval. The exact procedure followed varies between regions, with some 
requiring a business plan and others relying on the applicant's reputation. 
However, in all regions applications are vetted by the village council, a 
procedure which is currently non-transparent (RESAL 1999).  
Issues of land leasing and idle land are growing in importance in the region. In 
principle, no specific land policy for the smallest farm sub-sector should be 
considered; instead the issue should be addressed by general ownership and 
property rights policies. Furthermore, clearly defined land market policies are 
needed to integrate this sector into the market economy, and security of land 
tenure is fundamental for efficiency in this sub-sector. Otherwise, long-term 
investment and attention to production will not be so forthcoming. 
4.5  Technology and Research Based Support 
While almost all low income countries of the world benefit from a substantial 
set of organizations that assist with public goods provisioning for the small 
holder sector, this is largely absent in CEEC. The subsistence farm sector 
remains the most under-researched sub-sector in CEEC. This applies especially 
to technology research that might benefit the sector. Public research that, for 
example, helps to identify crop varieties, plant protection, backyard livestock 
production, input use, market services, and information systems is virtually 
absent. The traditional national and sub-regional agricultural research systems 
continue to focus on the large scale sector and are in disarray in many CEEC.  
One of the few lessons that may be drawn from the experiences of subsistence 
farming in developing countries is that public research, and the institutional and 
technological innovation created by it, can facilitate growth in this sector. A 
fundamental re-direction of public agricultural research and extension systems 
in CEEC is called for. Such research should quickly develop a capacity for 
intelligent borrowing from experiences with small holder productivity 
enhancement elsewhere in the world. A productive and vibrant part-time farm 
sector that plays a key role parallel to the large-scale sector could be the long-
run policy objective for many CEECs.  
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Home production of food, being a highly relevant mechanism through which 
many Eastern European and FSU rural and urban households attempt to cope 
with transformation risks, has largely been bypassed by public services and 
agricultural policy. Market integration will only slowly facilitate increased 
efficiency in the current subsistence sector in CEEC.  
A laissez-faire approach that would leave subsistence agriculture alone, and 
expects the market and economic transformation processes to take care of in-
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problem preventing small holders from investing at optimal levels in efficiency 
can be addressed in part by increasing public goods, such as applied research, 
technology, market information and rural institutions. However, these will not 
be forthcoming without policy actions.  
Therefore, an active engagement approach is advocated, one which takes an 
active public policy position, addressing market failure problems, and providing 
public goods that enhance efficiency. While taking this position, we must 
recognize that overcoming inefficiency in the subsistence sector will largely be a 
matter of economy-wide policies and comprehensive rural development actions.  
Still, the sector itself also can and must be addressed with direct policy actions. 
Otherwise, the misallocation of land and labor resources will prevail. The idea 
that this sub-sector of the rural and urban economy would vanish quickly in the 
context of a possibly re-invigorated economic growth process in Eastern Europe 
and the FSU seems misleading. Given the current conditions prevailing in 
Eastern Europe and the FSU, and the related economic risks for households, an 
increase in opportunity costs (wages) would reduce time allocation to 
subsistence farming only by a small portion, at least in the low income regions 
of CEEC. Household plot-based agriculture will remain a long-term reality in 
many parts of CEEC, and not only where per capita income is low. Part-time 
small-scale farming is a stable factor in agriculture all over the world. The 
CEEC will be no exception. Measures for productivity growth in that sector 
should be considered in the areas of  
•  rural institution building;  
•  policies that decrease risks of markets (especially for labor);  
•  policies that rationalize taxation;  
•  measures to facilitate scale economies through cooperation in input and 
output markets and rural finance;  
•  land market related policies, including the facilitation of land purchases and 
leasing through land ownership and land rental laws, must give attention to 
this sector; and  
•  technology and research-based support provided by re-directed agricultural 
research systems, that give due attention to this sub-sector. 
  
APPENDIX  
Table A:  Trends in the Development of Subsistence Agriculture in Some Central and Eastern European Countries 
 1989/1990 1994/1995 1999/2000 
Country  % Ag. land  Number  Av. size  % Ag. land  Number  Av. Size  % Ag. land  Number  Av. size 
Belarus
1  6.4  1 549 900 0.41 ha 15.3 1 532 000 0.94 ha 15.6 1 506 300 0.97 ha 
Bulgaria
2  10  1 783 800 0.4 ha 10.5 1 555 000 0.42 ha 6.2 *1 535 200 0.25 ha 
Estonia
3  n n n n n n **18 130  000 1.7  ha 
Georgia
4  7  729 000 0.29 ha 25 ~1 000 000 n **30 1 019 800 0.84 ha 
Hungary
5  6  1 400 000 0.25 ha 16.8 978 101 0.2 ha n n n 
Kazakhstan
1  0.11  2 093 400 0.1 ha 0.17 2 232 821 0.1 ha **0.16 2 149 501 0.2 ha 
Latvia
6  2.5  250 172 0.4 ha N n n **37 173 280 4.9 ha 
Lithuania
7  8.8  413 138 0.55 ha 23.4 378 412 2.2 ha **n 342 700 2.2 ha 
Poland
8  3.6  n n N n n *6.5 1 019 000 1.3 ha 
Romania
9  12  n 0.5 ha 56.4 *3 625 758 2.3 ha 67 4 221 015 2.35 ha 
Russia
10  1.5  16 300 000 0.2 ha 2.9 16 581 721 0.37 ha 3.0 15 500 000 0.4 ha 
Slovenia
11  n n n N n n 1.2 8448 <  1ha 
Ukraine
12  6.5  9 206 000 0.29 ha 13 11 057 000 0.48 ha 15 11 700 000 0.5 ha 
Uzbekistan
13  0.6  1 500 000 0.18 ha 1.6 2 080 000 0.25 ha 1.6 2 080 000 0.25 ha 
Notes:  * Data from 1996, ** Data from 1997. 
Sources: 
1 OECD (1998) CEECs/NIS Agricultural Indicators Database;  
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998a);  
3 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998b); 
4 State Department of Land Management as in RESAL (1999); 
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998c); HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2000), Table 6; 
 
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998d);
 
7 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998e);
 
8 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998f);
 
9 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998g); ROMANIAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD (2000);
 
10 GOSKOMSTAT, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF RUSSIA – various years;
 
11 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1998h);
 
12 UKRAINIAN STATE COMMITTEE FOR STATISTICS – various years;
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Bulgaria began the transformation of its agricultural sector early in the reform 
process. The chosen path of land reform was radical and aimed at restoring the 
status quo enjoyed half a century ago. The outcome of this slow and complicated 
process was a very fragmented structure of land ownership and farming 
structure dominated by a large number of small private family farms.  
Reforming land ownership rights to the status of fifty years ago created a 
dualistic farming structure of individual and commercial farms. Within the 
category of individual farms, there are a large number of small subsistence 
farms, most of which belong to elderly people. At the beginning of reform, they 
were considered as concomitant structures, stemming from pre-reform 
household plots with limited influence on the formation of the sector. However, 
with the prolonged land reform, missing land markets and difficult processes of 
creating the infrastructure of a market economy, it was realised that subsistence 
farming in Bulgaria was not a temporary phenomenon. 
Until recently, the considerable importance of the subsistence sector, not only in 
Bulgaria, but also in Central and Eastern Europe in general, was neglected. This, 
together with the prevailing market-theory biased rhetoric of the policy makers, 
ensured that applied agricultural policy remained focused on the commercial 
agricultural sector. 
However, the results of these policies over the transition period have been rather 
disappointing. This should indicate that the considerable relative size of 
subsistence agriculture exerts significant effects on agriculture overall, and can 
modify the impact of agricultural policy measures. Indeed, such is the 
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conclusion of a number of quantitative simulation studies, which explicitly 
model the subsistence sector, collected in MERGOS (2002). The current dualistic 
farm structure with a few large commercial producers on the one hand and a 
very large number of small-scale farmers on the other hand, is generally 
perceived as inefficient and non-viable for a medium-term solution or even on 
the long run (SARRIS et al. 1999). Another important and explicitly stated aim is 
the claim that the major emphasis in agricultural policy during a pre-accession 
period should be to support the emergence of medium scale, commercially-
oriented private farmers (OECD 1999). 
The situation is therefore somewhat of a paradox. Subsistence farmers are 
unwanted guests in the agricultural policy framework in Bulgaria, as well as in 
other CEECs. They are nevertheless an important constraint and underlying 
factor in the process of agricultural development.
2 To put it simply, in spite of all 
the market economy rhetoric and the all-but-obvious reluctance to consider the 
problems posed by existing subsistence agriculture, it still re-emerges in the 
domain of agricultural policy as something to reckon with. 
Research into this area has been far from satisfactory. Alongside recognition of 
the existing problem (SARRIS et al. 1999; KWASNIEWSKI 1999; OECD 1999), 
quantitative studies which model the sector are based on very different 
behavioural assumptions (BECKMANN and PAVEL 2000; MISHEV et al. 2002; 
WERHEIM and WOBST 2001) and therefore their results can be directly traced to 
the assumptions made. This illustrates just how little we knowabout the 
subsistence sector. Directly extrapolating results and conclusions from studies of 
the same phenomena in the LDCs seems rather dubious as well. In spite of their 
similarities, subsistence in transition countries and the same phenomenon in 
developing countries are dissimilar (O'BRIEN et al. 2000) and may even be 
driven by very different motivations (KOSTOV and LINGARD 2002). 
If we want to learn something about the likely behaviour of subsistence farmers, 
we need to find out what their motivation consists of, how they see their 
situation and what alternative ways of behaviour they envisage. It is therefore 
necessary to step up research on the motivation of subsistence farmers and to 
investigate the constraints they face in order to initiate and speed up the 
development process. In this way, we leave the area of normative theory 
prescriptions, which postulate how people should behave and define them as 
irrational if they do not behave in the prescribed way. One of the reasons for the 
inconsistent results of applied agricultural policies in Bulgaria in recent years is 
this unfilled gap in understanding the behavioural patterns of subsistence 
farmers.  
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2 METHODOLOGY 
Since our aim is to study the behaviour of Bulgarian subsistence farmers, we 
ought to find out how they perceive the economic realities, i.e., how they 'see' 
the world around them. This is the main determinant for future actions. While 
the most widespread concept of economic rationality – the substantive one – 
refers to the outcome of economic action, the motivation and the feasibility of 
economic choices in general can only be studied using the procedural form of 
rationality, which refers to the 'nuts and bolts' of decision making. In studying 
the mechanisms of subsistence farmers' decision making processes, we need 
therefore to somehow describe and assess the way they perceive economic 
realities. The tool we employed to investigate the limits and characteristics of 
the subsistence type of economic behaviour in Bulgarian agriculture is the 
concept of mental accounting. Mental accounts were first introduced by THALER 
(1980, 1985), with reference to the general concept of integration. This concept 
refers to the influence of some outcomes on the evaluation of present decisions. 
The essence of mental accounts is that they are used to record gains and losses, 
and if information of two events is recorded in one mental account, it will be 
integrated in the process of decision making. This integration can be temporal 
and spatial. Temporal in this case means that temporally different results will be 
taken into consideration; spatial means the case in which different aspects of a 
problem are considered at the same time, or one at a time. Mental accounting is 
governed by the principles of categorisation (HENDERSON and PETERSON 1992). 
The principles of mental accounting were incorporated at a very general level in 
the Behavioural Life-Cycle Theory (SHEFRIN and THALER 1988, 1992). They 
define three main types of mental accounts to categorise monetary assets: 
current income, current assets and future income. These facts are assumed to 
have a decreasing propensity to consume in the above-mentioned order. These 
three main types are in fact real accounts. However, they are mentally labelled 
in order to demonstrate the psychological constraints that they impose on 
consumption. Their use can be seen as a general strategy for resolving the 
inconsistency between short and long-term preferences or, as it is more popular, 
for self-control. The latter inconsistency is a well known problem in economics. 
STROTZ (1956) demonstrated this problem in a dynamic context: the continuance 
of consumption, which is necessary for the consistency of preferences, is often 
violated. THALER (1981) presents further empirical evidence on this topic. Self-
control strategies to solve this problem have been introduced and analysed by 
HOCH and LOEWENSTEIN (1991).  
It is important to note  that in contrast to TVERSKY and KAHNEMAN (1981), 
where mental accounts depend on a special case and have a specific use, the 
consumption of life-cycle theory done by SEFRIN and THALER (1988, 1992) are 
seen as more stable cognitive structures. Although not exhaustive, the above 
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accounts. The self-restraining effect of the use of mental accounts is a logical 
expression of the development of calculation agencies. The latter point is 
confirmed by the stimulating analysis of ZELIZER (1998) on the evolution of 
money "earmarking". 
3 GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF MENTAL ACCOUNTING MODELS FOR AN 
AGRICULTURE IN TRANSITION 
Economic transition represents a major alteration of an economic environment. 
It increases instability and provides for a difficult future. Considering the current 
income, which is the monetary element with the highest propensity to consume, 
the general fall in incomes under transition leads to decreasing consumption 
compared to the previous period. Due to egalitarian income policies in the pre-
transition period and high inflation at the early stages of transition, the 
importance of current assets as a source of consumption declines. The future 
income prospects are difficult to grasp from an individual point of view in 
conditions of high uncertainty. In general, transition leads to decreased 
consumption. KOSTOV (2002) argues that the effects of high uncertainty and 
institutional instability accompanying transition are expressed in disintegrated 
social structures, including markets for agricultural products. Following the 
same line of argument, one could assert that since mental accounts are socially 
established constructs, the effects of transition processes on them will be similar. 
In other words, transition necessarily results in the increased segregation of 
categories classified in different mental accounts. With regard to consumption, 
the facts mentioned above cause current income, current assets and future 
income to become segregated. Therefore, consumption is confined mainly to 
current income. SELLART et al. (1997) suggested after extensive experimentation 
that the influence of mental accounts is directed toward buying decisions, 
whereas their effect on general consumption is indirect. Therefore, the 
mentioned study by ZELIZER (1998) provides indirect empirical support. The 
lower monetary propensity to consume makes small-scale farmers more 
orientated to self-sufficiency and dependent on household production.  
The influence of uncertainty on consumption and buying decisions is twofold. 
First, it influences the propensity to consume. Higher uncertainty implies an 
urge to consume by increasing the importance of current income and belittling 
future income. Current assets are seen as a buffer for contingency situations and 
thus consumption is anchored to current income. Moreover, there are numerous 
institutional constraints on the use of current assets (KOSTOV 2002). Secondly, 
uncertainty makes it impossible for people to clarify the future, which leads to a 
smaller importance of future income. In other words, great uncertainty 
obliterates the differences between market and self-sufficiency-oriented farmers, 
thus acting as a driving force for agricultural de-commercialisation. Another 
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pressure on decision makers. KAPLAN et al. (1993) argues that time pressure 
induces a shift in focusing the information processing from external to internal 
sources, such as stereotypes and institutions. The economic hardship of 
transition has led to transforming agriculture into a social buffer, which is a 
sector that provides some, although insufficient, income and employment. 
Consequently, agriculture became dominated by aged persons who are less 
motivated to find alternative sources of livelihood. Aged persons have stronger 
links to the institutions of the former planned economy and refuse to "unlearn" 
these stereotypes. PEJOVICH (1996) suggests that aged persons in general feel 
threatened by the ongoing economic changes because of the responsibility for 
their families which was institutionalised in Eastern European "shortage" 
economies. The greater conservatism of aged persons leads to increased status-
quo effects (SAMUELSON and LECKHAUSEN 1988), while responsibility drives 
them towards escalation of their commitment to outdated stereotypes and 
courses of action (BROCKNER 1992). Overall, aged people are less likely to adapt 
to the changing environment and thus prefer to reduce their risk exposure by 
insulating themselves from the markets, which are more subsistence-oriented. 
The standard economic interpretation of the latter is the tendency of higher 
uncertainty to increase risk aversion. It is important to note that this conclusion 
about the greater subsistence orientation of aged persons is a result from the 
analysis of transition economies, which defines which stereotypes are activated 
and thus does not necessarily apply to aged persons in general. 
The above discussion can lead us to formulating certain hypotheses about the 
behavioural characteristics of subsistence farmers. First, the degree of perceived 
uncertainty has an impact on the degree of commercialisation of agricultural 
activities. Suitable measures of perceived uncertainty could be (the instability 
of) agricultural prices, unclear property rights and problems in market access. 
The age structure of subsistence farmers could also define their choices. The 
latter can be investigated by 'mapping' the perceived problems and relating them 
to age characteristics. 
4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data were collected in the framework of the Study of Urban and Peri-Urban 
Agriculture (SUAPUA) Copernicus project, executed in 2000-2001. The study 
was done in two regions – around Sofia and Troyan. Sofia is the capital and 
biggest city of Bulgaria, with a population of over 1 million. It is also the major 
market for agricultural food products. Troyan is a small town (population 
25,260) in the Northwest of the country. It was selected as a representative and 
typical town for Bulgarian conditions due its geographic location, size, 
traditional activities and scale of agricultural production. The unemployment 
rate in Trojan is 11.6% and more than 14% of the population is over 60 years of Plamen Mishev, Philip Kostov  76
age. About 80% of the houses have their own yards
3, which are intensively used 
for agricultural production for family needs. Farming activities are not the basic 
occupation of the inhabitants; usually they have another job and can only add to 
their income with the production from the yards. 
In the Sofia region 80 farmers were interviewed in the recreation zones around 
the city and in all nearby villages. In Troyan, 68 interviews were carried out in 
the town and all surrounding villages. The interviews were conducted 
systematically. In each village the interviewees were chosen in the following 
way: from households located on the left- hand side, on first and/or second 
cross-roads, when looking to the South of the center on the main street of the 
settlement. Interviews were done with non-farmers, farmers representing 
successful and unsuccessful examples of economic development and also 
different types of farming. Semi-structured interviews were carried out, with a 
formal questionnaire followed by an informal discussion on the issues of 
agricultural production. Those interviewed were allowed to choose one of the 
available options in the questionnaire as a first choice and another as a second 
choice, according to their opinion on the prominence of these. A pilot survey, 
consisting of only a questionnaire, was used for formulating an appropriate 
hypothesis about the structure of mental accounts of the interviewed farmers. 
The latter has been investigated using informal interviews carried out during the 
main study.  
The questionnaires consisted of a socio-demographic part which included 
questions about the type of household, education, length of residence in the area, 
main occupation, age, etc., and a part concerned with agricultural production 
issues. The socio-demographic information was used as an additional check for 
representativeness of the sample when compared to the characteristics of the 
region. It was also used in preparing for the informal interviews; potential points 
of contention with regard to the preliminary hypotheses about the mental 
accounts structure of the respondents were identified. The part concerned with 
agricultural production contained questions about the aims of agricultural 
production, marketing channels, future production plans, intentions regarding 
financial loans and likely use of the latter, as well as perceived problems related 
to agricultural production which are discussed below. Other questions that were 
not explicitly included in the discussion collected data about the type of 
products, size of the plots, intensity of use of production factors (labour, 
fertilizers, machinery), use of land quality maintenance practices, water 
conservation measures and other production characteristics.  
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5 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The questions about the primary aim of household production formally included 
the provision of food for own consumption and its role as a source of income 
and employment. These two survey elements are clearly related. They were 
stated by most of the respondents and were chosen by 62% and 21%, 
respectively, of those interviewed in the Sofia region and 80% and 15% in the 
region of Troyan. Additionally, they were selected by a further 22% and 26% in 
the Sofia region and by 10% in both groups in the Troyan region as a second 
reason for practicing agricultural activities. The latter shows that most 
subsistence farmers are driven by one of these two motives. However, both can 
be expressed in terms of income. Employment is a source of income, because 
producing own food saves income that can be spent on additional needs. 
However, one could assume that the distinguishing mark between these two 
options shows the mental constructs employed by the interviewed subsistence 
farmers.  
Emphasising the food aspect, results reveal a mainly subsistence orientation (the 
need to feed one's self), whereas focusing on income, a market orientation is 
demonstrated (money will be obtained by this). Moreover, detailed discussion 
with some of those interviewed revealed that they do not perceive the 
consumption of own production as an income. The latter refers to the elicitation 
of stereotypes. Their typical answer to the conventional opportunity costs 
argument was to state that this is their reference situation. To put it simply, they 
regard producing as the benchmark situation with which the other alternatives 
have to be compared. Owing to this, they do not perceive consumption of own 
production as an income element and consequently segregate it from the income 
elements of their mental accounts. Only monetary income, that is, the return 
from sold agricultural produce, is viewed as income from their point of view. 
When challenged with the example that if they were not producing they would 
require the monetary means to purchase these products, they either explicitly 
stated "What else can we do?" or declared that if they were not producing it, 
they would not consume it at all, thus demonstrating once again the mentioned 
segregation.  
Regarding the above-mentioned facts, one could conclude that current small-
scale farmers in Bulgaria are more subsistence- than market-oriented. Moreover, 
this subsistence orientation seems to be prevalent in typical rural areas rather 
than in suburban areas. This is in accordance with the general picture presented 
in MISHEV and KOSTOV (2000), but contradicts the suggestions of KOSTOV and 
LINGARD (2002) and the detailed analysis of KOSTOV (2001) about the primary 
market orientation of subsistence farmers in Bulgaria. However, there is no 
contradiction. KOSTOV (2001) (implicitly) and KOSTOV and LINGARD (2002) 
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realisation only if the whole production process, from the planning of production 
to its sale, is integrated over time.  
Owing to the high uncertainty, however, small-scale farmers tend to temporally 
segregate production and marketing, which results in the current subsistence 
agriculture (KOSTOV 2002). Therefore, this segregation introduces a bias in 
interpretation of the question "Why do you produce". In the mental categories 
which are in the mental accounts held by subsistence farmers', production and 
marketing are segregated.  
Additionally, it is well known that people often cannot objectively express their 
opinion in a direct way. There is vast marketing and psychological literature on 
this topic. The answer of the question "Why do you produce" involves elicitation 
of the current situation and evokes memories of the most recent past outcomes 
which are subsequently integrated in returning a verdict. The answers show 
mainly subsistence orientation due to the recent emergence and expansion of 
subsistence agriculture and disintegration of agricultural markets. The higher 
market orientation in the suburban area of Sofia simply reflects the better market 
opportunities in the local market. The markets of agricultural products in 
transition countries are predominantly local. A more appropriate way of 
inferring the true orientation of subsistence farmers would have been to ask 
them a question like "If you have an offer for a given product at price X, how 
much would you sell?"  
To confirm the role of the market access, 43% of the respondents in the Sofia 
area use the central market, 29% sell to relatives and friends and 29% sell 
directly from the plot or on local markets.
4 No one uses middlemen. On the other 
hand, in the area of Troyan, about 1/3 of those who provided an answer to this 
question claimed to sell to middlemen. Furthermore, the sale to relatives and 
neighbours is possible only in the area of Sofia, where people who do not 
practice agricultural activities also live. Overall, in rural areas the main reason 
for the statistical results showing greater subsistence orientation is restricted 
market access and the smaller local market. 
The access to healthier and safer food as a motive for production was selected 
by 7% of the Sofia sample as a first choice, and by 30% of the Troyan sample as 
a second choice. The higher percentage in rural areas may seem surprising at 
first sight. However, this answer can be interpreted as a preference of own 
produced food compared to purchasing products. The formation of this 
preference is probably an outcome of psychological differentiation and 
consolidation processes (SVENSON 1992) accompanying the recent expansion of 
subsistence agriculture and, as such, it is better expressed in rural areas. The 
ranking of this motive in first place by some respondents in the Sofia sample 
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may reflect to a certain degree a genuine concern about the quality of the food 
available on the market. However, the effects of the above-mentioned preference 
for the behaviour of subsistence farmers is considerable. It denotes a segregation 
of own production and market food. Simply said, if one produces a certain 
product, he/she normally would not buy the same product on the market. 
This can be confirmed by the elasticity calculations of MISHEV et al. (1996). 
KOSTOV (2001) provides further quantitative support for this argument, claiming 
that eggs are probably the only exception. The formed preference for own 
production provides sufficient differentiation in terms of mental constructs 
between them and the equivalent products available on the market. 
Consequently, they are categorised in different mental accounts. However, the 
latter cannot fully explain why people would not buy the same product as he/she 
is producing. We found that the purchase of inputs and the sale of own 
production are positively correlated. However, the sale of agricultural products 
not only provides financial funds for organising production, it also allows other 
food to be substituted for products produced in household. A reasonable 
question would be whether this substitution is feasible the other way around.  
The land in our sample has been used very intensively and subsistence farmers 
produced significant output per unit of land area. Furthermore, a very common 
perceived problem is the poor soil quality; this was indicated by 20% of the 
interviewed farmers in the Sofia area and over 58% of them in the Troyan area. 
This confirms the conclusion of MISHEV et al. (1998) that subsistence 
agriculture has restricted growth potential. The highest importance for future 
production was attributed to children – 23% of the overall sample. This 
percentage may seem low, because less than half of the interviewed answered 
this question. Since children have been a source of labour for the household 
farm, "labour capital" (O'BRIEN et al. 2000), the latter shows that subsistence 
farmers are feeling the pressure of restriction on growth. Therefore, the 
substitution of own production for purchased food is not feasible under present 
conditions. Regarding the possible substitution effects, subsistence plays an 
important role for income and is seen as such. The limits of subsistence types of 
economic behaviour have been virtually reached and the only change that could 
be induced is the commercialisation of agriculture. 
Regarding subsistence mainly as an income supporting activity raises questions 
about the future. It suggests that market access and the size of markets for 
agricultural products play a crucial role in transforming subsistence agriculture 
(KOSTOV and LINGARD 2000). The present structure of differentiation of 
consumer goods in the mental accounts, employed by small scale farmers, 
interferes the commercialisation opportunities (KOSTOV 2002). Therefore, a 
successful strategy to transform current subsistence agriculture should apply a 
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Farmers' expectations would play an important role in initiating change. Next we 
review the answers provided to some questions that indirectly reveal farmers' 
expectations and attitudes. 
Asked about future production plans, the majority of farmers (between 60% and 
80% for the different subgroups) declared that they do not intend to change their 
volume of production. Those who did intend to increase production were 
approximately the same number as those who wanted to decrease or even quit 
production. The only exception to the above-mentioned results are the owners of 
temporary houses around Sofia, where only 10% intended to increase, while 
40% intended to decrease their production. The willingness to increase 
production suggests a market orientation for the rural residents, although it can 
have different reasons for the non-residents. The decision to keep the same level 
of production may be a strategy of waiting (KOSTOV 2001). We do not reject 
other explanations for the above shown result, but since most of the farmers 
have asserted it, the waiting strategy seems convincing: it could increase the 
adaptive abilities of subsistence farmers to future changes by preserving their 
production potential. 
Another question related to farmers' intention regards whether they would take a 
loan. Most of them expressed their reluctance to take loans. The only type of 
credits they were interested in was preferential ones. It would be misleading to 
treat the above given answer as a typical subsistence orientation. The interest in 
preferential credits shows that the terms of a loan are very important. Depressed 
agricultural prices restrict marketing opportunities and hence subsistence 
farmers do not see any reason to expand their production. However, their 
intention to remain at the same level demonstrates that they are ready to react to 
favourable circumstances. In order to get further information, farmers were 
asked to state the most likely way they would utilise credit resources. The 
answers may be summarised as equipment and improvements on existing 
agricultural buildings. This reflects the cautious approach to extending 
production. Since previous losses, which reflect outcomes that are integrated in 
the decision making process, lead to risk averse behaviour, it is clear that the 
strategy of waiting and uneasiness toward credits is an expression of such 
behavioural changes. The profitability of agricultural production is thus an 
important prerequisite for changing this situation. 
Risk attitudes and market expectations are significant factors influencing the 
inter-temporal substitution of one type of specific capital for another (KOSTOV 
2002); in other words, the substitution of future income for current assets. In 
fact, high uncertainty and the discounting factor prevent it. Another constraint to 
take credits is that in Bulgaria land currently cannot be used for collateral. Land 
is a natural candidate to serve as collateral for agricultural credits, since it is 
integrated with agricultural production in a sense that they are kept in similar 
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latter. The use of other current assets for collateral may be prevented by the 
structure of the employed mental accounts. KOSTOV (2002) lists certain 
conditions which could allow for the elimination of some of these restrictions, 
including general stability and opportunities in the area of primal asset use. 
The degree of production and marketing segregation is a reliable indicator for 
the underlying commercial or subsistence orientation. In this respect, the 
structure of the perceived problems provides valuable information. Except the 
mentioned facts about soil quality, the following, more important problems have 
been listed by the interviewed farmers in the Sofia area: lack of labour and time 
(20%), thefts (20%), lack of capital (19%), insufficient market opportunities or 
low prices (18%), lack of technical information and advice (4%). On the other 
hand, in the area of Troyan, the main problems were: lack of inputs (40%), lack 
of capital (33%), insufficient market opportunities or low prices (28%), lack of 
technical information and advice (25%), lack of transport (25%). Taking into 
consideration that the area of Troyan is more rural, the differences in farmers' 
perceptions are crucially significant. In the latter sub-sample, one could see that 
the presence of problems that reveal market orientation is considerable. The lack 
of transport is one of these problems. Also in the Troyan area, the perception of 
common problems as market opportunities was considerably greater than in the 
Sofia area. The difference in the perception of capital and technical information 
also demonstrates the more commercial orientation of the farmers in the Troyan 
area. Capital and technical information are factors which influence employed 
technology, and changes in technology are related to greater market orientation. 
On the other hand, the lack of labour resources and time presumes unchanging 
technology and thus more of a subsistence orientation. The problem of theft in 
agricultural production leads to more risk averse and hence more subsistence-
oriented behaviour. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Young people are currently reluctant to get involved in agriculture. This is a 
consequence of their longer planning horizon. They do not see a future in 
agriculture due to unfavourable market conditions. It was suggested that any 
successful agricultural commercialisation strategy should involve measures 
aimed both at increasing market opportunities and creating additional income 
sources. However, the latter can divert young people who could benefit from the 
additional income opportunities instead of entering agriculture. The extent to 
which this could happen depends, of course, on the balance of stimuli and the 
sequence of changes. However, commercialising agriculture means that in 
general there will be a free labour force to compete for non-agricultural jobs. 
Younger people are more likely to be successful in this competition. Regarding 
this, we could expect that even in future, agriculture would be dominated by 
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Nevertheless, agricultural commercialisation and general income increase 
should drive out the elder farmers, who are currently striving to survive on their 
subsistence farm and thus would decrease the average farmers' age from its 
current level of around 62 years (SARRIS et al. 1999). For example, if the rent for 
agricultural land is sufficiently high (as a function of agricultural profitability) 
pensioners may be tempted to exit. The general demographic trend of an ageing 
population and the lower chances of exit to other jobs compared to younger 
persons, however, seem to tie aged persons to agriculture. Their commitment to 
agriculture is higher and hence they are more likely to launch the revival of 
agriculture. Production requires experience, and marketing products depends on 
network contacts. Both are more likely to be found with aged persons than in the 
younger generation.  
The choices that subsistence farmers face in transition economies are defined by 
the unstable economic situation characterised by underdeveloped institutions 
and a generally high level of uncertainty. In this situation, subsistence 
agriculture does not contradict economic rationality. KOSTOV  and LINGARD 
(2000) demonstrate that the existence of subsistence agriculture can lead to 
Pareto improvements at the aggregated level. In the terminology of New 
Institutional Economics, economic transition induces increases in transaction 
costs. The latter have substantial impact on economic decisions. Since 
transaction costs depend on the existing institutional structure, institutional 
developments are the key to agricultural commercialisation. A view of 
institutional change is necessarily dynamic. We have used the mental accounts 
methodology to clarify some categories employed by Bulgarian subsistence 
farmers. The use of certain categories instead of others channels the way of 
thinking, which represents the "theoretical" views of decision makers.  
The use of the categories "supply", "demand" and "equilibrium" in economics, 
and the links among them, is an example of the way economic theory is 
structured. Similarly, in the case of subsistence farmers the structure of their 
categorical frameworks, that is, the system of mental accounts they employ, 
defines their choices.  
Investigating the structure of mental accounts, and particularly the degrees of 
integration and segregation, helps us to identify the boundaries of their 
economic behaviour. In a certain sense, this is a use of the concept of bounded 
rationality. Unrestricted economic rationality refers to a situation in which all 
mental accounts are fully integrated across time and space. Since the latter is 
impossible, segregation imposes certain restrictions. The type of economic 
behaviour that results is evidently inconsistent with the postulates of economic 
orthodoxy. For example, preferential ordering in a system of mental accounts 
that is not fully integrated can be only partial. With partial instead of full 
preferential orderings, however, economic behaviour may be inconsistent. 
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can identify their likely response to agricultural policies and the needed 
measures to introduce the required institutional changes.  
We would like to stress that institutional changes are not only changes in 
legislation and organisational structure of the economy, but also changes in the 
relevant rules and routines of economic behaviour. It is true that legislation and 
organisational structure influence the process of formation of these rules. 
Nevertheless, they do not "create" these rules. The farmers will only adopt such 
rules that are consistent with their views, which means with their mental 
accounts. 
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From the point of view of promises made ten years ago, the transition of the 
food sector of many Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is 
considered weak and somehow disappointing (MACOURS and SWINNEN 2000). 
The development of the agricultural sector as the domestic raw material 
producer for food processing is hampered by a syndrome of weak market 
development and increased subsistence production. Many reasons for this 
development are put forward. In essence, a vicious cycle of structural deficits 
that consist of a limited number of emerging new farms on one hand and limited 
marketing opportunities on the other has been identified as a major reason 
(SARRIS et al. 1999). This development expresses itself in an even more 
noticeable duality of the farm sector; few emerging small-scale farms compete 
with many persistent, large-scale, bankrupt farms (most noticeable in former 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries), and subsistence farming 
is on the rise. In particular, the share of the small-scale subsistence farm sector 
in agricultural production, land occupation and labour allocation has increased 
considerably in many countries. For example, in Russia potatoes are now 
produced by 90% of household subsistence plots (1996) compared to 61% 
before transition (1985; CASKIE 2000). Similar observations are made in meat 
production (51% in 1996 and 26% in 1985; CASKIE 2000). Even aside from 
extreme cases such as Russia, farmers are reorienting themselves towards 
subsistence production. For instance, in Romania and Bulgaria, where farms 
have emerged from land privatisation, they tend to continue subsistence farming 
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These observations are contrary to expectations that existed at the beginning of 
transition. It was expected that market development, even in the short run, 
would lead to many prosperous medium-scale, commercially-oriented farms 
which would become increasingly efficient over time. It was also expected that 
farms would invest in modern technology and accumulate capital and land; thus 
out-migration from rural areas could be stopped because new farms could 
provide jobs, income and food security improvements, etc. Instead, the number 
of new farms that are today commercially-oriented and produce marketed 
surpluses is stagnant (SEROVA 2000). This phenomenon is not only confined to 
countries that lag behind in privatisation. Rather, the agricultural sector of most 
CEEC countries, for instance Estonia, (KIVISTIK 2000), that have undergone 
institutional changes such as full privatisation and redistribution of land, face 
similar problems in developing the agricultural sector. It appears much more 
difficult to achieve efficient farm structures than expected from liberalisation. 
Even defining what is efficient is an emerging problem, because efficiency 
might strongly depend on structural factors. 
There seems to be even more problems involved in market development and 
transition of the whole food sector. Transition from a formerly state-controlled 
to a viable private farm sector in CEECs is no independent process. Policies 
involved cannot simply focus on a single aspect such as land redistribution and 
wait for results; integrated policies might be more fruitful. What is missing is an 
investigation into the links between market development, the potential for 
market driven restructuring of the agricultural and food processing sectors, and 
integrated policies (LYONS et al. 1998; YASTREBOVA 2000). It is the objective of 
this paper to contribute to the debate by developing a model that reconsiders 
market imperfections, development needs, and the restructuring of the 
agricultural sector.  
In the model we will analyse the following aspects: First, we look into economic 
conditions that influence households to become subsistence farmers. In 
particular, we will touch on high transaction and processing costs in the food 
processing sector of CEECs. High transaction costs result in low sales prices and 
high food prices, encouraging home production and processing. Home 
production is recursively labour demanding and hence labour market 
opportunities need to be considered. Second, with respect to subsistence labour, 
we will look at "off-farm" employment on large farms that can locally exercise 
market power in wage determination. We hypothesise that low wages have 
forced households into subsistence farming. Third, in the model, potential land 
title transfers from the "old", large-scale sector (already privatised) to an 
emerging small-scale farm sector will depict commercialisation (we distinguish 
commercialisation from privatisation). Fourth, this transformation is driven by 
government investment in technology and knowledge on farming which is Ernst-August Nuppenau  88
injected into emerging farms. Knowledge acquisition is enabled by extension 
and access to reasonably priced inputs. 
Fifth, since food prices play a key role, we investigate the potential of cost 
reduction in the processing sector as a result of less market imperfections and a 
reduction in processing costs. In this context, the model portrays the imperfect 
competition between a large-scale, dominant firm (CARLTON and PERLOFF 1994) 
that has access to foreign capital and can therefore exploit economies of scale, 
and small-scale processors that are residual suppliers of food (LYONS  et al. 
1998). Small-scale processors are limited in development but might play an 
important role in closing the gap between local raw product demand and 
processed product supply. To obtain locally low food prices is an intermediate 
objective. Finally, the government is modelled as a key player that can use 
extension services, taxes for various sectors, and subsidies as instruments to 
encourage dynamic behaviour. Apparently, investments by a dominant processor 
shall result in the growth of a commercially-oriented medium-scale farm sector, 
because processing creates a demand for raw products. There seems to be a role 
for the government and it is the objective of the paper to provide arguments for 
beneficiary government intervention in case of a vicious cycle. The question is 
whether this government is benevolent or subject to lobbying? In the paper, the 
suggested policy will be a mix of a welfare maximising, social cost-benefit 
analysis-oriented government and a government that is subject to political 
influence facing constraints in finance. The analysis will include urban 
consumers that live close to rural areas and are interested in low food prices. 
The relevant market shall essentially be defined by the dominant firm that serves 
local food consumption and might also be a foreign direct investing firm.  
The paper is organised in five sections. After this brief introduction (section 1), 
we discuss the problem of subsistence orientation in section 2. In section 3 we 
provide objective functions for various players. In section 4 balances between 
players (sectors) are introduced and dynamic conditions for policy are outlined. 
Then, in section 5, we will present a dynamic model of policy descriptions. This 
model can serve as a benchmark or reference for actual policies. 
2 SUBSISTENCE ORIENTATION, DIVISION OF LABOUR AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT 
Optimal resource allocation between different user categories is an important 
criterion for determining the economic performance and efficiency of the food 
chain. The general perspective of neo-classical economic theory is that the 
market allocates resources between sectors and even within sectors, i.e., the 
market allocates people or working hours to enterprises and creates employment 
opportunities on the basis of wage differentials. Where labour is mobile and 
looks for the highest wages, market allocation results in the best allocation of the 
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the industrial sectors, as well as to migration between rural and urban areas. 
Weak points in this theory are economies of scale, imperfect competition and 
information deficits on returns of various job opportunities that may lead to 
short term allocation deficits. In the long term, provided liberal institutions exist, 
competition will solve all allocation problems and no government intervention is 
needed (sic!). However, the crucial question is whether the tendency of 
agricultural labour to enter subsistence agriculture (for instance, described in 
Russia by SURINOV and SHASHNOV 2000) can be fully appreciated by this theory 
and whether subsistence agriculture is really a good solution. For instance, one 
question is what determines transaction costs, which are not considered in the 
narrow version of that theory. But for the moment fundamental questions are 
excluded; nevertheless, they should be kept in mind for further evaluation of the 
food chain at a later stage of the conceptual development. In the beginning, we 
should focus on labour mobility. We assume that, in the current stage of 
development in many transition economies, an increase in subsistence farming 
means low returns on labour, which results in less labour for surplus farming, 
less labour for the processing sector and less labour migrating to other sectors of 
the economy. Labour reallocation takes place over time. Hence the intended 
model is dynamic and explicitly reckons labour reallocation over time. In the 
short run, the various actors (Figure 1) are subsistence farmers, emerging 
commercial farmers, large-scale farms, small-scale processors, the rest of the 
economy, etc. Subsistence farmers are labour constrained. Since it is intended to 
model labour movement as being explicitly driven by the decision making of the 
large-scale sector, a dominant firm and emerging commercial farms, and as 
determined by costs of migration, the processing margin for food, food and raw 
product prices determine labour transfer. 
Also, from a dynamic perspective land allocation is a crucial factor. In the given 
version, land is with the large-scale sector (privatisation has been in favour of 
large-scale farming). In the short, run emerging small-scale farmers are land 
constrained; only in a medium term perspective will land be reallocated from the 
large-scale sector to an emerging small-scale sector (CIS-countries). It will be 
transferred according to transaction costs imposed by the government, anticipated 
returns of the sectors and determined by sales opportunities (Figure 1). In an 
alternative version, after slight changes, the model can also be redesigned for a 
land transfer from the subsistence sector to the emerging commercial small-scale 
sector (privatisation in favour of small-scale subsistence farms). Depending on 
the initial distribution of land, the model structure is flexible in describing 
reallocation processes, as only slight changes are needed. Ernst-August Nuppenau  90
Figure 1:  Links and Mechanisms to Reverse the Vicious Cycle of 
Subsistence Farming 
Notes:  With structural inputs: 
S
l:   Land from large-scale farms. 
S
e:   Land to emerging small farms. 
'S
e':  Potential land from subsistence farms. 
L
l:     Labour to large-scale farms. 
L
s:     Labour from subsistence farms. 
L
e:     Labour to emerging farms. 
L
r:     Labour to rest of the economy. 
With prices: 
p
p:     Price of processed food. 
p
r:     Price of raw material (corresponds to the delivery on raw products). 
And quantities:  from...product to...user:  
q
r,l,d:  Raw from large to dominant. 
q
r,l,s:  Raw from large to processor. 
q
r,e,d:  Raw from emerging to dominant. 
q
r,e,s:  Raw from emerging to processor. 
q
p,r:  Processed to urban, etc. 
q
p,d:  Processed from dominant to market. 
q
p,s:  Processed from small to market. 
And with instruments:  
n
e:     Extension; knowledge on farming. 
t
l:      Taxing of large-scale farms. 
t
s:      Taxing of small-scale processors. 
t
d:      Subsidy for investment of firms. 
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In the next step labour reallocation (by migration) determines demand for 
processed food in rural and urban areas. By definition, subsistence farms do not 
buy processed food, whereas the volume of sales of the food processing industry 
is determined by the division of labour. This aspect of an anticipation of 
increased market volumes for food drives the demand side. This is crucial for 
the presented analysis and offers dynamic aspects that go beyond a static neo-
classical analysis. It is suggested that a large-scale investor in food processing (a 
new dairy factory, a slaughter house, etc.) make his investment decisions 
depending on sales forecasts. The investor (mostly a foreign investor or joint 
venture conglomerate; LYONS et al. 1998) considers himself as a dominant firm 
and calculates sales volumes as estimated on per head consumption multiplied 
by the population to be reached, minus residual supply from small-scale 
vendors. The procurement is given by land allocation and availability of raw 
material. 
In essence, a dual market structure emerges in which the dominant firm sets 
prices, considering own sales as a residual of small-scale processing or local 
home production. In contrast, eventual supplementary purchases of subsistence 
farmers increase the market. Currently, increasing subsistence agriculture has 
three "negative" effects: First, consumers that otherwise demand "industrially 
processed" food are missing (and vice versa, an increased division of labour 
reduces the volume of home produced substitutes as well as the commercial 
success of a dominant firm which is dependent on large volumes of food sales). 
Second, more labourers in subsistence agriculture creates shortages in the work 
force of commercially-oriented farms. Converting the current contraction of 
commercial labour markets into a new commercialisation will create multiple 
dividends for both sectors, the processing industry and in subsistence-caught 
small farmers. Third, a low exploitation of economies of scale results in high 
food margins and subsistence is therefore preferable. Declining average costs in 
processing are an intermediary objective and an indicator of success.  
The question is if we have a concept for reversal? Such a concept can be 
observed in Figure 1. Also, from a modelling point of view, a dynamic model 
should result in positive multipliers. Hence, Figure 1 provides arguments for 
multipliers. It must be noticed that the interaction of indicators for market 
development as used by the various actors in transition creates a positive self-
enforcing cycle. Hence, we will consider commercialisation of agriculture and 
food processing as a dynamic game involving strategic interactions. We will 
show how interdependent and sequenced decision-making allows to investigate 
the necessary behaviour of participants. We will focus on investment decisions 
of the processing industry to capture benefits from economies of scale. 
Moreover, since it is a dynamic game, short term benefits from increasing the 
market volume of the dominant firm will result in long term societal benefits. 
Since competition from small vendors will partly guarantee a competitive Ernst-August Nuppenau  92 
environment, this will bring margins down, so that finally less subsistence 
agriculture will occur.  
In this dynamic game the government will be assigned the role of a promoter of 
technology for commercial farmers, a promoter of competitiveness for small-
scale vendors and a promoter of investments for large-scale processing firms. 
Any government activity should be grounded in a cost-benefit analysis of the 
government. Moreover, to make it a game that is analytically accessible, we 
have to decide on sequencing and to qualify what behavioural equations are 
inputs for superior decision-making. First, on sequencing we start with 
modelling subsistence behaviour. Second, temporal decision-making of large 
farm operations will provide the ground for joint interaction on labour and land 
markets. Third, we will look into the small-scale processors' short-term decision-
making. Fourth, the dominant firm decision-making on investment will provide 
necessary investment dynamics. Altogether, resulting residual behavioural 
equations are used to show how a government can build a policy for promoting 
commercialisation and market development. Note that government decisions are 
dependent on the correct anticipation of effects which result from incentives. 
The government also anticipates potential developments of the non-agricultural 
sector as a reference for internal decision making. It should be further noted that 
it is crucial to decide on a relevant objective function of the government: Will it 
be a benevolent dictator or a partial government favouring vested interests? 
3 BEHAVIOUR AND OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
To ground the government's objective function on individual objective and 
interest functions, we will outline the relationship between involved parties 
(structure), their objective functions (performance) and behavioural equations 
(conduct) and adjust it to parties that are not active players. Some are incentive 
takers rather than incentive providers. Primarily subsistence households, small-
scale vendors and the rest of the economy are modelled in this second step. 
3.1  Household Food Production and the Large-scale Sector 
The subsistence-oriented household food production sector (briefly, the 
subsistence sector) produces most of its food on its own (by definition), but 
subsistence is only an orientation. This means that lower processed food prices 
will impose a redirection towards the reduction of subsistence crop production, 
and subsistence farmers will engage more in labour and food markets. 
(3.1) 
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whereas:  p 
p(t):  Price of processed food, 
p 
x(t):  Price of other commodities, 
w
l(t):  Wage at large-scale farm, 
w
r(t):  Wage in the rest of the economy, 
L
l(t):   Labour demand of large-scale farms, periodical, 
L
s,*(t):  Labour in subsistence agriculture, changes between periods, 
L
r(t):  Labour demand of the rest of the economy, periodical at time 
(t). 
From equation (3.1), the subsistence objective function, we can receive demand 
functions for food depending on prices and income. Equation (3.1) implies a 
supply function of labour to the farm sectors, which depends on structural 
variables, prices of processed food, and total labour. For instance, the labour 
supply can be used to describe the relationship of the subsistence sector with a 
large-scale farm sector. This relationship is characterised by a principal agent 
relationship which means that the labour supply function of the subsistence 
sector  
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enters as a behavioural equation (3.2) the objective function of a well-
established large-scale sector. The large-scale sector relies on labour from the 
subsistence sector for profit maximisation, whereas its objective function is 
normally specified, with the exception that land is constrained. Initially, though, 
the constraint is only marginal with a low shadow price: 
(3.3) 
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new:     S 
l(t):  Land with commercial large-scale farms, 
t 
l(t):   Tax on land, 
q
r,l(t):  Quantity of raw products by the large-scale sector. 
From equation (3.2) we receive endogenous wages which enter the objective 
function of large-scale farms. After the insertion of (3.2), a profit function such 
as that of a principal appears: Ernst-August Nuppenau  94
(3.3') 
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According to equation (3.3') the large-scale sector determines labour demand 
and wage. It determines a Nash equilibrium for labour from the food subsistence 
sector. 
Thus, we finally have a new "objective" function of the subsistence farm sector 
(3.4) that includes the behaviour of the large-scale sector. It will be the relevant 
function for policy makers that have anticipated the conditions and potential of 
subsistence agriculture. 
(3.4) 
l l x l
s p r p l s
l x l l r l s l x s
L L
L L L


















r r ,* r l p
w p ] L
) w ( L [ p ] [w p 2 p .5 2 ] ) w ( L [L
] [w p p ,...)]) , , (p ) w ( L [L , w , w , p , (p
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
+ + −
− + + + − − +
+ + = − −
 
The new objective function of the household food production (subsistence) 
sector includes the repercussions from the current labour exchange between this 
unit and large-scale farms. Land and labour in the function are derived from 
allocation decisions within the large-scale farms. At this point we can obtain a 
new food demand function, that depends on job opportunities and payment in 
the large-scale sector, as we calculate the first derivative of the price for 
processed food. Constraints can be lifted only periodically, and the off-farm 
demand for labour is: 
(3.5)  ... w ) w ( L
r
00 000 r
r γ γ + = , 
Dots "..." express that other factors of the complete function are included; a brief 
form. Then 
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defines food demand. We will need this function (3.6) to determine sales of a 
dominant firm. For the raw material procurement we will also need the supply 
function of large-scale farms. 
Note that the profit function of the large scale sector now includes components 
of the subsistence sector due to labour market interactions. Representing only 
cross components, we receive: 
(3.7) 
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and in order to define raw material supply of large-scale farms the first 
derivative offers: 
(3.7')  ... ... ] p p ... p [ - [
,*
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This supply of raw material (3.7) is periodical and contains L
s,*, the labour 
caught in subsistence farming, as a structural variable. For linking sub-sector 
behaviour, the subsistence sector will offer labour for emerging small-scale 
farms, which are the major focus of the analysis. 
3.2 The  Emerging  Commercially  Oriented, Small-scale Sector 
The objective function of the emerging small-scale sector recognises value 
added from own labour and the fact that this group also has to buy food from the 
market. Hence, it has an indirect utility function which reflects food purchases 
and raw product sales prices in a joint function. "Own labour" is based on 
former labour from the subsistence sector. One of the major differences between 
subsistence and emerging small-scale farmers has to be seen in the 
responsiveness of emerging small-scale farmers to knowledge dissemination by 
extension services. Moreover, land has to be acquired from a market that is not a 
spot market, but includes specific transaction costs. Land and labour enter as 
structural variables to be lifted temporally:  
(3.8) 
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new:  S
e,*(t): Land with emerging small-scale farms, S equals total land as 









e(t):   Input prices, 
q
r,e(t):  Quantity of raw production by the emerging small-scale sector,  
N
e(t):  Knowledge of the emerging small-scale sector, Ernst-August Nuppenau  96 
q
r,e(t):  Quantity of raw production by the emerging small-scale sector. 
Particularly the representation (3.8) of the small-scale sector offers a linear 
supply function of raw material for the processing industry, if the first derivative 
towards quantity is calculated.  
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The emerging, commercial, small-scale farms should be the central focus of the 
structural adjustments intended by a transition policy geared towards 
modernisation. Knowledge "N 
e" is pivotal for long term success on labour and 
land markets. The implications of a need for knowledge acquisition and 
dynamics are discussed in a later chapter on system evolution and policy.  
3.3  Food Processing and Distribution Sector  
The food processing sector shall be a dual sector. It comprises a large-scale 
processing firm that can exhibit market power and many small firms. The large 
firm or agglomerate of processing units (abattoirs, etc.) has the control over 
large parts of the raw product due to economies of scale and it shall behave like 
a dominant firm. It may be that it is a group of investors, local ministry 
controlled food processing units etc. But market power is limited due to existing 
and emerging small-scale processors and retailers. The level of market shares is 
determined by differences in cost functions. Very similar cost functions mean 
nearly perfect competition.  
On efficiency in the processing sector, the small-scale sector by definition 
remains small-scale business and changes in the margin are not accomplished by 
the introduction of better technologies. Whereas the large-scale sector can attract 
foreign investment and costs of processing are subject to technology acquisition 
and use of economies of scale (LYONS  et al. 1998). Indeed, it would be no 
problem having only large firms in the processing sector and just a 
reconstruction of previously state run factories if these firms could not exercise 
market power. There is a trade-off between large firms implementing advanced 
technologies and regional exercise of market power, especially where transport 
cost are high. Then the small-scale processors play an important role in 
providing the competitive environment in which dominant firms operate. 
Investors will analyse their potential in achieving market shares on regional 
output markets to become price leaders, forecast volumes of sales to reap 
economies of scale, and investigate procurement and raw product prices to 
assure commercial survival. 
From a governmental point of view, fostering competition within the food 
processing sector should mean to create a viable small-scale sector. 
Simultaneously, recognition of profitable investments in the large-scale sector is 
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governments have to demonstrate how subsidies for investments in the large 
scale sector impact the efficiency of dominant food processing firms and how 
gains in efficiency can be transmitted to emerging commercial farmers, for 
instance, in terms of higher raw product prices. They have to show how 
moderate taxing in small-scale processing encourages growth in the sector and 
contributes to competition within the sector, thereby reducing margins. We will 
argue for a doubly-oriented strategy of increasing competition and efficiency. 
3.3.1 Small-scale  Processors 
Before we can start to optimise the behaviour of the dominant firm as the 
strategic player, we have to reconsider the objective function (3.10) of small-
scale processing firm; primarily in order to determine the market share of the 
dominant firm. This also implies deciding on marketing channels chosen by the 
various units, whereas products shall be fungible substitutes.  
(3.10) 
s p x s r s p s r r s p p x r p s w C w
, s , , , , q t - ) , q , q ( q p q p ) , , p , (p − − = Π , 
new:   w 
s(t):  Other input prices of small-scale processors, 
q 
p,s(t): Sales quantity of processed produce by small-scale processors, 
q 
r,s(t):  Purchased quantity of raw production by small-scale processors, 
t 
s(t):  Tax imposed on small-scale processors (variable and positive if 
tax-exemptions are introduced). 
Note that the small-scale sector pays sales taxes. As an instrument, we may 
include exemptions from sales taxes "t 
s". Next, for simplification we consider a 
Leontieff technology in processing food from raw products within cost 
functions. That enables us to limit decisions of small-scale processors to a single 
quantitative decision on the volume of processing in this sector.  
3.3.2 Dominant  Firm 
In a dynamic context, a dominant firm is confronted with two serious 
judgements. First, it has to anticipate market volumes on procurement and sales 
markets in particular regions. On both markets it competes with small-scale 
firms. Second, it decides on investment in processing. Ernst-August Nuppenau  98
(3.11) 
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new:   w 
d(t):  Other input prices of small-scale processors, 
q 
p,d(t): Sales quantity of processed production by dominant firm, 
q 
r,s(t):  Purchased quantity of raw production by dominant firm, 
i 
d(t):    Investment of the dominant firm, 
t 
d(t):    Subsidy (inverse tax) for investment of the dominant firm, 
I 
d(t):  Capital accumulated in the dominant firm. 
The function (3.11) has to be maximised under the dynamic constraint that 
investments, as accumulated capital, deteriorate under normal circumstances, 
and has to be renewed with a certain volume every year. Capital is a stock 
variable and investment is a flow i
e
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Also, for simplification as in the small-scale processing sector, we assume a 
linear relationship between processed food and raw material, which reduces the 
number of decision variables of the large scale sector to processing volume, 
investment and price behaviour. In essence, the large-scale sector might use a 
dynamic optimisation for investment decisions. In that optimisation the volume 
of capital invested I 
e is endogenously determined and prices are simultaneously 
determined. Technically dynamic optimisation can be presented by a continuous 
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Dynamic control theory offers a mode for solving the problem (3.13) 
analytically (TU 1991). This finally results in a Hamilton function (3.14) which 





t, and the production capacity q
p,d
t. The coefficients in equation (3.14) are 
condensed coefficients and are calculated from coefficients of the underlying 
supply and demand functions. They reckon market equilibrium and 
technological conditions. Furthermore equation (3.14) contains "exogenous" 
incentive variables:  
(3.14) 
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After optimisation, the dominant firm reveals its contingency of conduct 
(investment) on market structures and performance of participating players in an 
investment game. Contingency is given by the dependency of the solution on 
"incentive variables" such as subsidising new investments of the dominant firm, 
taxing large-scale farms, or small-scale processors. For the political support and 
calculation of "optimal temporal paths", in a final step to be presented, the 
resulting optimal dynamic behaviour is a solution from optimising (3.14). It 
provides a dynamic constraint (3.15) for government behaviour. This constraint 
includes endogenously the investment behaviour of the large-scale dominant 
firm, being dependent on subsidies, extension, and market performance. Market 
performance is recursively dependent on the necessary accumulation of 
knowledge and land for farming by the emerging small-scale farms. 
Competitiveness of small-scale processors, as dependent on margins, indirectly 
determines the behaviour of the dominant firm. We receive a dynamic constraint 
which is the residual of an internally solved anticipation of market development 
as judged by the dominant firm. 
(3.15) 
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For the interpretation of repercussions we have the following: Government 
announces its potential behaviour to the large dominant firm and, if they have 
the same perception on market performance, a residual game (joint projections) 
enables both to benefit from the commercialisation of subsistence agriculture. 
3.4  Consumption and the Rest of Economy 
To close the model, we need consumer behaviour in the rest of the economy. 
This means that the specification of the production sector is supplemented by a 
residual sub-sector that caters for non-rural food demand. Though the model has 
a major focus on household food production (subsistence), large-scale farms, the 
potential for commercial small-scale processing, and processing in a dominant Ernst-August Nuppenau  100
firm, the measurement of achievements is evaluated through benefits from 
increased food consumption. The demand of the rest of the economy is derived 
from an indirect utility function. The indirect utility function reflects consumer 
surplus:  
(3.16) 





p γ γ γ + + = . 
This type of function provides both a linear demand function for food and a 
closure of balances in food consumption, and it serves as the consumer surplus 
in the cost-benefit analysis.  
4 BALANCE AND CONSTRAINTS 
In addition to the constraints and balances that have to be considered on sub-
sector levels, the government faces sector balances and constraints. These 
conditions have to be recognised in the specification of the objective function 
and the conditions for government optimisation.  
4.1 Periodical  Balances 
So far, we have introduced the objective functions of various groups that 
participate passively and actively in the commercialisation of subsistence 
agriculture. To proceed, we need to reduce the number of variables and redirect 
the model at market and policy analysis. Basically, the balance of supply and 
demand, as well as iterative procedures of processing and farm technology will 
help us to specify variables as given in market categories. First, the output 
market will be served by the small-scale processing sector and the dominant 
firm and products are bought by the rest of the economy and the household 
production sector (rural labourers):  
(4.1.1) 
d r d s s d p s s p q q q q
, , , , , , + = + . 
Second, the procurement of the small-scale processing sector and the dominant 
firm from large-scale farms and emerging small-scale commercial farms has to 
be balanced accordingly: 
(4.1.2) 
s l r s e r d s r d d r q q q q
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This brings about a determination of residual markets for the dominant firm on 
both sales and procurement markets. It is up to the analyst to decide on the level 
of knowledge of the dominant firms on related markets. Technically, we could 
use the information on structural conditions and economic variables for each 
participant, as gathered in the previous sections, and include them in the 
conditional decision making of any participant. The question is, whether 
participating firms really have all the necessary information. We may 
compromise and presume that some variables are strictly observable whilst 
others are less important and neglected by a dominant firm. We need a focus on Commercialisation of Subsistence Agriculture in Transition Economies  101
market explorations that capture information. Third, labour and land markets 
shall be balanced, which endogenously determines input prices.  
4.2 Financial  Balance 
Within the given framework of potential government intervention, a balance 
between expenditures and revenues of governments might be of interest. A 
balance means that revenues raised from taxing large-scale farms via a land tax 
and taxes from small-scale processors, equals expenditures. Then the money is 
used for subsidising investment of the dominant firm and for expenditures on 
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Going along this route, the number of variables for government intervention is 
reduced to two.  
4.3 Dynamic  Constraints 
In chapter three, we have already identified constraints (3.15) for public policy, 
which is now: 
(4.3.1) 
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It links investment decisions on large-scale processing in a dominant firm to the 
structural conditions of that sub-sector. It can be influenced by a government 
that contributes, through policy to structural change, to deciding on instrument 
variables such as subsidies and taxes. But the government has not only this 
constraint for consideration: Knowledge acquisition of emerging small-scale 
farmers has to be considered a dynamic function (ARROW 1992). It links 
government efforts n(t) to knowledge (extension) and knowledge accumulates 
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The function (4.1.2) directly relates to policy. Furthermore, we have land 
transactions  s
l
t. Land is transferred between the inefficient large-scale and 
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Finally, labour and migration between occupations receives special attention, 
where  l
l
t is the number of subsistence farmers that newly start farming as 
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Note that we make a distinction between labour as a stock variable which is 
necessary to conduct food production in both farm sectors and migration, or 
exchange of labour between sectors as a flow variable. The optimisation 
depends on the costs of migration which are recognised in the individual 
objective function when we enter into dynamic considerations. Note also that 
due to definition, an increase of land and labour in the emerging small-scale 
sector is accompanied by a similar decline in the large-scale sector for land and 
subsistence for labour.  
The dynamic conditions (4.3.1 to 4.3.4; note four equations and four state 
variables) are expressed in a differential equation system: 
(4.1)  (t) e (t) (t)     (t) Γ   +     Ν   + Ψ = u y y , 
where y(t) is a vector of the state variables y(t)=[L(t),S(t),N(t),I(t)] and u(t) is a 
vector of control variables u(t)=[n(t),t
d(t),l(t),s(t)]. For interpretation: The 
system (4.1) represents the development of desired and achievable "states" y(t) 
as subjected to the action u(t) of the government contingent on behavioural and 
technical aspects of a food production system. This dynamic constraint will be 
used with the public objective function for policy evaluation.  
5 GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOUR  
Until now the food sector has been analysed given a particular market structure 
that hampers structural changes. Structural changes that may be the result of 
policies are: labour to be transferred from household food production to 
emerging small-scale farms (i.e., foundation of family farms) and land transfer 
from large-scale farms to emerging, commercially-oriented, small scale-farms 
(land reform). The model explicitly includes knowledge of emerging farms and 
other controllable "state" variables. Control or support variables are taxing and 
subsidising as well as extension for knowledge accumulation; all steering the 
system as a result of government activity. Private investment of a dominant 
processing company is endogenous; missing is a derivation of the public 
objective function for a dynamic cost-benefit analysis.  
5.1  Government's Objective Function  
In designing support policies, the government needs an objective function. 
Equation (5.1) provides an objective function of a benevolent government that is 
identified as a benevolent one. It does not prefer particular groups involved in 
food production, processing and consumption; rather (5.1) is a non-weighted 
summation of private objective functions over all participants. Commercialisation of Subsistence Agriculture in Transition Economies  103
(5.1) 
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. 
As has been discussed in NUPPENAU  and BADIANE 2000, such an objective 
function can be empirically derived from elaborating on functional forms and 
corresponding estimations. Essentially, it is feasible to describe the objective 
function (5.1) in matrix notation and preserve the structure of state and control 
variables. An objective function that is simulated by equation (5.1) can be 
reduced to a vector of long term adjustments with state variables as above in the 
system evolution: i.e., remaining labour in subsistence agriculture, land in large-
scale farms, knowledge of emerging small-scale farms, investment of a 
dominant firm (y(t)=[L(t),S(t),N(t),N(t)]), and so-called control variables: i.e., 
extension services, subsides for investment in processing, land reallocation as 
ownership transfer and the land in newly emerging farms 
(u(t)=[n(t),t
d(t),l(t),s(t)]). Then the optimisation of the objective function is 
subject to the dynamic constraint (4.1). The government uses a similar framing 
of market structure, conduct and performance as the dominant firm. In the game 
of reversing the cycle of subsistence farming, a government has the role of a 
master player while the firm is the follower of incentives.  
5.2  Technical Aspects in Modelling of Dynamic Optimisation of a 
Benevolent Government 
The objective function (chapter 3 and equation 5.1), together with the dynamic 
constraint (chapter 4, equation 4.1), specifies the dynamic control problem. This 
implies the use of a Hamilton function presentation. The Hamilton function 
includes the time dependency of the objective functions of participants. For 
construction of the coefficients from individual functions, see the Appendix. 
Part 1 is the constrained welfare function (5.1), and part 2 is the dynamic 
system. Technically, the Hamilton function (TU 1991) depends on state variable 
y(t), control variable u(t) and a constraint assessment λ(t) that can be seen as a 
Lagrange factor: 
(5.2) 
] Γ   +   Ν   + (   Ψ   [ ′   +   ] ′ − ) (   ′ +
  Π ′ + ) ( Π ′ + Π ′ + Π )′ ( + ) ( Π )′ (   }[0.5 ∗ =
e(t) u(t) t) y (t) λ u(t) w t y π
u(t) ) z(t t y ) z(t u(t) ) u(t u(t) t y t y t y t ω exp{     H(t)
0
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. 
Such a system satisfies the concept of an optimal control problem (TU 1991). If 
the curvature of the objective function is correct, equation (5.2) can be directly 
used for policy evaluation. The right features of the curvature are theoretically 
satisfied if general economic assumptions on profit functions, i.e., normality, 
semi-definiteness, etc., are given. For its solution (TU 1991), a control theory 
problem has to fulfil certain conditions to obtain a maximum:  Ernst-August Nuppenau  104 
λ Hy  & − =  (5.2.a),    0   Hu  =  (5.2.b),  y &   = λ H    (5.2.c). 
These conditions are applied to the stated Hamilton function. By that we get for 
y(t), u(t), λ(t): 
(5.3.a)  λ(t) ω(t) - (t) λ - λ(t) π p z(t) u(t) y(t) 0
w
6 4 2 1 & = Ψ′ + +
′
Π + Π + Π   +   Π , 
(5.3.b)  0 w λ(t) N z(t) u(t) y(t) 5 3 2 = + ′ + Π + Π + ′ Π , 
(5.3.c)  (t) y e(t) Γ u(t) N Ψ(t) & = + + , 
for comparison see EHUI and HERTEL (1989), who also show how to evaluate 
steady states. The conditions are rearranged to solvable differential equations in 
a system if equation (5.3.c) is  
(5.3.c´)  e(t) G N y(t) Ψ N (t) y N u(t)
1 1 1 − − − − − = & . 
Inserting in (5.3.a) results in  
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System (5.4) is a set of dependent differential equations and offers the optimal 
path of policy.  
For confirmation: Applying techniques of solving multiple differential 
equations, the path of endogenous variables in the vectors, y(t) and λ(t), can be 
mathematically obtained. Technically speaking, equations in system (5.4) are 
used to come up with a combined set of time dependent variables λ(t) and y(t) 
and correspondingly u(t) is given (using equation (5.3.c´). Generally speaking, 
the solution u(t) describes the optimal choice on policy variables in the system, 
i.e., choices in the subsistence combating strategy: Indirectly the path of i
d(t), the 
investments, is given by knowledge generation, n(t), subsidies t
d(t) and s(t), land 
transfer, etc. Importantly, the specific path of l(t) describes the creation of a 
commercial farm sector; i.e., u(t)=[n(t),t
d(t),l(t),s(t)]´ are endogenously 
determined. Recursively, the state variable vector y(t) reflects government's 
desires to improve the performance of the food sector and can be projected. Commercialisation of Subsistence Agriculture in Transition Economies  105
APPENDIX 
As an explanation for empirical evaluation, for instance, the objective function 
in chapter 3 may correspond to quadratic objective functions. A quadratic 
outline of V
e
t(...), as applied to the emerging small-scale farmers and as based on 
knowledge, land labour, etc., can be written in matrix form as: 
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(V e) u(t) + z(t)'Π4
(V e) y(t)+z(t)'Π5
(V e) u(t), 
where πi,1i,i coefficients in Π 
i(Ve) expressed in matrix notation, are coefficients 
as derived from an econometric supply analysis of behaviour. In dual theory, the 
first derivative of the profit function provides linear functions and coefficients 
are derived from regressing product supply to prices and constraints. Later on, 
prices become endogenous in formulation of the objective function from a 
sectoral point of view. The coefficients can also be interpreted as elasticities of 
supply response. In the same vein, the other profit and surplus functions of the 
temporal cost benefit analysis are established:  
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           ....                                  as coefficients in equation (5.2). Ernst-August Nuppenau  106 
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DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF SUBSISTENCE FARMS  
IN SOUTHEASTERN POLAND: 
SOCIAL BUFFER STOCK OR COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE? 
 
 





In this paper we discuss the developmental perspectives of subsistence 
agriculture in the wider framework of structural change within an entire 
economy. We put forward the proposition that subsistence agriculture in South-
eastern Poland must largely be understood and interpreted as one single stage of 
a mid- to long-term process that is called the 'agricultural transformation' 
(TIMMER 1988). This structural transformation of the agricultural sector has 
been observed in many countries during the course of economic development. 
Its principal direction is toward specialisation and market participation at the 
producer level (TOMICH et al. 1995, p. 36); it is characterised by an integration 
of agriculture into the whole economy, accompanied by a decline of the relative 
importance of this sector and a gradual dissolution of subsistence. The latter is 
understood as the fact that farm households consume a substantial share of their 
own-produced food themselves. As observed in maturing economies, factors 
previously employed in the primary sector are reallocated in the industrial or 
service sectors. Through the development of efficient factor markets that link 
sectors and regions, this is supposed to induce overall economic growth.
2 
                                           
1  The authors are indebted to S. ABELE, H. HOCKMANN, Z. LERMAN, P. WEINGARTEN, and an anonymous 
reviewer for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2  The major determinants of the agricultural transformation in a given country are usually of a long-term nature 
and encompass elements such as the population-resource ratio, income and demand structure over time, 
technological change, and the institutional environment (HEIDHUES 1976). In the following, an economic 
way of analysis is pursued that leaves aside a number of important sociological and anthropological issues, 
such as the impact of behavioural norms, social stratification in villages, or generally peasants' value systems, 
which all may well affect the pace and intensity of agricultural development (and which are discussed with 
regard to Poland e.g., by NAGENGAST 1991 and ZBIERSKI-SALAMEH 1999).  Martin Petrick, Ewa Tyran  108
As a consequence, we apply a factor market approach to the problem of 
subsistence farming versus market integration. We believe that the further 
development of peasant farms in Southeastern Poland crucially depends on their 
participation in efficient factor markets and their ability to realise a substantial 
growth of (particularly) land and labour productivity in order to meet future 
income needs. In a mutually reinforcing process, this will also result in 
increasing commercialisation and participation in product markets. In the longer 
term, the peasant society may thus differentiate into larger commercial farms on 
the one hand, which are partly based on rented land, and rural employee 
households on the other, which may still be landowners but cultivate at best a 
gardening plot. 
The paper's discussion contains four steps. In the second chapter, we give an 
overview of the development of subsistence agriculture in Poland and its current 
problems. In the third chapter, we investigate how subsistence production can 
theoretically be understood in the process of structural change and we derive 
hypotheses on mutual relationships. The fourth chapter examines whether these 
considerations are supported by empirical data gathered in a farm survey carried 
out in former Tarnów and Rzeszów voivodships (now parts of the newly created 
Małopolska and Podkarpackie voivodships). The final chapter concludes with 
some general remarks on the relationship between mechanisms of structural 
change and subsistence agriculture in the Polish context. 
2 POLISH SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN THE PROCESS OF STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
The proposition of the dependence of subsistence on long-term structural change 
is based on the fact that subsistence agriculture in Southeastern Poland is 
primarily not a transitory phenomenon triggered by the economic hardships of 
transition to a market system. Instead, the existence of a subsistence-oriented 
peasantry in Southeastern Poland is largely the result of emancipation 
movements during the affiliation of the region with the Habsburg Empire in the 
mid-nineteenth century (NAGENGAST 1991). Furthermore, peasant farmers 
successfully resisted several attempts of collectivisation during the socialist 
period. There is thus a considerable difference between the Polish situation and 
subsistence farming in other former socialist countries. In the former Soviet 
Union, for example, private part-time farms were largely dependent on 
kolkhozes or sovkhozes, and their existence was subject to directives of the 
central planning authority (SCHINKE 1983) and not the result of a historically 
evolved farming structure as in Poland. 
As a consequence, the rural population in many parts of Poland was never fully 
integrated into the overall economy. Nevertheless, in a study of structural 
change in Polish agriculture between 1960 and 1985, QUAISSER (1987) showed 
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speaking, improved employment opportunities outside of agriculture during the 
1960s and 70s induced a shift of smaller farm households towards off-farm 
employment, while larger farms managed to maintain their incomes by 
productivity increases and growth. At the beginning of the 80s, a relative 
improvement of living conditions in agriculture compared to other sectors, the 
result of the overall economic crises, dampened this development (p. 91). It can 
be assumed that during this whole period quite a significant number of farm 
households still lived in relative autarchy and mainly relied on their self-
produced diet (WOJCIECHOWSKA-RATAJCZAK 1999). At the end of the 80s, 
Poland therefore still had a comparatively small-structured peasant agriculture 
sector (see Table 1). 
Table 1:   Characteristics of Individual Farms in 1988 and 1996 






Characteristics 1988 1996 1988 1996  1988  1996
No. of Individual Farms (ths.)  2167.6 2041.4 71.7 69.8 73.7 72.3
Average Farm Size (ha)  6.25 6.99 3.53 3.39 3.31 3.15
Non-Producing or Prod. Value 
Not Determined 
n.a. 10.1 n.a. 19.0 n.a.  22.6
Producing Solely for Own 
Consumption 
n.a. 10.9 n.a. 12.9 n.a.  12.6
Producing mainly for Own 
Consumption 
n.a. 33.1 n.a. 47.8 n.a.  46.0
Purpose of 
Production (%): 
Producing mainly for the Market n.a. 45.9 n.a. 20.2  n.a.  15.1
Working Solely On-farm  63.7 71.7 58.0 70.1  51.2  68.1
Working Both On- and Off-farm 23.2 21.6 25.7 24.4  35.2  28.0
Activity of People  
of Working Age 
Living on Individual 
Farms (%): 
Working Solely Off-farm  13.1 6.7 16.3 5.4  13.6  3.8
Notes:  n.a. = not available. 'Non-producing' farms may include land-owning households that have registered 
as farms in order to skim off certain public benefits. In fact they do not produce anything at all 
because they live on off-farm sources. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on data of National Census 1988 and Agricultural Census 1996 according to 
GUS (1998, p. 188) and GUS (1999, pp. 37; 111). 
Structural change and subsistence orientation seem to have been relatively 
slightly affected by the Polish transition to a decentralised market system. This 
again is in contrast to the situation in the former Soviet Union, where 
subsistence production substantially increased by a strong intensification of 
home gardening and the new creation of small private farms (see THO SEETH et 
al. 1998). For 1996, we have for the first time reliable data on the stated purpose 
of production of Polish peasant farms: Table 1 shows that more than 40% of all 
Polish farmers produced solely or mainly for own consumption. Unfortunately, 
there is no comparable statistic for the pre-transition period, so we cannot 
quantify the impact of the transition process. The total number of peasant farms 
only slightly decreased during these years, but a marked concentration process 
did not resume as a result of the economic liberalisation. For the former Martin Petrick, Ewa Tyran  110 
voivodships of the study area, the average size of farms even declined (see 
Table 1). This apparent standstill is supposed to be the result of two opposite 
tendencies, which seemingly offset each other so far. 
Increased pressure on farm incomes constitutes the first tendency. In the course 
of transition, liberalised markets caused a further reduction of the agricultural 
terms of trade (see Figure 1). Although there was a recovery in 1994 and 1995, 
this implied a general reduction of net farm incomes compared to the pre-
transition period since there was no compensation by productivity increases 
(KOWALSKI 1993; WOŚ 1999). Though the physical output of agriculture after 
transition was relatively slightly affected by these circumstances, the increased 
price-cost squeeze can be seen as an important push factor that potentially 
reinforces structural change in Polish agriculture. With regard to impending EU 
integration, fears loom large that increased competition on product markets 
might have further negative consequences for the income situation of Polish 
farmers, although the effects of EU accession will very much depend on the 
specific form of direct payments and price policies implemented. Generally, it 
seems that EU integration merely accelerates structural adjustment processes 
that would have been inevitable anyway. 







1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 
Notes:  Output-/input-price ratio for individual farms. A changing weighting system was used. For details, see 
the source below. Prior to 1992 the figure is interpolated from the data-points of 1970, 1980, and 
1990. 
Source:  GUS (2000, p. XLII). 
A contrary tendency can be observed with regard to the labour force on peasant 
farms. The number of people of working age living on peasant farms 
significantly increased during recent years because of job cuts and dismissals in 
both state farms and rural industries. This labour force inflow clearly reduced 
labour productivity on farms and aggravated the income situation in agriculture. 
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additional safeguard against the risks of participating in the off-farm labour 
market. In fact, the labour force increase only concerns the group of people that 
spend all of their working time on the farm, while the importance of both part-
time farming and full-time off-farm activity dropped (Table 1). This trend was 
accompanied by a growing reliance on public transfers such as old age and 
disability pensions. According to FRENKEL and ROSNER (1999), the share of 
peasant households with pensions as the main source of income increased from 
18.7 to 29.6% between 1988 and 1995. 
As a result, it is asserted that structural transformation has still to be 
accomplished by most farmers, both in Poland in general and in the study areas, 
and that the liberalisation of the economy after the demise of socialism has 
boosted forces that both bring about and hinder structural change. The aim of 
the following chapters of this paper is thus to look more closely at the 
conflicting forces at work in the rural economy. Furthermore, the objective is to 
investigate how likely the current state of affairs in the agricultural sector makes 
an intensified structural change in the near future. Based on a theoretical 
analysis we first put forward some testable hypotheses. After that we investigate 
in how far these hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence. 
3 A  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE AND 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
We group our further analysis into two parts. First, we present some general 
considerations on subsistence and agricultural change, and second we derive 
some hypotheses on the relationship between both. 
3.1 Basic  Considerations 
For the following analysis we define subsistence as the fact that a farm 
household is only to a limited extent integrated in product markets because a 
significant share of output is consumed by the producers themselves. Based on 
this definition we make two assumptions about subsistence households. First, we 
assume that the degree of subsistence is inversely correlated with the relative 
surplus over the amount of output the household members consume themselves. 
Second, we assume that production and consumption decisions, and decisions on 
factor use within or without the farm household are each theoretically separable 
(HANF 1996). This is justified by the fact that the average farm in our sample 
sells around 75% of its production output to the market (see below) and that 
markets exist for all factors. It is thus more appropriate to speak of semi-
subsistence farms. 
The assumption of theoretical separability allows to analyse agricultural change 
as largely induced by relative market prices, which determine decisions on 
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relatively decreasing prices of labour lead to an increasing labour intensity with 
respect to capital and vice versa. These adjustment processes tend to result in the 
efficient allocation of factors. The force to efficiently allocate factors will be 
particularly pronounced in cases of strong income pressure. This income 
pressure may for example be the consequence of deteriorating agricultural terms 
of trade as observed in Poland in the course of transition (see Figure 1). A semi-
subsistence farmer principally has two major options when faced with increased 
income pressure (BRANDES 2000):  
1. He may decide to seek employment of his factors outside agriculture. The 
core determinant of this decision is the remuneration of factors in other 
sectors of the economy, hence their opportunity costs. If other sectors 
develop more rapidly, relatively higher factor remuneration may imply a 
significant suction that forces factors into uses outside agriculture. This is 
particularly valid for capital and labour, and results in the creation of rural 
employee households or urban migration. As a consequence, the household 
may still consume most of his own-produced food, but the farmer's major 
income now is from non-agricultural sources. 
2. In case the first option is blocked by certain exit barriers, which are to be 
discussed below, the farmer may choose to stay within agriculture and 
attempt to compensate the reduced factor incomes by rationalising existing 
production activities, shifting to more remunerative activities, or increasing 
his factor stocks via lease or acquisition. An increase of factor productivity 
can principally be achieved by realising technical progress, e.g., by 
mechanisation, introduction of new plant varieties or artificial insemination, 
or adoption of new management techniques. Technical progress is usually 
implemented by investment in human and/or physical capital. This 
developmental path can thus be characterised as commercialisation. 
The paper's central hypothesis is that the degree of subsistence will diminish as 
structural change induced by these exit-or-stay decisions progresses. As we have 
seen, the decision on which developmental path to choose is highly determined 
by the factor incomes that can be achieved in other sectors. If these incomes are 
low, a semi-subsistence farm might be forced to either commercialise or accept 
income losses. However, even in the case of high opportunity costs for labour 
and/or capital, a number of other exit barriers may seriously delay any 
adjustment processes.
3 In the following, we refer to the problem of quasi-fixed 
assets in agriculture, as well as the effects of the use of factors that do not 
require permanent payment (GARDNER 1992). 
The notion of quasi-fixed assets draws on the following observation: many 
assets used for agricultural production exhibit the property of their salvage value 
                                           
3  This has motivated some authors to speak of an 'evolutionary' theoretical approach as opposed to the 
frictionless neoclassical paradigm, where adjustment processes occur without any delay or cost (BRANDES 
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being much lower than their acquisition value, particularly buildings and 
specialised machinery. With regard to opportunity costs, this is also valid for 
human capital. The bulk of the acquisition value therefore counts as sunk costs 
and must not be regarded in decisions on the continuation of production. 
Although an increased price-cost squeeze may make further investment in the 
sector unprofitable, it does not force current producers out of business because 
their assets are largely immobile (i.e., cannot be reallocated to other, more 
productive uses). This path-dependency may result in long-lasting delays  of 
structural adjustment if producers with old equipment continue to operate 
although the profitability of their units does not justify any further investment, 
while growing enterprises which have to account for the whole costs of 
investment cannot bid them out of the market. 
A similar problem arises if production factors such as owned land, family 
workforce, or farmers' equity do not require permanent payment. In this case, 
owner-producers have an advantage over those who have to lease land and 
labour or rely on external finances, because the latter continually need to 
generate sufficient profits to pay these factors. In times of deteriorating product 
prices, this implies a significant chance of survival for subsistence farming 
based on owned factors. 
In the subsequent analysis we thus empirically explore the following two related 
issues: 
1. What are the prospects for semi-subsistence households to leave the 
agricultural sector?  
2. In the group of agricultural producers, is there an observable inverse 
dependency of subsistence on structural change? 
In dealing with the first question we will primarily look at the relative 
remuneration of factors within and without the agricultural sector. In times of 
high rural unemployment it will be instructive to see whether effective off-farm 
employment opportunities do in fact constitute significant opportunity costs for 
farm family members. Generally, if factor allocation has fully adapted to 
existing price relations, the marginal factor income should be equal in all uses. 
Although we observe only the average income, this should be close together if 
structural change has come to an equilibrium, and significantly different if to a 
large extent change still has to be accomplished. 
The second question is investigated by testing several hypotheses on the 
relationship between degree of subsistence and structural change, which are 
presented in the following subchapter. 
3.2  Hypotheses on the Dependence of Subsistence on Structural Change 
If subsistence is dependent on the progress of structural change, the following 
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First, profits from agriculture should generally be larger for less subsistence-
oriented producers. This is due to the simple notion that autarchy in production 
implies the renunciation of trade and specialisation benefits. Market integration 
in turn should result in increased efficiency of factor allocation and production 
and thus in higher profits as compared with self-sufficiency. The expectancy of 
increased profits also provides the principal incentive for subsistence producers 
to commercialise and to participate in markets. 
Second, subsistence should be positively correlated with the participation of 
family members in non-agricultural labour markets. A large proportion of off-
farm income implies that the household has in fact left the agricultural sector. 
However, at least for the rural households investigated here, we hypothesise that 
consumption of self-produced food temporarily remains important as an 
insurance mechanism. Our sample does not contain households that do not 
pursue any food production at all or that have migrated to urban areas. 
Third, we expect that the active participation in all markets for factors other than 
labour is associated with a low degree of subsistence. Subsistence employee 
households are unlikely to act as a purchaser on land and capital markets. For 
land and capital, this concerns both sale and rental markets. Empirically it can 
be observed as a share of rented land, the degree of financial leverage, and as 
investment outlays on land purchases. At early stages of structural change, 
subsistence farms are also unlikely to let their land to others, since this implies 
that own consumption needs cannot be met anymore. This in turn means that 
commercial farms may have difficulties in acquiring land.  
Fourth, as a result of negligible engagement on factor markets, we also 
hypothesise that subsistence is inversely correlated with land and capital stocks. 
This relation may however be much less pronounced with regard to labour 
resources. Furthermore, the lower the degree of subsistence is, the more we 
expect a higher degree of mechanisation and a more favourable age structure of 
equipment. Commercial farms are likely to show higher levels of investment in 
productive assets such as farm buildings or agricultural machinery. Therefore 
they also have a higher capital intensity with regard to land as compared with 
subsistence farms, at least if commercial farms have more difficulties in 
acquiring land than in acquiring machinery. As a consequence, mechanisation as 
measured in hp per ha may also be higher. In addition, commercial farms are 
assumed to modernise their equipment more frequently. An interesting aspect is 
to look at investment in alternative income generating activities in rural areas 
such as agrotourism. Subsistence farms may also pursue these as an alternative 
strategy for generating cash revenue. 
Fifth, the value added per agricultural labour unit should be lower, the higher the 
degree of subsistence is. According to our considerations on capital and land 
stocks, subsistence production is likely to be associated with low capital and 
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subsistence agriculture are low, which does not necessarily hold for the 
remuneration of land and capital. In turn, commercially-oriented farms may 
show a high remuneration of labour and a lower return on capital and land. 
Sixth, we expected that all individual factors that support productivity 
enhancement in agriculture will be negatively correlated with the degree of 
subsistence. This is due to the notion that increased productivity is likely to 
result in a surplus above the family needs which can be sold to the market. We 
only mention those individual factors that seem most important. First, we 
assume that people with a higher degree of formal agricultural education will 
also be more actively engaged in structural change and be more able to manage 
productivity enhancement in agriculture. Second, this is likely to be 
accompanied by a more intensive use of advisory services. Third, farmers who 
show more innovative behaviour with regard to agriculture are presumably those 
who are more commercially-oriented. The opposite is true for individual risk 
aversion: more risk-averse farmers are likely to be reluctant to implement 
technical progress and probably prefer a more self-sufficient mode of production. 
Finally, older farmers might be less open to change than younger ones. 
4 SUBSISTENCE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN FORMER TARNÓW AND 
RZESZÓW VOIVODSHIPS 
In the following, these relationships are studied at the micro level by evaluating 
the results of a cross-sectional farm survey conducted in the former Tarnów and 
Rzeszów voivodships in the year 2000. The empirical analysis is based on a 
geographically stratified random sample of farms in the database of the official 
extension service ODR (Ośrodek Doradztwa Rolniczego, Extension Centre of 
Agriculture), which contains approximately 25% of all farms identified by the 
Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS). The sample 
consists of farms that show at least some degree of commercialisation and 
market integration and that account for the bulk of the traded agricultural 
produce in the research area. We measure the degree of subsistence as the 
proportion of self-consumed food in relation to the value of total agricultural 
output. For further details on the survey see PETRICK (2001). 
A first inspection of the farm sample revealed that the degree of subsistence in 
fact ranges from 0 to 100%. This large variation alone already suggests that 
differentiation processes have already started up, and that different farms are on 
different time points on their developmental paths. In order to test the 
relationship between subsistence and structural change more rigorously, Table 2 
and Table 3 show the results of a mean value comparison for two subgroups of 
our sample. We divided the sample into two equally-sized groups according to 
their degree of subsistence being above or below the median value (= 17.3%) of 
the total sample. In Table 2, along with some general statistics on the farm 
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production and the criteria of resource stocks, mobility, which largely means 
activity on factor markets, and remuneration. In general, for profit calculations, 
we do not make any allowances for owned factors. As stated above, even in the 
longer term, these factors do not require permanent payment and thus may not 
be relevant for decision making at the margin. 
We start the analysis with the hypotheses on structural change. We see that most 
of our hypotheses on the relationship between factor reallocation processes and 
subsistence production are supported by the data in Table 2. Specifically, we 
observed that subsistence farmers are those with lower profits, smaller resource 
stocks of land and capital, and in general a less pronounced participation on 
factor markets. On the other hand, the group of commercially-oriented farms in 
fact participates in these markets and exploits gains of trade and specialisation. 
However, their average farm size is still rather small and growth has apparently 
been possible only to a limited extent. 
Factor remuneration on commercially-oriented farms is generally around twice 
as high as on subsistence farms (though not always significant), which reveals 
the benefits of increased efficiency of factor allocation. With regard to land and 
capital, these benefits apparently by far outweigh the supposed higher labour 
intensity on subsistence farms. This implies that commercial farms will in 
principle be able to bid subsistence farms out of the land market. The fact that 
farm growth so far has been limited and that even subsistence farms have some, 
though significantly less, land rented suggests that additional exit barriers as 
discussed above are very relevant. These may be due to comparatively older 
farmers and older machinery which point to quite low opportunity costs for 
human and physical capital. Furthermore, a lower degree of financial leverage 
means that subsistence farming is based more on equity capital, which in turn 
does not require permanent payment. 
Astonishingly, land rents paid to lessors are on average smaller for commercial 
farms, and are substantially lower than the value added per ha (although this 
indicator still includes remuneration of family labour and equity). A possible 
explanation for this phenomenon could be that the land rental market is 
generally thin and that land rent is determined by other factors than relative 
scarcities alone. For example, commercial farms might be in a better bargaining 
position than subsistence farmers. 
With regard to the share of family labour force with off-farm employment, we 
observed that it is not significantly different for both types of farms. Across both 
groups, on average, every fifth member of the family is engaged full-time in 
non-agricultural activities, which is approximately identical to the corresponding 
value for all farms in the region (see Table 1). This is a first indication that 
differentiation processes have not yet become visible on the labour market. Two 
explanations may be possible: First, subsistence households may have 
difficulties to find more extensive off-farm employment, or second, commercial Development Perspectives of Subsistence Farms in Southeastern Poland  117
farms may still be dependent on non-agricultural sources to meet their income 
needs because productivity enhancement has not yet resulted in sufficient extra 
profits. 
Table 2:   Stocks, Mobility, and Remuneration of Factors of Sample Farm 
Households (Mean Values in 1999) 
Refe-
rence 








Degree of Subsistence (Own-consumed Goods 
in % of Total Value of Production) ** 
40.0 6.6 <.001








No. of Household Members incl. Children  5.0 4.7  .068
Resources   Total Land Cultivated (ha) **  8.0 14.3  <.001
Share of Rented Land (% of Total Land 
Cultivated) ** 
10.7 25.8 .003




Investment Outlays on Land Purchases 1997-
99 (zł per Farm) ** 
400.0 2,045.1 .003
Remuneration Value Added in Agriculture (zł per ha)
a 688.2 1,883.2  .103
Land 
  Land Rent Paid to Lessors (zł per ha)  139.9 108.2  .284
Labour Force Capacity Living in Farm 
Household (Labour Units)
b 
3.6 3.6 .589 Resources 
Age of Farmer (Years) **  45.9 42.9  .006
Share of Workers (Labour Units in % of 
Family Labour Force) ** 
.4 2.6 .016 Mobility 
Share of Family Labour Force with Off-farm 
Employment (%) 
22.1 20.6 .622
Value Added in Agriculture (zł per Family 
Labour Unit Engaged On-farm)
b 
2,137.0 5,823.4 .237
Income from Off-farm Activity (zł per Family 




Share of Income from Public Transfers (%) ** 21.2 7.8  <.001
Capital Stock of Farm (ths zł) **  175.1 282.7  <.001
Age of Latest Tractor Acquired (Years) **  12.3 10.5  .024
Resources 
Tractor Power (hp per ha of Total Land 
Cultivated) 
5.7 6.6 .216
Leverage (Farm Debt in % of Capital  
Stock) ** 
5.4 9.1 .003 Mobility 
Savings (Household Savings in % of Capital 
Stock) 
2.9 4.1 .127
Return on Equity (%)
a ** 3.9 9.0  .007
Cost of Farm Debt (Annual Interest in %) **  12.1 7.1  .013
Capital 
Remuneration 
Interest on Savings (Annual in %)
c 10.0 10.0  -
Notes:  Missing values were row-wise excluded; 4.227 zł = 1 € (annual average 1999); * Mean values are 
significantly different at 95% according to two-tailed t-test; ** Different at 99%; 
a Value of self-
consumed goods is included in profit calculation; 
b 1 labour unit = 270 days per adult household 
member; 
c Statements of National Bank of Poland on interest rates of 12-month deposits by major 
commercial banks. 
Source:  Authors' calculations based on IAMO Poland farm survey 2000 (except for interest on savings, see 
note 
c). 
The figures on labour remuneration shed more light on this issue. First, the 
difference of value added per labour unit between both subgroups supports the 
hypothesis of higher capital and/or land intensity on commercial farms. It is, Martin Petrick, Ewa Tyran  118
however, not significant at 95%. Second, average income from off-farm sources 
is generally higher than value added in agriculture for both subgroups. However, 
the reported off-farm income is biased upwards, since the opportunity costs for 
those that do not participate in the off-farm labour market are not observed and 
are assumably much lower. Bearing this in mind, any difference could still be 
interpreted as an insurance premium producers implicitly pay for the security to 
keep an at least basic living standard on their farm. In this case, the conclusion 
would be that the labour market is in equilibrium and that there is little need for 
adjustment.
4 It is, however, sobering to see that the off-farm income per labour 
unit generated by members of subsistence farms is only at 17% of the national 
and 19% of the voivodship average wage (average wage of all sectors in 1999 
according to GUS 2000, voivodship data as unweighted average of new 
Małopolska and Podkarpackie voivodships). This means that, although there is a 
supply of jobs that are substantially higher paid than engagement on subsistence 
farms, people on these farms are not able to get these jobs and their effective 
opportunity costs are thus very low. Even on the regional level there is thus a 
highly segmented labour market. We assume that this segmentation is mainly 
due to individual characteristics such as education or age structure, which is 
supported by the observation of much higher off-farm income per person on 
commercial farms. 
The official unemployment rates of a relatively modest 10.2% in Małopolska 
and 14.5% in Podkarpackie voivodships in 1999 (national average: 13.1%; see 
GUS 2000) do not allow the conclusion that a lack of job offers is the only 
reason for low opportunity costs of the subsistence farm labour force. A more 
plausible reason could be that in the relevant market segment (i.e., less 
sophisticated and with agricultural background) salaries are substantially below 
the average wage. Nevertheless, in comparison with the national and regional 
average, remuneration and productivity of the workforce on subsistence farms is 
quite low. This is usually labelled as hidden unemployment. The comparison 
reveals that subsistence farms in fact 'store' a substantial amount of unproductive 
labour force. Opposed to that, commercial farms with an already higher value 
added per labourer are, due to higher opportunity costs, much more likely to lose 
a part of their workforce in the future. 
The divergence, mainly in terms of quality, between labour supply of subsistence 
farms and employment opportunities in rural areas must thus be regarded as a 
major bottleneck for structural change in agriculture. Considering the recent 
increase of the share of people working solely on-farm (see Table 1), it becomes 
evident that the unfavourable situation on rural labour markets has not only 
halted but even reversed structural change. 
                                           
4  As indicated above, the decisive criterion to assess the need for adjustment is of course the marginal revenue 
generated by the last unit (the last hour) of labour force. It is well possible that, at least for the subsistence 
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The current lack of sufficient income generating opportunities in rural areas is 
partly cushioned by public transfers, particularly by the agricultural social 
insurance scheme KRUS (Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego), which 
is highly subsidised by the government. Table 2 shows that subsistence farms 
receive a significantly higher share of income from these transfers. 
Return on equity is significantly higher than the cost of farm debt for 
commercial farms and vice versa for subsistence farms. Under the assumption of 
diminishing returns on capital use, this means that commercial farms might still 
need to expand their capital stock, while subsistence farms are already over-
equipped. With regard to capital intensity, there hence seems to be still 
significant need for adjustment. However, two facts qualify this statement: First, 
return on equity as shown in Table 2 does not include payment of family labour 
and management. As a result, it can be assumed that even commercial farms 
may generate little more return than the required interest on credit if allowances 
for family labour were made. Second, due to their cross-sectional nature, we 
generally cannot prove how robust these numbers are over time, and return on 
equity may be particular sensitive to annual fluctuations in revenue. 
It is important to notice that agricultural credit in Poland is highly subsidised by 
the government as well. This results in the fact that costs of farm debt are lower 
than the interest on savings, at least for commercial farms, which apparently 
have comparatively better access to these subsidised credit sources. The 
difference between these farm groups raises doubts that subsidies are allocated 
equitably among farms, and the reported difference between credit and savings 
interest bears lively testimony to the major economic distortions induced by this 
subsidy. If commercial interest rates were charged to farmers, probably few 
agricultural activities would qualify for credit funding. 
Interestingly, the savings rate of subsistence households is not significantly 
different from that of the commercial farms. This can be taken as an indication 
that the former do not suffer from worse access to savings services as opposed to 
the latter, although subsistence farms face higher credit costs. 
Table 3 illustrates the relationship between degree of subsistence and factors 
that accelerate productivity enhancement in agriculture. As before, the data 
supports the notion that the diminishing importance of subsistence production is 
accompanied by intensified structural change. Commercially-oriented farmers 
are better educated, use advisory services more frequently (though not 
significantly), exhibit more innovative behaviour and are less risk averse. 
Furthermore, they invest more both in total and with respect to productive assets 
in agriculture, which corresponds with their better access to subsidised credit. 
However, although nominal differences are high, it is puzzling to see that, with 
the exception of farm building renovation, differences between subsistence and 
commercial farm households are not statistically significant at 95%. This is 
assumed to be caused by the relatively small number of non-zero observations Martin Petrick, Ewa Tyran  120
with regard to these items (e.g., only 116 in total for investment in tractors and 
machinery).  
The observation that subsistence farms invested more in telecommunication may 
be more due to the fact that they still have a lot of individual infrastructure to 
catch up on rather than being an expression of innovative behaviour. 
Commercial farms, however, invested more in guestrooms for agrotourism 
(although on a low level), which indicates an innovative strategy of non-
agricultural income generation. 
Further instructive information on the future plans of both subgroups of farms is 
also shown in Table 3. Four observations are of particular importance: First, 
today's commercial farms plan to grow and specialise further in the future to a 
much larger extent than subsistence farms. Second, in contrast, relatively many 
more subsistence farms attempt to exit farming and find off-farm employment. 
Third, the wish to pass on the farm to later generations is much more 
pronounced on subsistence farms, although the objective chances to be able to 
do so seem to be comparatively smaller. This may be an expression of a 
particularly conservative and traditional attitude in general. Fourth, roughly one 
third of both types of farms do not plan any changes at all. This probably also 
indicates a rather conservative and fatalistic, or even apathetic, state of mind 
among a significant proportion of farmers since people have apparently accepted 
their comparatively poor income situation without resistance. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In the analyses of the previous chapters we have shown that there are strong 
linkages between structural change in terms of factor reallocation and 
productivity enhancement processes on the one hand, and the extent of 
subsistence production on the other. The empirical facts provide evidence for the 
proposition that subsistence agriculture in Southeastern Poland will diminish as 
structural change in the agricultural sector progresses. Furthermore, it was 
ascertained that structural change has already started up and that – according to 
statements of farmers – it is likely to continue in the near future. Subsistence 
agriculture in the sense that a substantial share of total agricultural output in a 
given region is consumed by the farm households themselves is therefore 
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Table 3:   Human Capital, Current Investment, and Future Plans of 
Sample Farm Households (Frequencies or Mean Values in 1999) 








Primary School (%)  11.7  9.9  - 
Vocational School (%)  50.6  42.6  - 




(Frequencies)  University (%)  4.9  8.0  - 
Use of Advisory Service (Times in 1999)  12.3  14.2  .137 
Innovator in Agriculture (on Ordinal Scale 0=min to 
4=max)
a ** 
.8 1.2  .005 
Human 
Capital 
Risk Aversion (on Ordinal Scale 0=min to 7=max)
b ** 4.0 3.0  <.001 
Total (zł per Farm)  20,042.1  104,093.7  .133 
Renovate Farm Buildings  
(zł per Farm) * 
3,554.4 11,217.7 .032 
Buy Tractors and Agricultural 
Machinery (zł per Farm) 
5,325.4 58,751.5 .270 
Modernise Telephone Network  
(zł per Farm) 









Establish Guestrooms for 
Agrotourism (zł per Farm) 
.0 432.1  .169 
Increase Farm (% of Cases)  21.2  40.4  - 
Specialise in Certain Branches  
(% of Cases) 
34.2 54.3 - 
Exit Farming and Find Off-farm 
Employment (% of Cases) 
13.0 7.9  - 
Invest in Certain Assets (% of Cases)  14.4  26.5  - 
Pass on Farm to Next Generation  
(% of Cases) 





Don't Plan Any Changes (% of Cases) 39.0  31.1  - 
Notes:  Missing values were row-wise excluded; * Mean values are significantly different at 95% according to 
two-tailed t-test; ** Different at 99%; Differences of frequencies were not tested; 
a Measured as 
frequency of implementing certain innovative activities; 
b Measured as willingness to pledge certain 
assets as collateral. 
Source:  Authors' calculations based on IAMO Poland farm survey 2000. 
However, the future pace of this structural transformation will crucially depend 
on the functioning of factor markets that efficiently channel the allocation of 
resources within the economy. With regard to the three basic factors of 
production, the situation can be summarised as follows: 
•  The major bottleneck on the labour market is represented by the poor 
employment opportunities of the subsistence farm labour force. Labour 
productivity is comparatively low both on- and off-farm if there are any off-
farm job offers at all. The opportunity costs of labour thus are low, although 
the average income generated outside agriculture by members of subsistence 
households is less than one fifth of both the regional and national average 
salary, which implies substantial hidden unemployment. In the course of 
transition, the inflow of a redundant work force into the farm sector probably 
even temporarily reversed structural change. As long as this situation 
persists, subsistence agriculture will continue to be the labour force buffer of 
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•  This has important repercussions on the land market. A persistently 'stored' 
labour force on comparatively inefficient subsistence farms also acts as a 
regional land buffer that impedes the development of commercially-oriented 
farms. Due to this lock-in situation, farm growth has so far been modest. As a 
result, even commercially-oriented farms are forced to generate a substantial 
share of their income from off-farm sources, although their overall economic 
performance in agriculture is substantially better than that of the subsistence 
group. 
•  The market for capital is highly distorted by interest subsidies the government 
grants on agricultural credit, which drives credit interest below the market 
rate for savings. These subsidies are accompanied by remarkable investment 
outlays for productive assets in the group of more commercially-oriented 
farms, while subsistence-oriented farms seem to be less able to exploit the 
subsidies. Generally, interest subsidies ensure that the relatively low capital 
remuneration achieved in the agricultural sector is still sufficient to attract 
bank credit. Consequently, also with regard to capital, the farm sector stores 
resources that could be used more efficiently in other sectors of the economy. 
It is therefore concluded that rural factor markets currently are not able to bring 
about rapid structural change in Southeastern Poland. The paucity of productive 
employment opportunities for the rural labour force prevents the reallocation of 
land and capital towards more efficient uses, which in the case of capital is 
actively supported by the government policy. Subsistence production can be 
regarded as merely the visible symptom of this inefficient resource allocation. 
While the key to the problem clearly lies in the rural labour market, possible 
cures are hard to find. Keeping in mind the prospect of the currently hidden 
unemployed protesting on the streets against their situation even makes the 
government support policy of subsidising credit and pensions understandable. It 
does, however, not address the actual issue. 
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Romanian Agriculture went through major transformations after the political 
changes of December 1989, due especially to the structural reorganization of 
land ownership. Agrarian reform, started in 1990 with the liquidation of the 
socialist cooperatives and regulated by the new land ownership law (No. 
18/1991), along with a whole series of other laws and government decrees, 
triggered a process of transformation which could be best characterised as 
chaotic and painful both for the farmers and for the consumers.  
The main feature of the land ownership structure that resulted from this is the 
high degree of fragmentation of the property, the great majority of the former 
co-operative lands being tended today by farmers whose property is small, 
usually between 1 and 5 ha or even less. Although part of these farmers are 
associated with small agricultural enterprises, their weight in the whole structure 
of private land property is minor (less than a third), they usually cultivate a 
small number of crops, do not raise livestock and achieve mediocre results. The 
private commercial societies which were formed after 1990 cultivate a larger 
number of crops, enjoy a higher degree of productivity, but seldom raise 
livestock. The state enterprises, reorganised as shareholding societies (stock 
companies), still retain an important amount of agricultural land, are waiting for 
new privatisation laws and usually have serious financial problems. 
The proportion of the agricultural workforce in Romania rose after 1989 (from 
27% to about 35% today), due especially to the major crisis of manufacturing 
industries. This phenomenon further contributed to the fragmentation of land 
property and to the pauperisation of the farmers. The chronical lack of financial 
resources became visible in the high amount of manual and animal labour force, 
and is also the main cause of the low level of productivity. On the other hand, The Market Potential and Patterns of Contemporary Agriculture in Romania's Northwestern Plain  125
small properties cultivate a large variety of crops (though cereals are 
predominant) and usually raise a small number of livestock, just enough for self-
sufficiency. In these conditions, the degree of specialization is very low and an 
important part of the agricultural households are mainly subsistent. A small part 
of the farmers (usually in villages next to urban centers) are capable of 
producing and selling surpluses, formed essentially of vegetables, fruits and 
animal products. The food processing industry of these towns is mainly supplied 
by the commercial societies (either private or state-owned). 
A major problem of analysing the importance of Romanian subsistence-
agriculture is that there are no available statistics concerning either the quantities 
of sold products or the amount of financial revenues resulting from the sale of 
these products, especially for the small farmers who paid no revenue taxes in the 
nineties (they paid only a lump sum relating to the extent of their property). That 
is why we had to find a method which could indirectly delimit the territoral units 
where agriculture has better market access from those who are essentially 
subsistence-oriented. 
2 ANALYSTICAL APPROACH 
2.1  The Study Region 
The agricultural region targeted in this study is the Someş Plain, situated in 
northwestern Romania and representing the northern third of the Pannonian 
Plain positioned east of the Hungarian border. The plain is limited to the north-
east by the volcanic range of Oaş-Gutâi Mountains, to the east by the Western 
Hills, to the south by the Barcău river, to the west and the north by the border 
with Hungary and Ukraine. This area includes 50 communes (basic 
administrative units in Romania) of which 5 are urban. The urban center of the 
region and the biggest town is Satu Mare (the capital of the same county, with 
more than 130,000 inhabitants), followed by Carei (about 26,000); there are 
three other small towns (with around 10,000 inhabitants each) and 8 communes 
belonging to Bihor county (with Oradea as capital). 
2.2  Database and Methodology 
The database taken into consideration in order to establish the relative market 
potential mainly examines three categories: the population (demographic 
potential), the land-ownership structure (the property potential) and the 
transportation infrastructure (the communication potential). Though these 
parameters cannot substitute the weight of merchandise production expressed in 
monetary units, they can offer a starting point for analysing the level of market 
access for each administrative unit. 
The demographic potential was determined as a result of agricultural density 
and the weight of non-agricultural manpower. The agricultural density expresses Csaba M. Kovács  126 
the number of inhabitants who are supported by agricultural land, in other 
words, the amount of potential consumers for the agricultural products. From 
this point of view the biggest consumers are obviously urban centers, but the 
rural population (whose proportion in the Someş Plain is 48.5%) also has its 
needs and therefore they potentially consume half of every kind of product. The 
weight of non-agricultural manpower reflects, on the one hand, the importance 
of secondary or tertiary economic activities and on the other hand the higher or 
lower need for agricultural manpower as a consequence of the mechanization 
level. In this sense, a lower level of agricultural manpower is a positive feature, 
as it shows a higher variety of economic profile and the degree of economic 
development, and thus of the purchasing power of the inhabitants. 
The property potential is a result of the average weight of the private 
associations and of the average dimension of agricultural exploitations, and 
expresses the level of property-organisation and fragmentation. The average 
weight of the private associations and societies expresses the proportion of 
private agricultural land owned by associations and private commercial 
societies, and it shows the propensity of the farmers to organise themselves after 
1990 into bigger properties than individual households. Though this kind of 
organisation apparently offers advantages from the financial and productivity 
points of view, and thus for the market competition, their weight is still low 
(22% in average). The average dimension of agricultural exploitation represents 
the average surface of privately owned agricultural land (individually, in 
associations or in commercial societies) divided by the number of households. 
This shows mainly the degree of fragmentation of the private land property and 
has an average value of 2.6 ha in the Someş Plain (usually between 1 and 6 ha).  
The communication potential was calculated as an average between the 
dotting of the geographic distance from the urban centres (the positioning 
potential) and that of the transportation infrastructure (the transportation 
potential). The positioning potential was calculated as a ponderate average of the 
road distances from each commune centre to the urban centres, including the 
capitals of two neighbouring counties (Oradea and Baia Mare) and the town of 
Marghita, situated in the north of Bihor county (the ponderation of the averages 
was made according to the total population of these towns). The transportation 
potential is expressed by the sum of dots resulting from the number and rank of 
roads and railroads entering into each centre of commune. 
In order to make these parameters comparable, in each case we converted their 
values into a scale from 0 to 10, designating 0 points as the minimum and 10 
points for the maximum value of each of them (Figure 1).  The Market Potential and Patterns of Contemporary Agriculture in Romania's Northwestern Plain  127
Figure 1:  The Calculated Parameters of the Market Potential 
Source: Own  depiction. 
This method made it possible not only to compare the six analysed parameters 
but also to cumulate them; the final parameter obtained as the sum of the 
previous three being defined as the market potential (Figure 2).  
Figure 2:  The Values of Market Potential in the Communes of the 
Someş Plain 
Source: Own  depiction. 
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3 CLASSIFICATION OF REGIONS 
3.1 Market  Orientation 
The agriculture of the Someş Plain can be classified by administrative units into 
four main categories (Figure 3): 
•  Subsistent agriculture with the values of the market potential below 14 points; 
•  Intermediate agriculture where the market potential is between 14 and 18 points; 
•  Quasi-commercial agriculture with a potential between 18 and 25 points; 
•  Commercial agriculture, where the market potential is above 25 points. 
Figure 3:  The Categories of Agriculture in the Someş Plain, According 
to the Market Potential of the Communes 
Source: Own  depiction. 
3.2 Classification  According  to Production Patterns and 
Commercialisation 
The territorial differences of agriculture can also be emphasized by the values of 
the crops/livestock balance, calculated according to the relative importance of 
the crop or animal production for each commune (KOVÁCS 2002). The market 
potential related to the crops/livestock balance allows the identification of 
several types of agriculture characteristic of larger areas within the Someş Plain 
and which are thus appropriate for establishing the main patterns of agriculture. 
These patterns can be further divided into sub-patterns either by their geographic 
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Figure 4:  The Patterns and Sub-patterns of Agriculture in the Someş 
Plain 
Source: Own  depiction. 
The established patterns and sub-patterns are: 
1. The commercial pattern is represented in the Someş Plain by only six units, 
from which five are urban and one is an urbanized rural commune. The market 
potential is the highest in these cases (above 18 points) shown especially by the 
high demographic potential and the best communication potential. The 
crops/livestock balance inclines to the animal sector in the northeastern towns 
and to the cropping sector in the western half of the plain. 
The urban-commercial sub-pattern, represented by the two major urban centres 
(Satu Mare and Carei) which are the only cases of typically commercial 
agriculture, is characterized by the highest population density, a negligible 
proportion of agricultural manpower, the most important industrial processing 
capacities and the highest level of transportation infrastructure. The agriculture 
practiced in the suburban zones of these towns is dominated by livestock raising 
and vegetable farming and is almost exclusively oriented towards the nearby 
urban consumers, represented either by the food-processing factories or by the 
free market.  
The quasi-commercial sub-pattern is characteristic for smaller towns whose 
economic profile is agro-industrial; consequently, they have certain industrial 
processing capacities, though not comparable to that of the bigger cities. The 
higher market potential (between 18 and 25 points) is given both by the high 
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agricultural manpower) and a good communication potential (these towns are all 
situated on the main road and railroad axes, and generally have a good 
transportation infrastructure). 
The suburban pattern is generally spread around the two major urban centres of 
the plain and is usually intermediate concerning their market or subsistence 
character, with a market potential between 14 and 18 points. Though the two 
towns that represent their primary centres of attraction are not similar in size, the 
difference is rendered neglectable by a more important food industry-capacity in 
the case of the smaller town (Carei). This difference has an impact on the 
crops/livestock balance and natural conditions. Moreover, the land ownership 
structure around the two towns are quite different, which induces further 
differences in the agriculture's profile; this is why such a pattern can be divided 
into two subpatterns: 
The suburban-mixed sub-pattern is characteristic for the communes situated 
around Satu Mare which are not very ecologically favourable (poor soils), but 
they can still make a profit from their direct vicinity to the biggest town in the 
plain. This is especially visible in their high communication potential, which 
offers them good market access, and thus a higher market potential. The profile 
of agriculture is balanced, with the livestock raising being dominated by a few 
intensive farms (dairy, pork and poultry) and completed by the small private 
farms, while the cropping sector's most important branches are the cereals, 
vegetables and fodder cultivation. 
The suburban-cropping sub-pattern includes the communes around Carei and is 
unique in the plain mostly because of its high ecologic potential (especially due 
to very rich soils), very favourable to crops such as cereals, industrial plants and 
vegetables. This is why the crops/livetock balance here usually inclines towards 
the cropping sector, though the animal raising, dominated by swine, is still 
important. These villages also have the highest proportion of organised farmers. 
The highest specific production levels obtained in these villages are mostly 
absorbed by an important food-processing capacity (edible oil production, textile 
processing, the milling industry, the meat industry, tobacco processing, and 
canneries) in Carei.  
The peripheral pattern groups the communes situated a larger distance from the 
main urban centres and thus with less favourable market access, visible in the 
usually lower market potential. The geographic situation in more peripheral 
areas of the plain also cause a larger spread of the cases belonging to this 
pattern, reflected in a larger variety of the natural landscape and potential, the 
agricultural profile, a generally lower demographic potential and a lower quality 
of transportation infrastructure. According to the geographic position and to the 
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The livestock-peripheral sub-pattern is characteristic for the northeastern 
extremity of the plain and presents common features concerning the natural 
potential, the demographic potential, the structure of the land property and 
particularly the profile of the agriculture. The determining ecologic characteristic 
is the slightly cooler and wetter climate caused by the proximity of the 
mountains, combined with a very flat terrain which encourages stagnating water, 
thus rendering the soils poor. These features lead to a higher proportion of 
pastures and meadows, thus to an orientation of agriculture towards livestock, 
especially cattle; this sub-pattern is the closest to what is known as dairy 
farming. The average dimension of the exploitation is low and the weight of 
private associations and societies very low, so the property/potential is reduced, 
but the demographic potential and the communication potential are higher than 
in the case of the other peripheral sub-patterns, as is the market potential.  
The cropping-peripheral sub-pattern concerns cases found in the southwestern 
extremity of the plain (situated in Bihor county), near the border with Hungary. 
These communes generally have superior natural potential, but are far away 
from the major urban centres, have a low quality transportation infrastructure, a 
high proportion of agricultural manpower and low property-potential; thus their 
market potential (with one exception) is usually low. The rich soils and the 
variety of natural landscape allow the cultivation of a great variety of crops 
(cereals, industrial plants, fodder, vegetables, fruits, vineyards), which easily 
incline the crops/livestock balance towards the cropping sector, but also impede 
the specialization of agriculture, emphasizing its subsistent character. 
The balanced-peripheral sub-pattern is represented by the communes situated 
on the southeastern borderline of the plain, abutting the low hills of Crasna. This 
position provides a high variety of natural landscape which, combined with a 
generally low demographic and property potential, gives a dominantly subsistent 
character to agriculture. The relatively long distances to the urban centres, and 
with few exceptions, the low level of transportation in these villages, further 
reduces the market potential even if some of the villages have certain industrial 
processing capacities. Given the fact that a large number of crops are cultivated 
and there is also an important amount of pastures and meadows which favour 
animal farming, the profile of the agriculture is balanced. 
The regressive pattern is given by the cases with less favourable conditions for 
agriculture, represented by four communes from the inner-central part of the 
plain. They have as common features the lowest natural and demographic 
potential and isolation from the main axes of communication, which gives them 
a low market potential in spite of the relatively central geographic position 
within the plain. These villages are situated on very flat terrain with mediocre 
and poor soils, have a very sparse and aged population, predominantly 
agricultural manpower and a very poor transportation infrastructure which 
emphasizes their isolation. The average dimension of the exploitations is higher Csaba M. Kovács  132
than anywhere else in the plain due to the low agricultural density, but the 
weight of private associations and societies is low. Though important surfaces 
are used as pastures and meadows, they are usually situated on the poorest soils, 
which is why the animal density is also low, which has led to semi-extensive 
cattle breeding.  
4 CONCLUSION 
The main patterns described are also characteristic for other regions in the plains 
and lower hills of Romania, (even if they present specifically local features) so 
they can be considered as general patterns  for the actual state of Romanian 
agriculture. The correspondents of these patterns and sub-patterns can be found 
especially in the Transylvanian provinces, where the elements of natural 
potential and socio-historical development of agriculture were quite similar to 
those of northwestern Romania, and where the actual trends of evolution are 
also very similar: beyond the general crisis which is characteristic for the whole 
of Romanian agriculture, the last decade has shown an increase in the territorial 
contrasts between the more favourably positioned villages with better market 
access and the isolated, profoundly rural settlements where agriculture remains 
predominant and essentially subsistent. 
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Subsistence agriculture is a phenomenon that is presently encountered not only 
in developing countries, but also in the Central and Eastern European transition 
countries (CEECs). The various land reforms implemented in Eastern Europe 
have led to differences in the land tenure and farming systems and have 
influenced the access to land and capital and farms' productive efficiency. 
The Bulgarian land reform of 1991 changed the economic behaviour of the rural 
population. It created new visions, a new environment and possibilities for the 
development of rural households, and took them to a decision-making crossroads: 
to continue working in agriculture or to leave it; to enter the agricultural sector 
or to stay out of it; to change or leave unaltered their economic, social and 
environmental preferences. As a consequence of all these decisions, an 
imbalance in the agricultural sector emerged. 
Subsistence farming in Bulgaria has played a huge social role in the last decade 
due to long-lasting economic reforms and macro-economic instability during the 
first years of transition. In the last few years it has been used as an instrument 
for smoothing consumption by providing the necessary means for rural 
households to overcome their budget constraints. However, it does not lead to 
optimal allocation of resources, increases in welfare or to economic growth. The 
current large number of subsistence farmers in Bulgaria is a temporary situation 
which will continue to exist in the future, but in smaller dimensions. 
Importantly, current and future agricultural policy should focus not on the 
support of this farming system, but rather on reducing the level of subsistence, 
on the transformation of existing subsistence farms into commercialised farms, 
and on improving their competitiveness and efficiency. Diana Kopeva, Nivelin Noev  134
This paper describes the development of individual farm structures in Bulgaria 
during the last century and the role of subsistence farms in agriculture. Using 
official and household survey data, we analyse the current state of subsistence 
farming in rural areas and determine its importance for agricultural 
development.  
The paper is organised as follows. The second section presents an overview of 
some theoretical definitions of subsistence farming. An analysis of the current 
state of subsistence agriculture in Bulgaria appears in section three. Section four 
discusses the implications from our empirical analysis and provides insights to 
(future) rural development and agricultural policy. The last section concludes 
the paper. 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE 
The abundant set of economic, social, psychological, environmental and natural 
characteristics of the CEECs, which generally differ from that which 
characterises the Developing Countries (DCs), results in a differentiation of the 
existing subsistence farm types. However, the research on subsistence farming 
in the DCs could be used as a basis for developing a policy framework and 
strategies for coping with the negative outcomes from subsistence farming in 
transition. 
Farming systems consist of resources (land, labour, capital) used in activities 
(crops, livestock, off-farm) to produce a flow of outputs (food, raw materials, 
cash). A farming system is a unit consisting of a group (household) and the 
resources it manages in its environment involving direct production. Factors 
such as climate, weather, land tenure, land quality and socio-economic variables 
are included (BEETS 1990).  
Subsistence farming is a production process directed to the fulfilment of the 
household's basic needs. It neglects existing market conditions and usually 
applies non-optimal use of resources under certain constraints.  
Subsistence farming, mostly referred to as smallholder farming, implies 
producing enough food for the needs of the farmer and his family (SPEDDING 
1979). It leads to low labour productivity, low land productivity, soil erosion, 
ecological damages, food shortages, rising food prices and an economic 
environment which has shown itself uncongenial to accelerated mechanised 
farming (ATTA-KONADU 1974).  
Subsistence agriculture is a complex farming system where owners of small 
amounts of land and/or livestock take a higher risk in production, and through 
the low use of external inputs, produce insufficient output for the market. 
Following BEETS (1990) three types of farming could be recognised: (i) 
resource-poor, largely subsistence agriculture; (ii) intensive subsistence 
agriculture; and (iii) commercial/market-oriented agriculture.  Subsistence Farming in Bulgaria: Between Tradition and Market Requirements  135
HAINES (1982) considers the primary objective of subsistence agriculture to be 
maximising crop output by converting it into human and animal food with 
minimum waste. He argues that once this level is achieved, the farmer becomes 
less interested in maximising physical output than in maximising his income, 
and this may tempt him to reduce output in the hope of raising the prices. 
Moreover, while the main objective of the largely subsistence farms is to 
increase the produced quantity of food, intensive subsistence farms produce near 
the limit of sustainable production and their target is to maintain that level of 
production. 
3 SUBSISTENCE FARMING IN BULGARIA 
3.1  Historical Overview  
Subsistence farming in Bulgaria is not a phenomenon that has appeared as a 
result of the ongoing reform processes. It has its traditional roots in the years 
preceding the communist period, and thus we cannot get into its core by 
neglecting the past. 
The late start of the country's development (after 1880) and the land reform 
carried out at that time brought into the scene a large number of landowners 
possessing small parcels of land. Land owned by the rural households was 
extremely insufficient in quantity, or just enough, for the usually large-sized 
households, to produce the food which would satisfy their needs. Different types 
of land tenure systems existed mainly based on the cultivation of small, 
dispersed parcels of land. Subsistence farming was sustained through the low 
level of education, the lack of capital, the slow industrial growth, the legislation 
framework, the large-sized families in rural areas and the adverse living 
conditions. Attempts to reduce the significance of the problem and shift 
agricultural production from subsistence levels to market-oriented were made in 
the beginning of the 1920's when the first cooperatives were established. This 
allowed farmers to apply new techniques and new manners of land cultivation 
through mechanisation, and hence to enter the agricultural market.  
According to official data, in 1897 about 20.9% (19.3% in 1908) of the farms 
were below 0.5 ha. Another 11.3% (12.2% in 1908) were between 0.5 and 1 ha, 
or in total, 32.2% of all farms were smaller than 1 ha. In 1926 and in 1934, the 
situation changed and only 11.9% and 13.5%, respectively, of the farms were 
smaller than 1 ha. 
After the collectivisation process in 1950-1960, large-scale agriculture replaced 
the existent individual household farms. This drastically changed the situation in 
the sector and the small-sized subsistence farms vanished, replaced by co-
operatives and state farms. The only feature of subsistence farming that Diana Kopeva, Nivelin Noev  136
remained viable was the cultivation of household plots
1 where different crops 
were grown, mostly maize, vegetables and permanent crops (grapes, plums, 
etc.).
2 Later on, in the beginning of the 1980's, the state started a policy for the 
self-sufficiency of the rural population. According to the policy, each household 
had the right to cultivate small parcels of land (up to 0.1 ha) and/or to look after 
certain maximum of livestock heads (e.g., maximum 5 sheep, etc.). At that time, 
following the state policy, the co-operatives started to give parcels of land of up 
to 0.1 ha to the rural households (so-called "personal use" land), letting them 
cultivate the land and choose the crops they wanted to grow.
3 This specific 
feature of the socialist land tenure system in Bulgaria was successfully passed 
on to the present day, no matter the land restitution process, and currently, in 
many villages the cultivation of this "personal use" land represents the way in 
which subsistence farming operates and exists. 
3.2  Socio-economic Characteristics of Rural Households in Bulgaria 
Several factors play an important role in determining the social and economic 
position of rural households and cause a strong social differentiation between 
them:  
•  Lack of favourable market conditions; 
•  Lack of efficiently working rural institutions; 
•  Macro-economic instability during the first 9 years of the transition period; 
•  Lack of sufficient investments in agriculture; 
•  Lack of a well-functioning land market; 
•  Underdeveloped output markets; 
•  Limited opportunities for off-farm employment; 
•  Lack of favourable legislation framework for development and growth in the 
rural areas. 
The combined influence of all these factors separates the rural households, 
according to their financial situation, into four groups: successfully-developed 
rural households, households with stable development, subsisting households 
and impoverished. According to a representative responsible for the country 
household survey on social household characteristics (see KOZHUHAROVA 
1999), in 1998 only 6% of the households in the rural areas belonged to the 
group of successful households, about 26% were considered stable, 47% were 
determined to be subsisting and 21% impoverished.  
                                           
1  A household plot includes all the agricultural land cultivated by the household (usually up to 0.5 ha at that 
time), together with the house yard. 
2  The cultivation of the household plots is, however, something traditional for the Bulgarian society. A 
century ago, household plots were considered as a sign of wealth. Nowadays, because of economic 
changes, it is used only as an additional source of food and/or cash income. 
3  No permanent crops were permitted to be grown on such land (e.g., grapes, peaches, etc.). Subsistence Farming in Bulgaria: Between Tradition and Market Requirements  137
The subsistence farms' development and their transformation into market-
oriented producers are strongly connected with labour resources and the supply 
of labour in the rural areas. Transition countries, and particularly Bulgaria, face 
a two-sided labour problem. On the one hand, there are insufficient disposable 
labour resources in the rural areas, and on the other hand there are no incentives 
that could stimulate the unemployed agricultural specialists (often landowners) 
to move from the cities to the villages. Importantly, the unemployed rural 
population is ready to make big compromises just to become employed: 67.2% 
of the households are ready to receive lower-than-average wages for the area 
and 69.0% are willing to work even under bad working conditions. Rural 
household members prefer to be employed in non-agricultural activities, while 
land cultivation remains a source of additional income. Nevertheless, all those 
who are unemployed rely on their land. Sixty seven percent farm their land in 
situations of long-term unemployment and/or after spending all accumulated 
financial means. Importantly, about 40% of the Bulgarian villages are without 
non-agricultural employment. These are mostly small villages, 80% of them 
with a population of less than 500 people, with an average age per inhabitant of 
over 50 years. 
3.3  Household Consumption and Income 
To estimate the number of subsistence households, we use data from a 
representative national survey conducted in 1998 financed by the European 
Commission
4. As Table 1 shows, subsistence households account for a large 
share of all households in the rural areas. Importantly, 65.5% of all rural 
households produce food only for their own consumption. The share of 
subsistence farmers from all farms smaller than 0.5 ha is 68.4%. From those 
farms between 0.5 and 1.5 ha, some 76.1% are subsistence farmers and their 
share declines with the increase of the farm size (58.5% of those with farms of 
1.5-5 ha and 21.3% of those who run farms larger than 5 ha). This may also 
suggest that a large part of the land in the large-sized farms is left abandoned by 
the farmers. Interestingly, only 7.2% of the rural households consume between 
70% and 100% of their own production. 
Figure 1 reveals a trend of declining share of income from household plots in the 
total household income. This trend has been stable since 1997, and in 2000, the 
share was 51.5% less than in 1992. This proves our hypothesis that the 
importance of subsistence farming will decline in the future and will not count 
for a large share. 
                                           
4  The survey was conducted under the framework of the Phare ACE (Action for Cooperation in the fields of 
Economics) Programme 1996 project No. P96-6090-R. Diana Kopeva, Nivelin Noev  138
3.4  Land Reform and Individual Farming in Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian land reform of 1991 was focused on the restitution of land 
properties to their pre-communist owners, and its main objective was to make 
possible the establishment of new, private, competitive individual farms. These 
farms had to fill in the gap left after the liquidation of the collective farms. It 
was also claimed in the beginning of land reform that the development of the 
rural areas should be a copy of the model that existed between the two world 
wars and that the backbone of Bulgarian agriculture should be the individual 
farms. The potential of agriculture as a source of income and a source for 
employment was expected to revive the rural areas, to create new job 
opportunities and to solve the problems of depopulation. 
However, what was expected to happen in agriculture, namely the emergence of 
well-functioning, market-oriented individual farms, did not happen. On the 
contrary, as we can see from Table 1, two-thirds of the individual farmers are 
subsistence – they do not produce for the market. Land ownership 
fragmentation, weak internal consumer demand, as well as low farm-gate prices 
all contribute to keep them vital. Moreover, the insufficient development of road 
infrastructure in the under-developed rural areas, poor market information, and 
the lack of competitive markets additionally strengthen their existence.  
The land and structural reforms in Bulgaria created a situation in agriculture 
similar to the one before the communist period in terms of land ownership 
fragmentation. The average farm size in 1998 was 3.92 ha, which is the smallest 
average size for a period ranging one hundred years (Figure 2). Moreover, the 
share of fallow and unused land from the average cultivated land per household 
was very high (29.9%), which shows the negative externalities from the 
implemented land reform (KOPEVA et al. 2000).  
According to our estimations, the number of parcels in Bulgaria in 1998 reached 
some 8,007,000 (Figure 3), which is even higher than the number of parcels in 
1897 (7,980,000). After 1999, the process of land sub-division between the heirs 
of former owners accompanied land restitution, and as a consequence the 
number of parcels has been permanently increasing. On average, small-sized 
farms are located on two parcels, while middle-sized and large-sized farms 
cultivate, 3.1 and 2.6 parcels on average, respectively (Table 2). However, in 
1998, the average size of a parcel was 0.6 ha, still higher than those of the past 
(Figure 4). 
The total number of individual farms in Bulgaria has fluctuated between 
1,700,000 and 2 million over the last seven years
5 (Table 3). 
                                           
5  The last official census of individual farms was conducted by the National Statistical Institute (NSI) in 1995. 
In July 1996, the NSI repeated the results from 1995. Subsistence Farming in Bulgaria: Between Tradition and Market Requirements  139
Different households require different amounts of land to satisfy their needs. 
Usually, subsistence farms are equated with small-sized farms, which however, 
does not represent the exact share of households not producing for the market.  
For the purpose of our analysis, we divide the individual farms into three groups 
according to their size (see Table 3). The first group (up to 1 ha) comprises 86% 
of the individual farms and 26% of the total land area cultivated by individual 
farmers. The farmers in this group, mostly pensioners, produce mainly for their 
own consumption, and with time, their number has been gradually diminishing.  
The second group, the group of the so-called marginal farms (1-5 ha), which 
play a buffer role between the small-sized, mostly subsistence farms and the 
large, market-oriented farms, consists of 13% of all individual farms. They 
cultivate about 26% of the land under individual farming.  
The third group, large market-oriented farms, includes about 1% of the newly-
established individual farms (larger than 5 ha), which cultivate 7% of the area 
under individual farming. Farms larger than 10 ha comprise only 0.2% of all 
individual farms. Importantly, these large farms cultivate more than 41% of the 
land farmed by individuals.  
Interestingly, from 1992-1998 there was a considerable decline in the number of 
households owning land up to 0.3 ha. While in 1992, about 50% of the 
households possessed up to 0.12 ha, in 1994 the same percent of households 
owned up to 0.68 ha, and in 1998 up to 1.4 ha. In 1998, some 27.8% of the rural 
households cultivated land of 0.1 ha, 14.0% between 0.1 and 0.2 ha, and 8.5% 
cultivated between 0.2 and 0.3 ha, i.e., 50.3% from rural households cultivated 
land no larger than 0.3 ha (including house yards).  
4 AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND SUBSISTENCE FARMING 
As transition is characterised by macro-economic instability, a high share of 
unemployment and limited access to capital, cultivation of small house yards 
remains a reliable source of food provision. Moreover, in the regions where off-
farm employment opportunities are limited, it remains the main income source. 
Subsistence farming impedes the development of rural areas, the implementation 
of new technologies for land cultivation and does not provide conditions for 
competition on the output markets. Furthermore, it negatively influences, in a 
direct or indirect way, the performance of commercialised farmers. According to 
HAINES (1982), the long-term policy towards subsistence farming is a necessity 
caused by: (i) the relatively low incomes in agriculture compared to the other 
sectors of the economy; (ii) the maintenance of domestic agriculture; and (iii) 
the contribution of agriculture to economic growth and common welfare. Diana Kopeva, Nivelin Noev  140
After the end of the land reform in Bulgaria (2001), one particular question has 
come to the fore: Where to place the focus of agricultural policy in order to 
reduce the number of rural households living at the subsistence level? 
As long as (off-farm) income is low, subsistence farming will continue to be a 
significant part of the agricultural system. In some regions, as it is in the 
Northwestern part of Bulgaria, the lack of off-farm activities and high 
unemployment keep subsistence farming vital. However, income gains can be 
achieved through easing access to land and capital and increasing their use. The 
lack of well-functioning land sales and land rental markets in Bulgaria creates an 
environment that impedes the possibility of more efficient land use. Hence, the 
importance of an agricultural policy oriented towards the development of land 
rental markets and their stabilisation, including land consolidation, is obvious. 
The share of subsistence farming also depends on farmers' location. In specific 
semi-mountainous and mountainous areas, certain constraints and/or resource 
availability problems may lead to a certain dominance of a particular farming 
system.  
Adequate credit supply also plays an important role in transition agriculture. 
Constrained access to capital impedes farms' development and reduces the 
efficient use of resources. During the first ten years of transition, financial 
institutions stayed away from agricultural loans because of their riskiness, 
inefficiency, fragmentation and disrupted links between the downstream and 
upstream sectors. The current interest rates imposed by the banks vary between 
22% and 26%, with a collateral requirement of over 150% of the loan, which 
makes loans unavailable for small- and middle-sized farmers. In addition, the 
state policy is limited to the activities of the State Fund "Agriculture" (SFA). 
However, the credit programs provided by the SFA still have high collateral 
requirements towards a loan's security (130% of the loan), although land is 
accepted as a backup. As a consequence, low-income rural households stay 
away from the credit schemes and there is no positive effect on subsistence. 
Hence, direct and/or social payments, and application of schemes for micro-
crediting could have a stimulating role in easing the access to capital and could 
reduce the role of the informal output markets and subsistence production. 
Furthermore, policies protecting farmers' incomes deserve attention. Even if a 
subsistence farmer becomes commercialised, the output markets and insolvent 
demand for agricultural products will constrain his/her possibilities for 
expanding and escaping from subsistence. 
In addition, the state has to ease the activities, through changes in the legislative 
framework, improved access to information and education and training facilities, 
of non-government organisations which are ready to provide financial and 
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Building up a stimulus for leaving agriculture, and particularly the level of 
subsistence, is an important instrument. If incentives for leaving agriculture are 
created, the implementation of land consolidation programmes will be 
considerably eased. However, such a policy remains currently inapplicable in 
Bulgaria due to two important reasons. First, is the strict fiscal regulations and 
lack of financial resources, as the state is under a Currency Board. And second, 
the preferences of new landowners for cultivation of the land they have received 
from restitution.  
Farm specialisation, together with contracting and strong vertical integration, are 
another remedy for subsistence farmers, as it increases the knowledge of the 
farmers as well as the farms' efficiency, and leads to the improvement of their 
welfare and social status. The development of a system clarifying the role of the 
intermediates in the food chain and their relationships with farmers and retailers 
has to be enhanced. The various and huge number of intermediates (physical and 
legal entities) in the food system at the moment absorb a disproportionately 
large share of the price margins, pressing down farms' profits and increasing 
consumers' costs. Currently, no state requirements are imposed on the quality of 
the intermediates' services and no specific regulations on their work and 
activities are legally enforced. As a consequence, disturbances in the food chain 
caused by the low quality of the services provided by the intermediates, cheating 
and payment delays are very often displayed.
6 In addition, farmers face 
difficulties when selling their produce due to the stagnation of the domestic 
markets and the collapse of the former trading system. 
The creation of possibilities for storing agricultural production can give stimuli 
to the farmers to increase their efficiency and profits. Improving, renovating and 
maintaining the road systems can ease access to the farms, reduce transport costs 
and make the whole community in a certain area better off. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigated the development of the farm structures and the role of 
subsistence farming in Bulgaria. It focused on the historical roots of subsistence 
agriculture and presented a detailed analysis of the current state of subsistence 
farming in the rural areas.  
Our results show that about 65.5% of the rural households in Bulgaria remain at 
the level of subsistence, which impedes the development of the rural areas and 
does not provide conditions suitable for competition on the output markets. 
                                           
6  Payment delays in Bulgaria are still often presented and they have never been adjusted for inflation between 
the time when the products have been delivered and when products are paid, as noticed also by GOW and 
SWINNEN (1999). Diana Kopeva, Nivelin Noev  142
An agricultural policy which encourages the reduction of the number of 
subsistence farms, in the view of the future EU enlargement, should focus on 
land market development, the creation of off-farm opportunities and better 
access to complete market information, as well as on infrastructure 
development. State-specific regulations regarding the quality of the provided 
services of the intermediates in the food chain, and their activities, should be 
legally enforced. Strategies and rural development programs whose main thrust 
is the level of household income and its improvement are crucial and should be 
implemented if the role of subsistence farming is to be considerably reduced.  Subsistence Farming in Bulgaria: Between Tradition and Market Requirements  143
APPENDIX 
Table 1:   Distribution of Individual Farmers in Bulgaria According to 
their Farm Size and Share of Consumed Production from Total 
Output, 1998 
Farm Size  Individual Farmers 
Consuming Less than 
70% of their Output 
Individual Farmers 
Consuming (70-100%) of 
their Output 
Individual Farmers 
Consuming 100% of 
their Output 
Up to 0.1 ha incl.  28.3  2.5  69.2 
0.1 - 0.2 ha  22.9  12.7  64.3 
0.2 - 0.3 ha  17.4  2.3  80.2 
0.3 - 0.4 ha  32.3  12.3  55.4 
0.4 - 0.5 ha  18.8  6.3  75.0 
First Sub-group, 
0.01 - 0.5 ha 
24.7 6.9  68.4 
0.5 - 0.6 ha  18.6  2.3  79.1 
0.6 - 0.7 ha  12.5  2.5  85.0 
0.7 - 0.8 ha  10.0  6.7  83.3 
0.8 - 0.9 ha  16.0  4.0  80.0 
0.9 - 1.0 ha  27.3  6.1  66.7 
1.0 - 1.1 ha  3.7  0.0  96.3 
1.1 - 1.2 ha  23.1  3.8  73.1 
1.2 - 1.3 ha  23.8  4.8  71.4 
1.3 - 1.4 ha  21.4  7.1  71.4 
1.4 - 1.5 ha  61.9  9.5  28.6 
Second Subgroup, 
0.5 - 1.5 ha 
21.0 2.9  76.1 
1.5 - 2.0 ha  34.0  10.0  56.0 
2.0 - 3.0 ha  18.6  11.4  70.0 
3.0 - 4.0 ha  48.6  5.7  45.7 
4.0 - 5.0 ha  33.3  19.1  47.6 
Third Subgroup, 
1.5 - 5.0 ha 
30.7 10.8 58.5 
Fourth Subgroup, 
more than 5.0 ha 
61.3 17.3 21.4 
Total for all 
Households 
27.3 7.2  65.5 
Total Number of 
Observations 
1085 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Table 2:  Average Number of Parcels Possessed by a Farm, 1897-1998 
Year Small  Farms 
(up to 1 ha) 
Middle-scaled 
Farms (1-5 ha) 
Large Farms  
(over 5 ha) 
Average for the 
Country 
1897  1.92 8.84  19.59 9.98 
1908  1.88  8.51 21.63 10.58 
1926  2.77 11.61 22.60 15.29 
1934  3.00 11.03 20.43 13.41 
1998  2.00 3.08 3.68 2.62 
Sources:  NSI for 1897-1934; KOPEVA (1999) for 1998 (KOPEVA et al. 2000). Diana Kopeva, Nivelin Noev  144
Table 3:  Bulgaria: Individual Farms in Bulgaria, 1992-1995 
Groups of Farms by Land Area (ha)  Year 
0 - 1  1 - 2  2 - 5  5 - 10  over 10 
Total 
Arable Land (hectares) 
1992  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  1438000 
1993  400003 328934 264097  98007 143581  1234622 
1994  652147 371567 407180 160361 467290  2058545 
1995  631139 312184 342145 168421  1008362  2462251 
Number of Farms 
1992  1783808 128874  42520  8608  580  1964390 
1993  1537462 248772  91980  15195  4045  1897454 
1994  1555090 342340  93568  15762  4201  2010961 
1995  1535111 156092  68429  13483  4007  1777122 
Average Farm Size (hectares) 
1992  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
1993  0.26 1.32 2.87 6.45  35.50  0.65 
1994  0.42 1.09 4.35  10.17  111.23  1.02 
1995  0.41 2.00 5.00  12.49  251.65  1.39 
Source: NSI. 
Figure 1:  Bulgaria: Change in the Income Share from Household Plot 
in the Total Household Income, 1992-2000 
Note:  Data for year 2000 is preliminary. 
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Figure 2:  Bulgaria: Average Size of Farms, (ha), 1897-1998 
Note:  In 1946 there is no data for the share of the arable land and the share of fallow and unused land. 
Sources: NSI  and  KOPEVA (1999), (KOPEVA et al. 2000).  
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Sources: NSI  and  KOPEVA (1999), (KOPEVA et al. 2000). 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBSISTENCE FARMING IN GEORGIA AS AN ECONOMIC 






1 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this contribution is to show what official data are available and what 
statements can be made concerning the importance of subsistence farming in 
Georgia. Combining the official figures with observations of the Georgian 
situation provided insight to the significance of subsistence farming for the 
Georgian society.  
It is obvious that subsistence farming plays an important role when considering 
Georgia's economic situation. Trying to get hold of this importance in figures 
requires a definition of subsistence farming and a comparison of this definition 
with the categories used in the Georgian statistics.  
The contribution takes a general look at agriculture's share in the Georgian 
economy, then discusses land reform as a precondition for the present structure. 
By using official Georgian statistics, we attempt to approximate the importance 
of subsistence agriculture, even though this category as such does not exist in 
these statistics. 
By describing the Georgian context, we put forward how subsistence agriculture 
should be defined for this specific case. Criteria for subsistence agriculture are 
discussed, leading to the issue of subsistence agriculture as a social and 
economic buffer. Having discussed the issues on a general and national level, 
the district (raion) level is focussed on, presenting detailed data from a case 
study conducted by the author. The data presented lead to the concluding 
remarks on the importance of subsistence agriculture in Georgia and its role in 
future. Hannah Kegel  148
2 AGRICULTURE'S IMPORTANCE AS ECONOMIC SECTOR IN GEORGIA 
Agriculture has always contributed a substantial share to the Georgian Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). But in times of economic collapse agriculture's 
importance increased dramatically. In terms of GDP-share, agriculture became 
the largest sector in the economy during the nineties. Due to this fact it is of 
interest to analyse to what extent the agricultural sector consists of subsistence 
farming. 
Table 1:  GDP Share of Agriculture, in percent 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
29.7  26.5  54.5 66 64.4  41.7 31 28.2  24.8 
Source: SDS  (1999b). 
Agriculture in 1990 was dominated by large collective and state farms that 
specialised in products for export to the other Soviet Republics. In 1998, 
agriculture was characterised by small family farms and production was 
orientated towards local consumption. 
Because of the total collapse of the economy, even though total agricultural 
production drastically declined, agriculture's share in the GDP reached its peak 
in 1993/94. In the extremely difficult years of 1993/94, which were charaterised 
by a total collapse of law and order, household plots became essential for 
survival. In the rural areas, the opportunity to produce for own consumption is 
still vital, as there has been no economic recovery in rural areas during the past 
years. 
3 GEORGIAN LAND REFORM 
In 1992 land reform started with the physical distribution of land to all rural 
families, even to families where none of the members were employed in 
agriculture. In land distribution, the maximum a family could receive as private 
property was 1.25 ha – this includes the household plot the family cultivated 
prior to reform. This maximum applies to families only where a member was 
employed in agriculture, whereas others received less land. In the mountains the 
maximum was raised to 3 ha. In densely populated villages the families received 
less land than the maximum. 
The decision to implement this type of reform was substantially influenced by 
the important role household plots played in Georgia throughout the Soviet 
period. In Georgia, private farming i.e., household plots – which at their largest 
size measured half a hectare – held the highest share of production in the whole 
Soviet Union. 1988 they officially produced 40% of the total Georgian 
agricultural production, whereas at the same time they only cultivated 6.3% of 
the agricultural land (SAKARTVELOS SSR STATISTIKURI SACHELMZIPO KOMITETI 
1989). The non-agricultural rural population with their household plots also 
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with their gardens. A substantial proportion of the rural population was engaged 
in non-agricultural spheres of labour without migrating to urban areas 
(GACHECHILADZE 1995). After land distribution, these plots have been enlarged. 
For most rural households cultivating their land has become essential for 
survival. 
Looking back, the measure of land distribution has often been critisised for 
having fragmentised the land and having been started without proper preparation 
(DIDEBULIDZE 1997), but it has to be mentioned that in the years of turmoil from 
1992 to 1995, land distribution had a stabilising effect on food security and on 
the political situation; wide-spread hunger in the rural areas was avoided and a 
tendency for spontaneous privatisation which would have lead to an increased 
destabilisation on the local level was defused. 
4 STATISTICS 
The paper now focuses on the structure of post-reform agriculture as it is 
presented in the Georgian statistics, first by looking into the terms used in the 
Georgian statistics and then by looking at data on land ownership and 
agricultural production. 
4.1  Terms Used in the Official Georgian Statistics 
Concerning the types of farms in the statistics there exist two categories: 
households and, in contrast to them, agricultural enterprises. In the English 
translations of Georgian publications, sometimes instead of "household" the 
confusing term "private farms" is used. In Georgian the term family farms 
"ojachuri meurneobebi" and agricultural enterprises "sasoplo sameurneo 
sazarmoebi" are used. 
Adding to the confusion are the categories privatised land and land belonging to 
the state fund. These two divisions are not necessarily congruent. Although 
privatised land is nearly exclusively in the hands of family farms, there are cases 
where an agricultural enterprise rents privatised family farm land. It is quite 
common that a tenant of state funded land is not registered as an agricultural 
enterprise. Does this mean that his production is attributed to the family farms? 
In cases which cannot be clearly classified in the existing categories – it is not 
an agricultural enterprise, but it uses state land – the district level seems to 
decide in which category the farm will be included. This fact causes a lack of 
standardisation on the national level.  
The term private farm – resulting from privatised land – instead of household or 
family farms is confusing, because the majority of agricultural enterprises are 
private according to their legal status (companies of limited liability, joint 
liability, joint stock companies, co-operative farms, individual farms), but they 
rent their land from the state. Hannah Kegel  150
Despite these classification problems the Georgian statistics give an impression 
of the size of the family farms and their importance. 
4.2 Land  Ownership 
In the 1999 Statistical Yearbook of Georgia, only 32% of all agricultural land 
and 54.6% of arable land were classified as privatised (as in Table 2). In these 
statistics Abkhazia and South Ossetia are included, even though at present they 
are not under the control of the Georgian government. In both regions 
agricultural reform has not taken place. If only Georgia is considered, the 
privatisation rate is higher. 
Table 2:  Land and its Distribution by Categories of Ownership as of 








Privatised, in thsd. ha  750.1 431.7 181.8 39.6 77.6
Privatised, in percent of Total  32 54.5 67 27.7 4.2
State Property, in thsd. ha  2,313.4 360.2 88 103.1 1,762.1
Note:  Lower rates of privatisation because Abkhazia and South Ossetia where no privatisation has taken 
place included. 
Source:  SDS (1999b), own calculations. 
Regionally, the overall percentage of privatised land differs significantly. These 
differences can be attributed to factors like population density, cropping patterns 
(tea plantations were excluded from privatisation in the beginning) and the 
composition of land (pastures have hardly been privatised). 
The average size of family farms obviously shows strong regional variation. To 
illustrate this I would like to refer to the 1997 household survey of the 
STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT (SDS 1998). In this survey the average size of land 
that rural agricultural households own is differentiated by mchare (regions), the 
average ranging from 0.96 ha at the upper, to 0.39 ha at the lower end. Densely 
populated villages with little land show even lower averages. 
What we should keep in mind from these statistics is the fact that more than half 
the arable land and more than two thirds of all the perennial plantations are 
privatised land that has been distributed to the population and is most likely to 
be cultivated by family farms with an average of less than 1 hectare. 
4.3 Production  Data 
In the 1999 Statistical Yearbook of Georgia the term family farm is used in 
Georgian, while in English the confusing term private farm is used. Let us stick 
to the term family farm. The share family farms have in agricultural production 
has increased for all products in the last ten years in part due to the decline of 
production of the agricultural enterprises. The share of the family farms for 1998 
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Table 3:  Share of Family Farms in percent of Total Harvest of 
Agricultural Crops and Animal Production in 1998  
Crop Production 
Crop Harvest  Share  Crop Harvest  Share 
Winter Wheat  73  Vegetables  87 
Maize  94  Melons  62 
Pulses Total  98  Fruit  99 
Sunflower Seeds  69  Citruses  98 
Soy Beans  82  Grapes  97 
Potatoes  90  Tea Leaves  45 
Animal Production 




Total Production, in 
thsd. Tons 
104.1 634.7  380.4  1.7 
Share of Family Farms, 
in percent 
99.4 98.8  99.1  94.1 
Source: SDS  (1999b). 
From these data the importance of family farms for production is obvious. 
Nearly all animal products are produced in family farms. The same can be said 
for the production of fruit, grapes, citruses, maize and legumes. Only in the case 
of the production of tea leaves is the share of the family farms less than half of 
the total production. This is simply due to the fact that at the beginning it was 
excluded from land distribution for strategic reasons (tea was exchanged against 
gas with Turkmenistan). Agricultural enterprises often concentrate on those 
crops where they can employ their machinery, for example wheat. 
The households – about 700,000 – have become the main producer of 
agricultural output. In 1997 and 1998 their share of total agricultural output 
amounted to 80% (SDS 1999a).  
5 SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN THE GEORGIAN CONTEXT – DEFINITION 
AND CRITERIA 
5.1  Definition of Subsistence Agriculture 
In the literature one often finds the division between subsistence agriculture, 
subsidiary farming and non-agricultural households with garden plots. For the 
case of Georgia, it is nearly impossible to make such distinctions. 
In Georgia's specific case – where all rural households have small plots of land 
at their disposal, and hardly any off-farm employment possibilities exist in rural 
areas – the differences between subsistence agriculture, subsidiary farming and 
non-agricultural households with garden plots have become so small that it is 
often impossible to decide to which category a household belongs. Therefore the 
term subsistence agriculture is used in a broad sense to include all types of 
family farms except those that are definitely market orientated.  Hannah Kegel  152
But subsistence agriculture is not only found in the tiny family farms, there are 
also agricultural enterprises which at a closer look satisfy all criteria of 
subsistence agriculture.  
5.2 Criteria 
What criteria should be used to describe whether a family farm or an agricultural 
enterprise is engaged in subsistence agriculture? Below the following criteria are 
discussed: market orientation, share of self-consumption, size, percentage of 
household/enterprise income from sale of agricultural goods and self-
assessment. Moreover, family farms as well as agricultural enterprises are 
examined. 
5.2.1 Market  Orientation 
The Georgian statistics offer no data on this complex question. Various surveys 
(BATESON 2000; DERSHEM 2000; SDS 1998b) as well as the preliminary results 
of the present case study come to the same conclusion: The majority of family 
farms are not market orientated. Their priority is to supply the family with a 
sufficient amount of food and sell their surplus produce. But when deciding 
what to cultivate they are clearly orientated towards their family needs. 
Those family farms which are market orientated often are located in the vicinity 
of large towns. For example, they engage in flower production – as prior to 
reform – and also in the production of milk and milk products (mazoni – a kind 
of joghurt). The production of fresh herbs for the markets of the large towns is 
also a typical specialisation of market-oriented farms. 
Agricultural enterprises substantially differ in size from family farms. Here, a 
market orientation should be expected, but there exist many cases where the 
total production of the enterprise just suffices to pay the workers in kind and 
barter for necessary inputs to keep the farm going and avoid liquidation. In some 
cases the enterprise lacks the resources to till all the land it has rented from the 
state fund, so that land is sublet. 
It has become difficult to market agricultural goods, especially those products in 
which Georgia was specialised and supplied the other republics with like tea, 
fruit and wine. The formerly important food processing industry totally 
collapsed and only very few enterprises are again functioning. Agricultural 
producers may sell directly to the consumer, take the products to the market or 
sell them to the retail organisations. Producers, especially family farms, suffer 
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5.2.2  Self-Consumption of Produce 
Most family farms consume the majority of their produce themselves, selling or 
bartering surplus produce. As mentioned above, some agricultural enterprises 
consume all their produce to pay their wages in kind or barter for inputs. 
5.2.3 Size 
The size of a family farm or an agricultural enterprise is not decisive for its 
market orientation. As mentioned above, there exists a small percentage of small 
family farms which are definitely market orientated and specialise in the 
cultivation of products they do not consume themselves. But the majority of 
family farms are engaged in subsistence farming.  
Compared to family farms, agricultural enterprises are more likely to have the 
intention of selling or exchanging their production. But cases like the one 
mentioned above, with low productivity and little sales, are quite common. 
Often, these are large farms in direct succession of the collective and state 
farms. 
Agricultural enterprises that are newly set up more often have the clear goal of 
obtaining cash or goods through the sale or barter of their produce in addition to 
producing for the needs of the family. 
5.2.4  Percentage of Household Income from Agriculture 
For the rural population the sale of agricultural products is the largest source of 
cash inflow. This shows that a certain amount is sold, which in general is surplus 
produce. According to the 1999 statistical yearbook (SDS 1999b) these sales 
provide up to 49% of the average monthly cash income of rural households 
(Table 4). 
Table 4:  Average Monthly Cash Income of Rural Households in 1998, in 
percent 
Sales of Agricultural Products   49 
Contractual Employment  22 
Self Employment   11 
Pensions, Stipends, Family Allowances  11 
Remittances from Abroad   3.6 
Remittances from Relatives   3.6 
Total, in Lari  85.5 
Note:  In 1998 the exchange rate for 1 USD was between 1.32 and 1.55 Lari. 
Source: SDS  (1999b). 
The data shows the very low level of cash income in rural households. As a 
result of this lack of cash, many households have difficulties paying their land 
tax. Tax collection started in 1997, the first five years after distribution being tax 
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For agricultural enterprises, the sale of agricultural products is not necessarily 
the main source of income. The majority of agricultural enterprises own 
machinery, and tillage services are often offered to the population. Buildings are 
let and an involvement in trade is also quite common. This corresponds with the 
preconditions for leasing land from the state fund that were found in the author's 
case study: in general the tenants have technical and/or financial resources at 
their disposal, and last but not least they often have good connections to the 
local administration.  
5.2.5 Self-Assessment 
In the present case study of one district, it was found that most (over 80%) 
households interviewed – especially those whose members were formerly 
employed in other fields – do not consider themselves to be farmers. They 
regard farming as a temporary necessity to help them survive until finding 
employment.  
6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BUFFER 
Subsistence agriculture has an important social and economic function. It helps 
the rural population survive in very difficult times. It cannot stop the migration 
from rural areas to the towns altogether, but it reduces the impact. Many 
younger people leave the villages to try to find work in the towns or abroad. Due 
to this, the age structure of the rural population has shifted towards pensioners, 
thus increasing the importance of pensions as a component of the household 
income. In the past years all state benefits have regularly been paid with great 
delay, if they were paid at all. 
6.1 Employment 
Looking into the question of employment, or rather of unemployment, one finds 
that in 1997 58.6% of the economically active population were officially 
employed in agriculture. At the same time, the rural population accounted for 
44.4% of the population (SDS 1999b). This means that more or less all of the 
economically active people in rural areas are employed in agriculture. This 
employment is in the majority self-employment, i.e., family farms. Even if the 
people consider themselves unemployed, officially they are self-employed 
(changes in the law on employment 12.11.1997 state that everyone owning one 
hectare of land or more is to be considered employed). Obviously, subsistence 
agriculture is a buffer for the dramatic unemployment that results from the 
breakdown of the economy. "Agriculture's overwhelming contribution to the 
number of self-employed (86% in 1999) merely reflects the crisis in other 
sectors of the economy and the inherent difficulties of finding employment. The 
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contributes to the perpetuation of non-monetary economic relations in rural 
areas" (UNDP 2000). 
There exist hardly any possibilities of employment. Nearly all factories are shut 
down. Where large farms still function, wages are often paid in kind. Families 
who, prior to the changes in the nineties. found their income elsewhere, now 
have to rely on agriculture. The priority of the majority of family farms is to 
produce sufficient food for the family and to sell or exchange surplus produce. 
6.2 Food  Security 
The Georgian state is not able or willing to take on the responsibility of ensuring 
food security for its citizens; instead it passed the responsibility to the rural 
inhabitants themselves by giving them small patches of land. Driven by low 
levels of security and the lack of sufficient capital, the majority of family farms, 
but also many agricultural enterprises, function according to the motto "low 
input – low output". 
"With the collapse of the formal economic system, for most households in 
Georgia the ability to produce their own food is a major factor in reducing food 
vulnerability. It is not an exaggeration to state that one of the main welfare 
systems in Georgia today is self-provision, especially when it comes to 
household food security" (DERSHEM 2000). 
Thanks to their agricultural activity, rural households have a caloric surplus 
(BATESON 2000). 
As a conclusion from the above discussed facts, subsistence agriculture is the 
main factor ensuring food security in rural areas. 
7 KHASHURI CASE STUDY 
In this chapter, some facts will be illustrated in more detail by presenting data 
from the Khashuri district where the case study was conducted. The study 
concentrates on agricultural enterprises, but the data gathered also include 
aspects concerning the role of family farms (data have been collected since 
1996). The Khashuri district belongs to the region (mchare) shida kartli. With 
585 km², it is a fairly small district with no high mountains (lower than 1,400 
m). The town Khashuri lies 130 km to the west of the capital Tbilisi. With 
71,200 inhabitants in 1998, i.e., 121 pers./km², it is one of the more densely 
populated regions of Georgia. 65% of the population lives in urban and 35% in 
rural settlements. The rural population lives in 81 villages which are grouped in 
to 11 administrative units called sakrebulo. 
The large share of urban population indicates the former employment structures. 
Light industry was prominent in the Khashuri district. A high percentage of 
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stand still and the former workers, as well as those who were employed in the 
service sector, mainly work the land they received during land distribution.  
Land distribution was quick in comparison with other districts as Khashuri's 
former head of district administration (gamgebeli) actively supported the 
measure. More than half the agricultural land has been privatised. Of the land 
remaining in the state fund, about one third consists of pastures. Perennials 
(87%) and arable land (75%) are now mainly privately owned (More details are 
shown in Table 5). 
Table 5:  Distribution of Agricultural Land in Khashuri District 1989 
and 1999 Compared, in ha and in Terms of Ownership 
  Situation 1989  Situation 1999 
Public Sector Land in State Fund  19,253 9,322 
Household Plots (Sakarmidamo)  2,022 2,022 
Privatised Land (Samamulo)   -  9,931 
Status of Privatisation 1999 
  Area, in ha  Per cent of Privatised Land 
Agricultural Land Total  19,253   
 Of Which Privatised  9,931  51 
Arable Land Total  9,627   
 Of Which Privatised  7,242  75 
Perennials Total  3,080   
 Of Which Privatised  2,689  87 
Meadows/Pastures Total   6,546   
 Not Privatised  0  0 
Sources: SAKARTVELOS SSR STATISTIKIS KOMITETI (1989); DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, KHASHURI (1999), 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, KHASHURI (1999). 
A regional commission leases the state land to individuals, cooperatives, firms 
and so on. Eighty-seven leasing contracts were in force in 1999. These tenant 
farms vary extremely in size and profile. Two farms lease more than 200 ha of 
state land each. The 10 largest farms (> 90 ha) work 53% of the total state land 
leased (7 farms are in direct succession from the state and collective farms, with 
2 of these belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture). More than half of these 
large farms can in a way be characterised as subsistence farms. The harvest is 
just sufficient to pay the labour in kind – a widespread practice – and to barter 
for necessary inputs. When looking at the large farms it should be recalled that 
an incentive to keep profits low lies in the tax system, where agricultural 
enterprises with a profit of 24,000 Lari or more have to pay a profit tax of 20% 
additional to Value Added Taxes (VAT), a result of which is an increase of 
informal activities. But the lack of financial resources in most of these farms 
makes them live from their reserves, with no necessary repairs and investments 
taking place, minimal inputs result in minimal output, keeping the farms 
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Among the 77 smaller (< 90 ha) farms, at least 9 can be classified as market 
orientated. Here the decisive factors are existing labour, access to technical and 
financial resources and last but not least connections. 
Let us now look in detail into the situation of the household/family farms in the 
Khashuri district. 
Animal husbandry is totally in the hands of the households. It is difficult to fix 
the amount produced, but the data on livestock have proved to be quite reliable. 
Almost every family owns at least one cow. In the late eighties this was an 
exception in the densely populated villages of the low lands. Looking at the 
livestock data it is interesting to observe that the urban population also sees the 
necessity to keep livestock (as shown in Table 6). 
Table 6:  The Population's Share of Livestock, Khashuri District 




1996 % of 
Which 
Urban 




1997 % of 
Which 
Urban 
Cattle  13,967 96.4  16.6 15,071 97.8  18.8 
Of Which Cows  7,426 97.8  20.1  7,559 99.4  23.5 
Pigs  6,362 98.9  28.5  6,697 99.3  19.6 
Sheep/Goats  2,616 99.5  22.5  3,901 99.7  35.5 
Note:  Livestock as on the 1.1.1996 and 1.1.1997. 
Source: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, KHASHURI (1998). 
This data is of course only a snapshot, but it quite vividly illustrates the 
importance of the family farms and in particular shows to what extent the urban 
population in the regions is also involved in agriculture. Due to the possibility of 
leasing land, the situation has changed slightly in the last few years. Several 
tenant farms are increasing their livestock, in particular in one sakrebulo where 
land was distributed quite evenly. The 24 tenants have an average of 20.5 ha and 
no tenant has more than 100 ha. To mention the other extreme, a sakrebulo with 
the same amount of agricultural land in the state fund leased all the land (427 
ha) to one tenant farm. 
For plant production there exists information of the amount of land farmed by 
the households. But the validity of the official data that exists on what is 
cultivated on this land and in particular how much is produced by these 
households, has been shown to be questionable. Hannah Kegel  158














Source: SDS  (1999a). 
Mixed cropping is common to household farms. This creates difficulties in 
determining the exact amount of hectares cultivated by a certain crop. The most 
important crop is wheat, which according to the official statistics accounts for 
62%, followed by maize with 24% of the cultivated arable land. The production 
of vegetables which formerly took up approximately 20% of the arable land has 
been reduced in favour of wheat and maize that can easily be stored, and are 
essentials for human consumption. An incentive to produce wheat was the fact 
that wheat functioned as a currency between 1994-1998.  
In 1998, the Department of Statistics started to collect household data on the 
sakrebulo level. In every sakrebulo the data of 10 households is collected every 
3 months. Using some of this data and complementing it with interviews with 
some of the families whose data the household survey consists of, as well as 
observance and interviews with members of other households, a short 
description of the average situation of a household in the Khashuri region is 
given (Table 7). Of course, such an average household can neither reflect the 
broad variation between the 11 sakrebulos, which are mainly due to the differing 
natural conditions and the differences in population density, nor the variation 
inside each sakrebulo, which mostly depends in the composition and resources 
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Table 7:  Household Farm Khashuri District 2000 
Family Workforce
1) 3.7 
Of Which Pensioners   1.8 
Livestock 
Cattle  4 
Of Which Cows  1.6 
Pigs





4)  0.1 
Land Use, in percent of Household's Arable Land Cultivated 
Maize  47 
Vegetables 7.3 
Potatoes  5.4 
Wheat  4.6 
Notes: 
1) Lowest average on sakrebulo level 2 – highest 5.5; 
 
2) Most pigs are slaughtered in winter; 
 
3) Data of 4 sakrebulo show no sheep or goats; 
 
4) 1sakrebulo had 10 beehives. 
Source: DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, KHASHURI, household data Quartal I and II 2000, N=110, 10 families 
from every sakrebulo; data from Interviews 1998, 1999, 2000. 
The high proportion of pensioners among the family work force indicates the 
age structure and the fact that in many families at least one family member is 
absent for longer periods trying to find a source of income in a large town or 
abroad. 
Because the household data from Quartal I and II is used, variations over the 
year are not caught. This is in particular the case with pigs. The households 
usually buy piglets in the spring or summer and slaughter them in winter, so the 
data over the whole should be higher, about 1-1.2 pigs per household.  
According to the data, self-consumption is higher for most products than the 
amount sold or exchanged (beans, onions, garlic and beef are the exceptions). 
But this changes in Quartal III where during harvest time substantially more 
products leave the households. All households mention giving a large amount of 
produce to relatives and friends as well as bartering. Giving agricultural 
products as gifts to relatives, friends and acquaintances helps to foster 
relationships, which are so essential in the Georgian society. This is not a new 
phenomenon (s. DRAGADZE 1988). 
8 CONCLUSION 
From the statistics and surveys discussed above it does not seem unrealistic to 
state that at least two thirds of total agricultural activity in Georgia should be 
classified as subsistence agriculture. It can be concluded that subsistence 
agriculture is the most important economic and social factor in the rural areas, 
enabling the rural population to survive in this time of transition. In agriculture, 
the transition from large state or cooperative farms to tiny household farms was Hannah Kegel  160
very fast. The process of developing a new market and export orientated 
agriculture will need more time. In the meanwhile, the main problem is the 
population's lack of purchasing power, which makes them dependent on their 
own produce. 
Taking the employment situation and the dominant role of subsistence 
agriculture in agriculture today into account, it seems reasonable to predict that 
widespread subsistence agriculture will be a long term phenomenon in Georgia.  
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1 SOVIET INSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE
2 
Three of the most important Russian agrarian institutions are the subsistence 
household farm (personal auxiliary farm), the collective farm, and the district 
administration.  
Before collectivisation, the Russian peasant farms were primarily subsistence 
farms. Each peasant farm had two types of land plots: a farmstead plot and field 
plot(s). After 1917 the land belonged to the state but the village community 
possessed the land around the village and distributed and redistributed field plots 
between households according to the numbers of people in the family ('eaters'). 
Collectivisation did not totally liquidate subsistence peasant farms; it 
collectivised field plots and diminished the number of animals allowed for each 
household to a subsistence minimum. For most of the Russian peasant 
households, the number of personal animals kept by a family did not diminish 
because before collectivisation they kept just this subsistence minimum
3. Later, 
in order to underline the priority of the work on collectivised fields and auxiliary 
character of the work in household farms, the latter were called Personal 
Auxiliary Farms (PAF). Stalin started the mass collectivisation not exclusively 
for ideological reasons, but rather for a pragmatic purpose of extracting 
resources from the countryside, which was primarily subsistence-oriented
4.  
                                           
1  This paper is based on the PhD dissertation of the author (YEFIMOV 2002). 
2  An analysis of the "dependence path" of the Russian agriculture is made in (YEFIMOV 2001, 2002). 
3  The most important legislative act concerning Soviet agriculture (Standard Statute of Kolkhozes of 
1969/1980) determined the limits for household farms in the following way: farmstead plot – 0.5 ha, one cow 
with a calf younger than one year, one head of fattening cattle younger than two years, one sow younger than 
three months or two fattening hogs, ten sheep or goats, bees, poultry and rabbits. The average Russian 
peasant farm as it was just before the collectivisation is characterised in the Table 1 of the Appendix.  
4  See the Table 2 of the Appendix.  Vladimir Yefimov  162
The subsistence character of Russian peasant farms before and after 
collectivisation is their "genetic" feature. M. SAHLINS (1972) generalised survey 
results for Russia undertaken at the beginning of the last century
5 as the 
"Chayanov rule", according to which "the bigger labour capacity of a household, 
the less its members work efficiently" because their aspiration levels are low and 
correspond to a subsistence minimum. My surveys in collective farms of 
Northern Kazakhstan in 1996-1997 and in Samara province in 1997-1998 
witnessed a subsistence-orientation of rural dwellers. They indicated the same 
number of animals in their PAF answering two different questions: 1. How 
many animals it is necessary to keep in your PAF just to survive? 2. How many 
animals it is necessary to keep in your PAF in order to live well? If I tried to 
convince my respondents that a bigger number of animals would increase the 
well-being of the family they reacted by saying that if they had more animals 
they would have to work too hard.  
The nature of the institution of collective farms (kolkhoz) cannot be understood 
properly without PAF. The PAFs are the direct continuation of Russian peasant 
subsistence farms from the pre-collectivisation period. Before the 1960's, the 
PAF were the only source of survival for Russia's rural population. Even during 
the most favourable stages of the post-collectivisation period, the share of PAF 
in incomes of members of collective farms did not drop below 20%
6. This 
helped to provide enough potatoes, vegetables, meat, milk and eggs to them. In 
the1990's, this share increased in many former collective farms up to 100%. 
Currently, this is almost the only source for many rural families. The Russian 
collective farms have never been, and are still not agricultural enterprises 
(businesses). They served as state control mechanisms of the distribution and 
usage of agricultural products, and at the same time as mechanisms of survival 
for the rural population (resources of collective farms could be used for PAF 
only by members of collective farms). In the1990's, the first function of 
collective farms almost disappeared and the second drastically increased. PAFs 
as subsistence household farms are known to be unable to exist without links 
with a large neighbouring farm. That is where (often unofficially) most of the 
fodder for personal livestock comes from. In case of a real, not imaginary 
privatisation, an end will be put to this situation. Animals of typical PAF are fed 
not from farmstead plots (0.25 ha – 0.5 ha), but from collective farm produce. A 
typical PAF would need a 'field plot' of 3 ha – 6 ha to feed them
7. The rural 
                                           
5  See Tables 3 and 4 of the Appendix.  
6  See Table 5 of the Appendix. 
7  A French agricultural economist 40 years ago aptly described collective farm – household farm relations in 
the USSR: "Un kolkhozien qui a, comme c'est le cas au Kouban, une vache, deux jeunes bovines, une truie et 
six porcelets et une cinquantaine de poules, n'utilise pas seulement une parcelle de 0.25 hectare, mais aussi la 
surface nécessaire pour nourrir les animaux puisque les aliments du bétail lui sont fournis en nature par le 
kolkhoze. On peut dire que son exploitation couvre effectivement de 3 á 6 hectares suivant la qualité du sol. 
On retrouve tout à fait la consistance des petites exploitations de subsistance en France." (DE CHOMBART 
LAUWE 1961, pp. 140-141).  Agrarian Reform and Subsistence Agriculture in Russia  163
dwellers accept it because the work on collective fields is totally mechanised 
and the most of the work in PAF is manual.  
The connection between subsistence household farms and a kolkhoz/sovkhoz 
was not limited to receiving feed only. Kolkhoz/sovkhoz was more than a 
workplace for countrymen; it was the habitat. It provided a great variety of 
services. It is now increasingly hard for kolkhoz/sovkhoz (or former 
kolkhoz/sovkhoz) to do so due to a lack of money.  
There is a myth about the efficiency of PAFs. They often say that PAFs occupy 
3% of agricultural land and produce more than 50% of the volume of the 
agricultural production of the country. As we have just remarked, the livestock 
in many PAFs is fed by forage produced in collective farms. The leading role of 
PAFs in some sectors of crop production is explained not by higher yields (in 
1998 yields of potato in PAFs were 9.6 t/ha and in collective farms – 9.7 t/ha), 
but by the fact that collective farms occupy, for certain crops (for example 
potato), less land than PAFs. The increase of the share of PAFs in Russian 
agricultural production comes primarily from the drop in production of 
collective farms. The growth of PAF production in 1998 in comparison with 
1990 was 12.6%, but the livestock production in PAF 1998 decreased by 10% in 
comparison with 1990. This decrease is determined by the dependency of the 
PAF livestock production on collective farms fodder production, which have 
now weaker potential than before. In the1990's, the subsistence character of 
PAFs became stronger than before. In 1991, 28.5% of potatoes produced by 
PAFs were sold on the market; in 1998 they sold only 10.2%. The same 
tendency is seen in PAF livestock production: meat – 30.1% in 1991, and 22.4% 
in 1998; milk and dairy products – 25.1% in 1991 and 18.3% in 1998
8.  
Sometimes, opinions are raised that the PAFs serve as a school for private 
farming for members of collective farms. I do not share this opinion in the case 
of Russia. The PAF experience, where most of the work is done not by men but 
by women, does not suit private agricultural businesses for several reasons. First 
of all, the PAFs are not agricultural businesses but subsistence farms and the 
family consumes most of its produce. Owners of PAFs are not used to making 
transactions about inputs and outputs of their farms. They 'take' inputs from 
collective farms. In the past, they also sold their products to the collective farm, 
but now most collective farms have stopped this practice. Now, intermediaries 
coming to the village buy, at a very low price, most of the PAFs products 
oriented for sale. Many trials to create marketing and other types of co-
operatives for the owners of PAFs have failed. The primitive technologies used 
in PAFs are incompatible with competitive businesses. 
                                           
8  These judgements are made on the basis of the Russian official statistics (see Tables 6 – 12 of the Appendix). 
It is necessary to take in account that their exactness could be doubtful.  Vladimir Yefimov  164
In their current form, the agricultural enterprises essentially remain Soviet 
kolkhozes/sovkhozes (collective state farms), whatever one calls them 
(partnerships, co-operatives, joint stock companies, etc.). These large-scale 
farms are not efficient because of diseconomies of scale and, not least, because 
of the inefficient property structure, where workers and pensioners of the farm 
own the farm on a quasi-egalitarian basis. These old-fashion Soviet-type 
agricultural enterprises tolerate and even need the agrarian administrative 
system. On the other hand, this administrative system would automatically lose 
most of its power upon the radical reform of agricultural enterprises. 
A very significant difference between the management in Soviet agriculture and 
that in Soviet industry was its direct stewardship by communist party 
committees at regional levels. The first secretary of the district (rayon) 
communist party committee was the main decision maker in this branch of the 
Soviet economy. The district's department of agriculture helped him to make 
decisions, but never made them in his stead. 
Current district administrations coming to substitute the "Party and Soviet 
organs" with the help of their departments of agriculture fulfil, in many respects, 
the same functions as in the Soviet past, among them: the distribution of 
subsidies and inputs provided in credit (fuel, fertilisers, and seeds). In many 
cases, these credits, as in Soviet times, are not paid back. Because most of the 
agricultural enterprises are bankrupt and their current bank accounts are 
blocked, district administrations participate in the development of financial 
schemes to provide cash for collective farms. 
2 OBJECTIVES AND LEGISLATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN POST-SOVIET 
RUSSIA 
The objective of post-Soviet agrarian reform in Russia was transition to western-
style agriculture. Two legislative acts provided the basis of this reform: the 
Decree of the President of Russian Federation of December 27, 1991, "On 
urgent measures of accomplishment in land reform in the Russian Federation" 
(PASHOV 1999), and the Resolution of the Government of Russian Federation of 
December 29, 1991 "On the rules of the reorganisation of collective and state 
farms" (PASHOV 1999).  
The Decree of the President provided that the state and collective farms were 
obliged in 1992 to undergo reorganisation. They were to put their juridical status 
in conformity with the Law "On the enterprises and entrepreneurial activity", in 
which such forms of enterprises as collective farms and state farms were not 
stipulated. The local bodies of the executive authority were recommended to 
ensure the control of realisation of the right of the members of collective farms 
and workers of the state farms for an unobstructed exit from these farms for the 
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using the land with the right of permanent use according to this Decree had to 
take the decision before March 1, 1992 on transition to private individual, 
collective-shared and other patterns of ownership. The local administrations had 
to supply the citizens becoming the proprietors of land appropriate certificates 
on the land property rights. The Decree laid under obligation the heads of 
collective and state farms to allocate land shares to the workers and members of 
their families within one month from the date of submission of the application 
for the creation of a peasant farm. The property shares were also simultaneously 
with land shares. In the case of delay with the allocation of land and property 
shares, the heads of farms were fined at a rate of three monthly salaries by local 
bodies of the Committee on land reform and land resources. The same Decree 
granted peasant farms the right of land mortgage in banks, and banks were 
allowed to allot credits under the land mortgage. 
The provisions of the Decree of the President were developed in the Resolution 
of the Government. In addition, the Resolution contains norms which were not 
present in the Decree. So, by this Resolution, collective and state farms were 
authorised to transfer objects of the social sphere such as residential houses, 
inter-farm roads, energy supply systems, water-supplies, gas supplies, telephone 
lines and other objects to the property of the Rural Councils. The Resolution 
envisaged such radical measures as the liquidation of collective and state farms, 
which had no financial resources for servicing the debt of wages and credits. 
According to this Resolution, they had to be announced insolvent (bankrupts) by 
February 1, 1992 and the liquidations and reorganisation had to take place 
during the first quarter of 1992. 
It is interesting to note that two months after the publication of this Resolution, 
an important update was introduced to its text, which cancelled the compulsion 
for collective and state farms to put their status in conformity with the Law "On 
the enterprises and entrepreneurial activity". They were allowed to stay 
collective state farms if approved by assemblies of their labour collectives, and 
if the former juridical form of managing decisions about preservation of the land 
was fixed to them according to the current legislation. In practice, no collective 
farms declared bankruptcy. 
Agrarian reform, the frame of which was determined in the Decree of the 
President of December 27, 1991, and the Resolution of the Government of 
December 29 of the same year, did not proceed according to the prescriptions 
the President and the Government. The Decree and the Resolution were either 
not executed at all, or were executed only formally by changing signboards 
without any essential or real changes in the functioning of agrarian institutions 
of the Soviet type.  
The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 27, 1993 "On 
regulation of land relations and the development of agrarian reform in Russia" 
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Following the idea of its authors, it should have loosened the deadlock of 
agrarian reform in Russia. Among other things, this Decree provided that the 
proprietors of land shares have the right, without the consent of other joint 
owners, to assign a land lot in kind for management of a peasant farm, which 
they can mortgage and lease. They can also use it for the extension, up to the 
established norm, of a plot used for a personal household farm. This Decree 
allowed the proprietors of land shares, without the consent of other proprietors, 
to sell land shares to other members of the collective, and also – and it was a 
serious innovation – to other citizens and legal persons for agricultural 
production. 
At this time, an experiment in the Nizhniy Novgorod province was undertaken 
with technical assistance from the International Finance Corporation of the 
World Bank. Within the framework of this experiment, auctions for the sale and 
purchase of land shares and property shares took place inside some farms (IFC 
1995). The government approved this experiment in the Resolution of April 15, 
1994 "On the practice of agrarian transformations in the Nizhniy Novgorod 
province" (PASHOV  1999). A little later, on July 27, 1994, the government 
accepted a new Resolution "On reforming the agricultural enterprises taking into 
account the practice of Nizhniy Novgorod province" (PASHOV 1999). The rules 
of realisation for auctions distributing land and property inside farms for the 
reorganisation of agricultural enterprises were supplemented into this Resolution. 
On 1
st February 1995, in the Resolution "On the procedure of realisation of the 
rights of proprietors of land shares and property shares" (PASHOV 1999), the 
Government approved two documents enclosed in this resolution. They were 
"the Recommendations for preparation and issue of the documents about the 
right to land shares and property shares" and "the Recommendations about the 
order of disposal of land shares and property shares". These recommendations 
concretised the provisions already stated in the earlier accepted resolutions of 
Government on the agrarian reform. 
In 1996 it had already become clear that agrarian reform in Russia, as 
determined at the end of 1991 in the Decree of the President and Resolution of 
Government, had failed. The Decree of the President of March 27, 1996 "On the 
realisation of the constitutional rights of the citizens for land" (PASHOV 1999) is 
an implicit confession of it. It repeated once again what was already stated in the 
Decrees of 1991 and 1993, but which was not actually realised, and clarifications 
of the previous norms were offered so that they at last would begin to work.  
All above-mentioned legislative acts are founded on a certain theoretical basis. 
This basis is liberal neo-classical economic theory. According to this theory, an 
economy and its sectors, including agriculture, consist of independent actors: 
producers and consumers. All these actors produce, consume, buy and sell. 
Producers maximise their profits and consumers make their choices according to 
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transactions between actors are envisaged in this theory
9. Advocates of the neo-
classical theory believe that those market structures or institutions are created 
rapidly by the introduction of new rules providing maximum freedom for these 
transactions
10 or even by themselves in the process of transactions. The most 
important statement of the neo-classical theory is the following: if both types of 
actors (producers and consumers) make decisions in such a way as described 
above, then the market forces ('The Invisible Hand') inevitably establish so-
called equilibrium prices and bring the allocation of scarce resources to the most 
efficient actors. From the point of view based on this theory, an initial allocation 
of resources among actors does not play an important role because market forces 
will change the situation rapidly in favour of the most efficient actors. Besides, 
in the liberal neo-classical theory, there is no state, and many advocates of this 
theory believe that the less state, the better.  
Agrarian privatisation in Russia was executed on an egalitarian basis. It meets 
the criteria of justice, but it does not at all exhibit the criteria of efficiency. But 
the authors of land reform legislation did not worry about that because they were 
neo-classical economists. They estimated that the most important thing is the 
right of owners of land and asset shares to buy and sell them. According to 
them, the inclusion of this right into legislation is sufficient to start a process of 
creation of viable agricultural enterprises on the land of former collective and 
state farms, with the subsequent concentration of land and other assets in the 
hands of the most efficient farmers. The reformers did not pay any attention to 
such an institution as PAF. 
An alternative to the neo-classical approach is the institutional approach. Actors 
in this theory are not independent and are not only producers and consumers. 
Instead, the state is one of the most important actors. Transactions between these 
actors are not spontaneous and are structured by formal and informal rules 
(institutions). The introduction of new legislation (formal rules) does not 
automatically change human behaviour. Informal rules rooted in traditions can 
continue to determine human behaviour and new formal rules can be rejected or 
not followed, or their application distorted, especially if they contradict interests 
of actors. The new legislation needs to be enforced (NORTH 1990).  
3 IMPEDIMENTS TO RUSSIAN AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE 1990'S  
We think that the current state of the Russian agrarian reform is a direct result of 
ignoring the nature of agrarian institutions inherited from Soviet times and the 
application of a liberal neo-classical approach in the law making process
11. The 
                                           
9  Many neo-classical economists think that these transactions are spontaneous. 
10  This point of view is shared not only by neo-classical economists but also by many lawyers (PROSTERMAN 
and HANSTAD 1999) and political scientists (WEGREN 1998). 
11  The same conclusion can be made concerning agrarian reforms in other former Soviet republics (YEFIMOV 
1997). Vladimir Yefimov  168
most important problem which presents impediments to agrarian reform is the 
role of collective farms as the mechanisms of survival for rural communities.  
Rural dwellers understand very well that if former collective and state farms 
were substituted by real private enterprises, then they would lose the only source 
of survival they have: PAF or Subsistence Household Farm (SHF). They also 
understand that only a minority of them could create agricultural businesses and 
the majority would lose access to fodder from collective farms and would not be 
employed in the new private agricultural enterprises. That is why they resist any 
transformation of their collective state farms. They resist not as individuals, but 
as a community. So members of the community who wish to create private 
enterprises are under pressure from the community worried about subsistence 
household farms. Agrarian reform legislation provided rural dwellers with a 
very powerful tool for this resistance: privatisation of collective state farms by 
members of these farms on an egalitarian basis
12. 
Egalitarian land distribution and the absence of alternatives to collective farms' 
survival mechanisms is the second impediment for agrarian reform in Russia. 
My multiple interviews with members of collective farms prove that they 
consider their land share certificates not as certificates of the right for decision-
making and dividends, but as certificates of their membership in the community 
for which the collective farm is a survival mechanism. They expect from the 
collective farm just the continuation of support for their PAFs and some other 
services, as was the case before the1990's. For rural dwellers, to sell land shares 
means psychologically and administratively to be excluded from the community, 
and it is impossible for those who continue to live in the village (the absolute 
majority). Even when a collective farm is dismantled, and in this way the 
economic basis of the village community is disorganised, villagers look to be 
attached to some new community (sub-community of the old one) using their 
land shares. A pensioner perceives the leasing of her land share by a private 
farmer not really as a land transaction but as her affiliation to a community 
where the private farmer is the chief. The vital necessity for rural dwellers to be 
affiliated to a community for the provision of resources for their households and 
the role of collective farms as economic and organisational basis of the 
community is the main cause of the absence of land shares market. Workers of 
collective farms continue to work on these farms in spite of the fact that they are 
not paid for months and sometimes years. The do so in order to have access to 
                                           
12  French sociologist HENRY MENDRAS 25 yeas ago foresaw a transformation of Soviet collective farms into a 
producer of fodder for household animals in the case of the transfer of decision-making power to their 
members: "Aujourd'hui (1976) le kolkhoze comporte une exploitation collective fréquemment consacrée à la 
culture des céréales facilement mécanisables… tandis que les lopins individuels des kolkhoziens sont 
spécialisés dans les cultures maraîchères et arboricoles et dans l'élevage… Si la coopérative est gérée par 
l'assemblée de ses membres, une tendance naturelle se manifestera chez ces derniers d'utiliser l'exploitation 
collective au profit de leurs cultures et de leurs élevages individuels, et notamment de nourrir leur bétail avec 
des céréales détourné de la production commune…" (MENDRAS 1995, p. 54).  Agrarian Reform and Subsistence Agriculture in Russia  169
the resources of the farm to maintain their PAF – the most important factor of 
their survival. 
The last but not least impediment to agrarian reform is the absence of a 
sufficient number of candidates prepared for private farming activity. The 
authors of the Russian agrarian reform legislation did not ask themselves who 
would become a private farmer cultivating his own land. They thought that a 
sufficient number of candidates prepared for private farming activity already 
existed in villages and cities. At the beginning of the 1990's, 3/4 of the creators 
of private family sized farms were city dwellers. Many of them left their farms 
quite rapidly. A large amount of money provided to them by the Russian 
government in the form of soft credits did not bring many results. After ten 
years of the private farming experience in Russia, empirical evidence says that 
the most efficient owners of private family agricultural businesses are former 
managers, especially chairmen and directors, of collective state farms. This is 
partially the result of their affiliation with local informal business and 
administrative networks, but it is also due to their entrepreneurial capacities, 
including communication. Ordinary members of former collective state farms 
are usually unable to run a business farm because of their insufficient 
educational, and more generally, cultural background. The requirements for 
private farmers in Russia to be successful are higher than in Europe because of a 
more complex and difficult to manage business environment, and because of the 
absence of adequate advisory services for private farmers.  
From the point of view of the medium- and long-term perspectives, maybe the 
most important mistake of Russian agrarian reform policy and legislation is the 
conservation of the orientation of agricultural education and training for a 
collective farm system. A very important part of the modernisation programmes 
of agriculture in European Union countries was always agricultural education 
and training. It is possible to say that Russia has already lost almost 10 years in 
making progress in this domain. 
Surveys undertaken by the author between 1997-2000 in seven Russian 
provinces among rural civil officers, farms' heads, collective farms' workers, and 
also among professors and students of agricultural universities and colleges have 
revealed that the majority of those who are connected with agriculture share a 
common set of ideas and beliefs of a mythical nature. The most important 
statements of the dominant agrarian ideology oriented to support the inefficient 
Soviet style agricultural system are the following:  
•  The state must control and finance agriculture as well as buy a large share of 
agricultural production, and supply to farms a large share of their needs for 
inputs; 
•  Land is the people's public good, and cannot be sold or purchased; 
•  In the West, private property is not important, and most Western farmers are 
tenants;  Vladimir Yefimov  170
•  Russians have worked in collectives for centuries; they are collectivists; they 
can work only in collective farms; 
•  Large collective farms are potentially more efficient than family farms 
because they can more successfully use the achievement of technological 
progress; 
•  In the West, family farms are disappearing and large corporate farms produce 
most of the agricultural production; 
•  The cause of non-profitability of collective farms is the disparity of 
agricultural and industrial product prices and the absence of sufficient 
support of agriculture by the Russian government; 
•  All forms of farm enterprises, collective farms under different juridical 
forms, family farms, personal auxiliary farms, must be equal in rights and 
require support from the government. 
It is quite easy to refute all these statements. 
4 INCOMPATIBILITY OF CURRENT DOMINANT RUSSIAN AGRARIAN 
INSTITUTIONS WITH A MARKET ECONOMY 
The incompatibility of current Russian agrarian institutions with a market 
economy comes from the economic inefficiency of collective farms and 
universal theft and corruption as inherent features of the current Russian 
agricultural regime.  
The economic inefficiency of collective farms was obvious in the Soviet period 
when these farms were plunged into a favourable environment of the state 
control-input supply-output procurement. In the Soviet period, collective farms 
were low yield and/or high cost farms, but all of a farms' losses were covered by 
the state. Now that the state is no longer the only owner of all branches of the 
Russian economy, it is unable and unwilling to do so. Weak revenues of urban 
dwellers and the presence on the market of cheap imported food do not allow 
farm gate prices to grow. So collective farms are condemned to non-
profitability. An immediate consequence of this non-profitability is the 
degradation of farm machinery and equipment. The latter creates the situation 
that the collective farm is able to produce minimally just to provide fodder to 
household animals. In this way the whole branch is becoming subsistence-
oriented.  
In the Soviet period, three main institutions of the collective state farm system 
(collective farms, household farms and regional administrations) had coherent 
interaction between themselves. In pre-reform Russia, rural inhabitants lived to a 
large extent by producing food in their subsistence household farms. The 
livestock of household farms was fed by fodder produced in collective farms. 
Collective farms were obliged to follow their "first commandment": "to hand 
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and regional authorities, as representatives of the state in the region, controlled 
as much as they could the functioning of farms. Key decisions concerning farms 
were made not on farms but at the regional (district) level by communist party 
bureaucrats. But at the same time, regional authorities organised input supplies 
to farms and output procurement from them. All levels of authorities were 
responsible for the results of farms' functioning towards their superiors. Theft 
and corruption took place at that time, but could not surpass a certain level 
because of the existence of strong hierarchical control systems.  
The situation radically changed when Russia undertook transition to a market 
economy. The communist party, as a ruling core of the Russian society and 
economy, has disappeared. At the same time, all collective state farms have been 
formally privatised. The Soviet state was a bad owner of farms, but with the 
beginning of the transition, the collective farms were left without any owner at 
all. Afterwards, these farms were plunged into an unfavourable, and inadequate 
for them, environment of a market economy. Private traders, private farmers, 
household owners, all of them took advantage of the absence of a real owner of 
collective farms. Private traders buy farm products at a lower price than the 
market price by bribing the farm director. Private farmers 'buy', for a bottle of 
vodka, the fuel from a tractor driver of a collective farm. Practices which 
previously existed in the Soviet Union, 'nesunstvo' (taking), or of stealing 
(taking) fodder for household (personal auxiliary) farms' animals from collective 
state farms – have assumed a larger scale than before. Regional (district and 
province) authorities are no longer responsible for the results of a farms' 
functioning towards their superiors. They also take advantage of this situation 
and of the absence of real owners of collective farms to enrich themselves 
through large-scale corruption. They get bribes from private companies and 
force collective farms to accept unprofitable conditions of input supplies and 
output sales. In this way, all three main institutions of the state/collective farms' 
system – collective farms, household farms and regional (district and province) 
administrations – are involved in illegal activities which destroy Russian 
agriculture.  
Collective farms and personal auxiliary farms connected closely with the former 
together makeup the dominant agrarian structures in Russia. The preservation of 
these structures in the market economy environment inevitably contributes to the 
degradation of the Russian agriculture, its growing primitivism, and increasing 
orientation to self-consumption by the village population. It is becoming 
inevitable because of the increasing wear of engineering inherited from the 
Soviet times. The latter provokes a gradual decrease of cultivated surface. Not 
only are poor lands abandoned. During my recent survey in the Kursk and 
Rostov provinces (black soil areas), local experts told me that 1/3 of agricultural 
land is not used and official statistics hide it by including it in the category Vladimir Yefimov  172
"fallow". At the same time, these experts witness that this unused land is not 
accessible to the people outside of collective farms. 
5 A WAY FROM THE DEADLOCK 
The standstill in Russian land reform can be explained by a tacit but strong 
resistance to reform not only from the agrarian bureaucracy, but also from the 
totality of the rural population. They understand that the majority of them will 
not be employed by commercially-oriented agricultural enterprises and with real 
privatisation by efficient owners, they will lose access to resources that maintain 
their SHF – the only source of their survival. 
In order to find a way out from this deadlock, it is necessary to divide business 
and social support functions. Business farms do not have to fulfil social 
functions. These functions should be exercised by special non-commercial 
organisations. Forms of these organisations could be agricultural consumers' co-
operatives and municipal enterprises. The establishment of agricultural 
consumers' co-operatives or municipal community support enterprises in each 
village might help to solve the above-mentioned problems. 
Agricultural consumers' co-operatives and municipal community support 
enterprises should be created to execute the following functions: 
•  Production of fodder, including green pastures and a free supply of fodder to 
SHF in the minimum quantities required for one rural family; 
•  Production of food grain, bread baking and a free supply to countrymen at 
predetermined norms; 
•  Supply (for fee) of fodder to personal farms above the amounts supplied free 
of charge; 
•  Delivery of paid services for selling SHF produce; 
•  Transport and other paid services for members of the community; 
•  Financial support of certain social infrastructure facilities. 
Subsistence household farms and agricultural consumer co-operatives 
(municipal community support enterprises) that back them are not the most 
efficient forms of organisation for agricultural production. The creation of 
agricultural consumer co-operatives (municipal community support enterprises) 
is a forced measure required in order to mitigate the difficulties of efficient 
market transition experienced by the countrymen. It also creates opportunities 
for the more painless implementation of real privatisation and restructuring of 
former  kolkhozes/sovkhozes when efficient private agricultural commercial 
ventures are created on their lands not being used for the organisation of 
agricultural consumers' co-operatives or municipal community support 
enterprises. In this case the rural community will be far less resistant to the 
creation of private enterprises because there is a guarantee of free fodder supply Agrarian Reform and Subsistence Agriculture in Russia  173
for the community members' SHF by agricultural consumers' co-operatives or 
municipal community support enterprises.  
Some calculations show that approximately 1/3 of the land of former 
kolkhoze/sovkhoze (depending on density of population and soil fertility) is 
necessary for the creation of such agricultural consumer co-operatives 
(municipal community support enterprises). This also corresponds to expert 
estimates made by certain heads of collective farms in the Samara province that 
1/3 of the resources of the collective farm serves to support the SHF. In fact, in 
many other provinces of Russia, especially in the non-chernozem zone, the share 
of resources used to support the SHF is approaching 100%. A rational 
organisation of agricultural consumers' co-operatives or municipal community 
support enterprises does not need all the collective farm's land. Much land 
would remain for the creation of real private agricultural enterprises, including 
business-oriented family farms. 
Current Russian legislation permits the creation of such agricultural consumers' 
co-operatives in each village by every family wishing to join in the consumer 
co-operative of the village contributing a part of their land and assets shares. 
Similar procedures can be applied for the creation of municipal community 
support enterprises by giving this part to local administration. Every version of 
the community support enterprise has its pluses and minuses, however, 
especially taking into consideration the ongoing difficulties in Russia of the self-
organisation of rural dwellers; the version of municipal enterprise therefore has 
more chance for success. 
If the choice is made in favour of a consumer co-operative, then the following 
principles must be applied: 
•  The chairman and the director of the co-operative are different persons. The 
first one is a representative of the community with the task to supervise the 
functioning of the co-operative in the interests of its members. The second is 
a professional manager employed by the co-operative; 
•  Members and workers in consumer co-operatives are, in principle, also 
different persons. Members of the co-operative have rights for free and paid 
services irrespective of whether or not they work in the co-operative. 
Workers of the co-operative are much less numerous than members and can, 
in practice, be employed from outside of the community; 
•  A consumer co-operative is not a profit-oriented organisation. Such co-
operatives don't have to pay income tax because their income is returned in 
one form or another to its members. Special favourable tax conditions must 
be created for this kind of enterprise. 
Fixed assets of agricultural consumer co-operatives and municipal community 
support enterprises can be created to a large extent by assembling a part of land Vladimir Yefimov  174
and assets shares of community members. Working capital should be provided 
by the State under the form of gift and soft credits.  
We suggest that Russian legislators enact a special law on the communal rural 
community support enterprise and to make necessary amendments to the law on 
agricultural co-operation concerning specific consumers' co-operatives described 
above.  
In order to create favourable conditions for the emergence of efficient private 
farming businesses on the lands left over on collective farms after the 
organisation of agricultural consumer co-operatives or municipal community 
support enterprises (2/3 of agricultural lands), adequate legislation and 
institutions must be put in place. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1:  Average Russian Peasant (Household) Farm in 1924/1925 
 Number  of 







Horses Oxen Cows Total  Cattle 
Converted in 
Adult Units
Zone of Consumption 6.01 6.5 3.46 0.98 0.00 1.69  3.73 
Zone of Production  6.10 9.46 7.68 0.92 0.09 1.19  3.51 
North-Caucasus  6.05 10.3 7.35 1.06 0.92 1.64  5.63 
Source: CHAYANOV (1928, p. 199). 
Table 2:  Table from Nemchinov's Memorandum to Stalin (1928) 
  Grain Production  Marketable Grain 
  Mln.  Puds % Mln.  Puds % 
% of Marketability
Before the War 
Landlords 600  12.0 281.6 21.6  47.0 
Kulaks 1,900  38.0 650.0 50.0  34.0 
Middle/Poor Peasants  2,500  50.0 369.0 28.4  14.7 
Total 5,000  100 1,300.6 100  26.0 
After the War (in 1926/1927) 
Sovkhozes/Kolkhozes 80.0  1.7 37.8 6.0  47.2 
Kulaks 617.0  13.0 126.0 20.0  20.0 
Middle/Poor Peasants  4,052.0  85.3 166.2 74.0  11.2 
Total 4,749.0  100 630.0 100  13.3 
Source: STALIN (1952, p. 194). 
Table 3:  Chayanov's Survey of 1910 in the Volokolamsk District of 
Moscow Province 
Eaters/Workers Ratio  1.01 – 1.20  1.21 – 1.40  1.41 – 1.60  1.61 – ∞ 
Production per Worker in Rubles  131.9 151.5 218.8 284.4 
Number of Working Days per Worker 98.8 102.3 157.2 161.3 
Source: CHAYANOV (1966). 
Table 4:  Chayanov's Survey of 1912-1913 "Production per Worker in 
Rubles" 
Eaters/Workers Ratio  1.00 – 1.15 1.16 – 1.30 1.31 – 1.45 1.46 – 1.60  1.61 – ∞ 
Starobelsk District of Kharkov 
Province 
68.1 99.0  118.3  128.9  156.4 
Vologda District of Vologda Province  63.9 79.1 84.4 91.7  117.9 
Velsk District of Vologda Province  59.2 61.2 76.1 79.5 95.5 
Source: CHAYANOV (1966). 
Table 5:  Share of Incomes from PAFs in Households' Incomes of 
Kolkhozes' Members 
1970*  1980*  1980  1985*  1985 1990 1991 1992 
35.1 27.5 25.1 26.2 21.8 21.5 30.0 41.6 
Note:  * data for the USSR. 
Sources:  Russian Federation in 1992, Goscomstat, Economy of the USSR in 1988, Goscomstat.  Vladimir Yefimov  176
Table 6:  Parts of Different Types of Farms in Russian Agricultural 
Production, in percent 
  1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
"Agricultural Enterprises"  76.9 73.7 68.8 67.1 57.0 54.5 50.2 49.0 46.5 38.7 40.3
Households' Farms  23.1 26.3 31.2 31.8 39.9 43.8 47.9 49.1 51.1 59.2 57.2
"Peasant Farms"  0  0 0 1.1 3.1 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.5
Source:  Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000). 
Table 7:  Distribution of Agricultural Lands Between Different Types of 
Farms, in percent 
  1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
"Agricultural Enterprises"  98.4 98.1 91.2 85.2 82.8 82.4 81.7 81.4 80.4 83.7 81.9
Household Farms  1.6 1.8 2.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.4 6.0
Personal Gardens  0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Personal Auxiliary Farms  1.4 1.3 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.8
"Peasant Farms"  - 0.1 0.6 3.1 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.6 6.9
Communal Pastures∗  - - 5.6 7.2 7.7 7.7 8.3 8.3  8.4  4.0 4.9
Note: *Author's  estimates. 
Source:  Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000).  
Table 8:  Personal Auxiliary Farms (Rural Household Farms) 
  1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number, Millions  15.7 16.3 17.1 19.3 16.6 16.6 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.0 15.5
Middle Size, ha  0.2 0.2  0.27 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36  0.36 0.4 0.4
Source:  Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000). 
Table 9:  Evolution of Production Indices of Household Farms 
Previous Year = 100%  Year 1990 = 100%   
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Potatoes  103 120  97  97  85 100 176 171 166 141 141 
Vegetables  95 129  99 103  99 113 260 270 270 270 300 
Meat  104 96 98 98 99 96  112  110  108  106  104 
Milk  102 100 100  99 100 100 122 122 121 121 121 
Sources:  Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000); Agricultural activity of households in Russia, 
Goscomstat (1999). 
Table 10:  Herd Size in Household Farms, Thousands of Heads 









1998  1990 1998 
Cattle Total  9,866 11,394 10,901 10,425  9,919  17.3  34.8 
Cows  5,235 6,705 6,483 6,238 5,979 25.5  44.4 
Pigs  7,076 7,556 7,246 6,963 7,393 18.5  42.9 
Sheep  13,584  11,030 9,426 8,487 4,339 24.6  54.7 
Goats  2,510 2,398 2,214 2,073 1,951 87.1  91.0 
Horses  274 765 799 827 820  10.5  45.5 
Rabbits  3,692 1,437 1,250 1,116 1,065 80.3  92.8 
Poultry*  195 161 151 143 139  29.5  39.0 
Bees**  2,771 3,107 2,911 2,837 2,887 61.5  82.0 
Notes:  * in millions of heads, ** in thousands of beehives. 
Source:  Agricultural activity of households in Russia, Goscomstat (1999). Agrarian Reform and Subsistence Agriculture in Russia  177
Table 11:  Comparison of the Evolutions of Yields in Household Farms 
and National Average Yields  
Households' Farms  National Average Yields   
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998  1990  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Potatoes, c/ha  113 120 116 113 96 104 117 114 111  97
Vegetables, c/ha  148 161 154 151 147 167 148 145 147 141
Beef, kg/head  188 156 151 156 161 121 93 88  96 103
Pork, kg/head  300 202 191 195 202 118 99 96 109 120
Milk, kg/cow/year  2,582 2,388 2,412 2,462 2,558 2,731 2,153 2,144 2,239 2,381
Sources:  Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000); Agricultural activity of households in Russia, 
Goscomstat (1999). 
Table 12:  Comparison of Evolutions of Marketability of Household 
Farms and Agricultural Enterprises (Former 
Kolkhozes/Sovkhozes), in percent 
 Households'  Farms  "Agricultural  Enterprises" 
  1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Potatoes   28.5 12.2 10.2 10.0 10.2 42.9 32.5 34.7 38.7 43.5 
Vegetables  16.7 8.8 8.8 9.5 9.5  92.2  71.3  73.8  72.0  83.0 
Meat  30.1 23.0 23.2 22.9 22.4 97.4  100  100  100 99.8 
Milk  25.1 18.4 18.4 18.3 18.3 90.4 78.8 78.3 80.3 78.5 
Sources:  Agriculture in Russia, Goscomstat (1998, 2000); Agricultural activity of households in Russia, 
Goscomstat (1999).  
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ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES OF INDIVIDUAL 







Individual Subsidiary Holdings (ISH) are a special form of 'cooperation' 
between rural households and large agricultural enterprises (LAE). Although 
cultivating only 13% of Ukrainians agricultural land, ISH manage to produce 
almost 60% of gross agricultural output. It is evident that the production of these 
ISH relies to a large extent on inputs obtained from LAE. This can be seen as a 
form of external financing of ISH through LAE. 
This case study attempts to explain the large share of the output of ISH in the 
total agricultural production in the Ukraine, and considers their development 
opportunities. Concurrently, the following questions should be answered: 
1.  What are the main sources of production inputs for the ISH? 
2. How do the ISH pay for these inputs and what is the actual value of the 
inputs? 
3.  What is the margin between revenues from sales and production costs?  
4.  What is the probable future development of the ISH? 
The study is based on a survey of ISH members in three regions of Zhytomyr 
Oblast, the Ukraine. In the survey, 90 ISH that were linked to 17 large 
agricultural enterprises were considered. Data on the LAE were obtained from 
the Zhytomyr Department of Agriculture. The interviews were conducted 
between March and August 2000.  
2 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF AGRICULTURE IN THE UKRAINE  
During transition, many Ukrainian agricultural enterprises found themselves in a 
deep economic crisis. Generally, the privatisation and restructuring of the 
enterprises was merely formal. Agriculture mainly suffers from an adverse Andriy Nedoborovskyy  180
overall economic situation, liquidity problems, and poor infrastructure. In the 
1990s the accumulated decline of agricultural output was 51%. In 2000, total 
agricultural output was recovering, as it increased by 9%, whereas the decline of 
livestock production continued (Figure 1). Over 43% of the agricultural large-
scale enterprises were still not profitable in 2000.  








1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Produktion Crop Livestock
 
Source: THE STATE COMMITTEE OF STATISTICS OF UKRAINE (1999). 
At the same time, the role of the ISH in agricultural production increased 
substantially. In fact, during the economic crisis, they became the most 
important agricultural producers in the Ukraine. Although the ISH' share of total 
agricultural production did not change in absolute terms, their relative share 
increased significantly, mainly because of the pure performance of the LAE (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2:  Agricultural Output in Public and Private Sectors, UAH mln 
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Source: THE STATE COMMITTEE OF STATISTICS OF UKRAINE (2001). 
Gradually, agricultural production has shifted from the public to the private 
sector. This can be shown in the case of livestock production: There was a 
strong decline in the number of cows and pigs in the public sector from 1990-
1999 (pigs down to 29% and cows to 38%), and the growth in the ISH (by 11% 
and by 34%, respectively). At the same time, in spite of the general decrease of Economic Background and Development Opportunities of Individual Subsidiary Holdings in the Ukraine  181
poultry, the reduction in the ISH was not that strong as in LAE (80% of LAEs in 
comparison to 16% in ISH). 
The main reason for the increasing importance of the ISH is the necessity of 
securing food consumption of households. Moreover, the ISH provide additional 
income (in most cases, the ISH are the only income source) and to improve the 
living standards of the rural population. Currently, the ISH are also an important 
and growing supplier of agricultural products to the markets; this is due to the 
insufficient payment of wages in large agricultural enterprises. 
3 DEVELOPMENT AND EFFICIENCY OF INDIVIDUAL SUBSIDIARY HOLDINGS IN 
THE UKRAINE  
3.1  Hypothesis of the Study 
This study will test the following hypothesis: 
Members of LAE are interested in allocating a significant share of their income 
from the LAE as production inputs to their own ISH. Without these inputs, most 
ISH would hardly be able to survive in the future. This is due to the fact that the 
benefits from making part of the transaction (here: inputs) within the hierarchy 
of ISH-LAE are higher than from making the transaction on markets, as 
purchasing prices on markets are significantly higher than the prices within this 
hierarchy. 
The ISH are of high importance in rural economies. As the large agricultural 
enterprises defer the payment of wages, the ISH remain the main sources of 
income. The efficiency of the ISH strongly depends on the opportunity to 
receive inputs for their households. Further analysis will show that the main 
sources of inputs are ISH' own production, and inputs from large agricultural 
enterprises that are either free of charge or distributed at lower prices than 
market prices. This statement is also supported by STRIEWE et al. (2001, p. 26).  
3.2 Sample  Characteristics 
The data on labour endowment of the ISH is shown in Table 1. The interviewed 
ISH have, on average, 2.8 members with and average age of 43.5 years. 
Table 1:   Size and Age Structure of ISH 
Age    Number of Members 
Male FEMALE 
Maximum  4 76  76 
Minimum  1 24  22 
Average  2.8 43.5  43.5 
Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). Andriy Nedoborovskyy  182
In summer, labourers mainly spend 3 to 6 working hours (4.4 hour per day on 
average) in their ISH and approximately 2 to 4 working hours (3.9 hours per day 
on average) in winter. This is a half of an average working day in LAE. In 
addition, the ISH work on average 1-3 times week overtime to sell their 
products.  
Table 2:  Household's Time for Sales and Purchase of Inputs 
Number of Households Who Sell 





Minimum, Hours  1 1  100 
Maximum, Hours  8 8  480 
Average, Hours  1.0 1.1  296 
Median, Hours  1.0 1.1  240 
Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). 
The high level of unemployment in rural areas explains the huge proportion of 
working time which can be spent for selling products and purchasing inputs. In 
the Ukraine, labour opportunity costs in rural areas are considerably low due to 
high unemployment and the lack of other income sources. Normally, employees 
of LAE are paid for 8 working hours per day, but usually they do not spend the 
whole time at the enterprise. Thus, being fully paid and working only part-time 
in the enterprise due to a lack of independent management control, the 
households are highly motivated to allocate a large part of their labour force to 
the ISH. 
In general, private households are not well equipped with farm machinery. 
Capital endowment of ISH is very poor. Only 30% of the ISH (27 households) 
have a car and only 1% of the ISH have a tractor. One third of the ISH have a 
horse carriage. The share of the ISH that have their own machinery varies from 
30% to 46%. The fact that only one third of the ISH have their own equipment 
strengthens the assumption of their dependency on employment in large 
agricultural enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the labour productivity of ISH is higher than the average of 
Zhytomyr Oblast and the Ukraine's LAE (see Table 3).  
Table 3:  ISH, Oblast Zhytomyr and Ukrainian LAE Labour 
Productivity 
  ISH  Oblast Zhytomyr LAE LAE of Ukraine 
Labour Productivity, in UAH 
per Worker
1  3,337 2,551 3,171 
Input on Labour per 1,000 
UAH of Gross Income  207 449 290 
Sources:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000); SABLUK  et al. (2001); DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE (1999); MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF UKRAINE (1999); own calculations. 
                                           
1  Calculated as (Gross Income – Production Costs)/ workers. Economic Background and Development Opportunities of Individual Subsidiary Holdings in the Ukraine  183
Household capacity for cattle and sows is completely used. On the other hand, 
only 87.5% of the available capacity for pigs is used. That leads to the 
conclusion that the ISH still has the opportunity to increase pork production in 
the short-term under favourable market conditions. 
Current data of crop and livestock yields gained in the ISH and the LAE in 
Zhytomyr Oblast are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4:  Crop and Livestock Productivity Indicators in ISH and Large 
Agricultural Enterprises of Zhytomyr Oblast 
  Min.  Max.  Median  Average of Large 
Agricultural Enterprises 
for Oblast Zhytomyr, 
1999 
Milk Yield, kg per Cow  1,169 6,375 3,488  1,387 
Cattle's Weight Gain, Gram per Day  200 700 390  232 
Pig's Weight Gain, Gram per Day  100 600 421  120 
Egg Yield  90 345 242  N/A. 
Crop Yield: Grain, 100 kg  5 80 21  18 
Potatoes, 100 kg  18 360  89  53 
Sugar Beet, 100 kg  30 857 260  162 
Vegetables, 100 kg  16 750 200  87 
Sources:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000); DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (2000). 
Table 4 shows that the average yields of the ISH are much higher than in the 
LAE. One possible explanation is that (1) the ISH use cheap inputs (especially 
compound animal feed) from the LAE, while thus decreasing the productivity of 
large agricultural enterprises. (2) livestock products such as milk, milk products, 
eggs, pork, and beef are an important income source due to the sale on market. 
As the increase of yields directly improves households' welfare, ISH have high 
motivation to properly manage their enterprise, which may not be for the case in 
the large collective farms. (3) ISH seem to specialise in production systems 
which are not subject to economies of scale. Rather, they run labour intensive 
systems that cannot be easily mechanised. This can also be shown for grain 
production where economies of scale can be exploited through mechanisation, 
and thus the gap between ISH and LAE is smaller. 
Additionally, it is interesting to consider the main sources of inputs and their 
prices (calculated as the actual wage-in-kind
2 from the large agricultural 
enterprises) (see Tables 5 and 6). 
 
 
                                           
2  The interviewed households did not receive wages in cash for many months. The only type of payment they 
received was so-called "wage-in-kind". Andriy Nedoborovskyy  184
Table 5:  Structure of Input Sources, in percent 
 Market  Agricultural 




Fattened Calf  2 20      7 71 
Young Pigs   33  52      15 
Growers  4     4  92 
Potato Seeds  2     6  92 
Grain Seeds  4 33      2 61 
Vegetable Seeds  92  2    2  4 
Grass Seeds  17  83      
Fertiliser  2  57      41 
Plant Protection 
Products  93  7     
Fuel     93  7   
Compound Feed  9  82     9  
Feed Grain  7  89     2  2 
Other Feed   9  69   9  13   
Insemination 
Services    97   3     
Veterinary 
Services   18   77  5  
Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). 
The main input sources are set in bold in Table 5. The table clarifies that the 
main input sources of the ISH are own production. These inputs are free of 
charge and as they are own-produced, opportunity costs of the ISH are lower 
than when buying them from enterprises or the market. The other source are the 
LAE themselves, especially concerning compound feed – 82% (of the total input 
purchase), feed grain – 89% and other feed – 69% that is purchased not at the 
market price, but under the production cost level. Inputs from this source were 
acquired as a wage-in-kind or free of charge (stolen) from the LAE. Vegetable 
seeds and products, as well as fuel, are purchased mainly on the markets or from 
intermediaries for cash, as there are still no alternatives for these input sources. 
Table 6 shows that average prices for compound feed and feed grain offered by 
large enterprises are much lower than the respective market prices. This 
observation offers two conclusions, both supporting the hypothesis stated at the 
beginning of the paper: first, relatively high livestock productivity in the ISH in 
comparison to the LAE (due to extreme low feeding costs, comp. Table 5), and 
secondly, the high dependency of ISH members on employment in the LAE. 
Overpricing of sugar, butter, and vegetable oil is explained by the 'institutional 
force' over most households: either accept more expensive products as a wage-
in-kind payment or receive no wages at all. By using barter as a means of 
commercial transactions, the LAE receive processed products from processing 
plants as an exchange for production inputs (sugar beet, milk, sunflower seeds) 
and transfer these products to their employees, thereby devaluating their real 
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Table 6:  ISH Purchase Prices, in percent of the Market Prices 
 Minimum  Maximum  Average 
Grain  0,3 143  79 
Compound Feed  0,01
3 70 23 
Milk  66 120 105 
Meat  75 125  91 
Vegetable Oil  82 82 82 
Butter
4  120 120 120 
Sugar  71 132 105 
Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). 
3.3  Efficiency of Individual Subsidiary Holdings in the Ukraine  
Table 7 presents data that strengthen the hypothesis. It was not possible to 
calculate the rate of farm profitability for ISH applying the methodology 
commonly used in the Ukraine (Profit*100/Total Costs), because of the absence 
of some data such as labour input costs, own consumption of the ISH and their 
repayments. Instead, only revenues from sale and production costs were 
compared in order to test the hypothetical response of ISH on the price rise and 
to define, based on current economic conditions, whether the ISH could 
represent an alternative production form to the LAE. Therefore, it must be 
assumed that the amount of own-consumed products (which are not sold on 
markets) is higher than zero. To calculate the figures presented in Table 7, the 
production inputs used by the ISH were valued twice: on the one hand, using the 
actual purchase prices and on the other hand, the average market prices. In our 
study we only considered the constant market prices, because the continuously 
changing prices could induce an adjusting reaction of the ISH, which is difficult 
to predict. 
Differences between revenues from sales and production costs are shown in 
Table 7. The data used in this table stress that only in cases where ISH are 
purchasing from LAE do the sales value outperform production costs. 
Otherwise, the costs of inputs at market prices exceed the revenues from sales 
by 11%. 
                                           
3  See explanations in the text.  
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Table 7:  Production Costs Versus Revenues from Sales
5  
   Average 
1. Revenues form Sales, UAH  228,581 
2. Costs of Inputs, UAH  82,822 
3. Costs of Inputs at Market Prices, UAH  253,588 
4. Costs of Inputs /Revenues from Sales*100, in percent  36 
5. Costs of Inputs at Market Prices /Revenue from Sales*100, in percent 111 
Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). 
But not all of the households demonstrate a low level of cost/revenue relation. 
To prove this statement the cash flow revenue rate (CFRR) ((Revenue from 
Sales – Variable Costs)/Variable Costs*100) was calculated. In this case, the 
difference between households at the actual input prices is presented in Figure 3. 






















Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). 
Figure 3 shows that most of the ISH are located significantly above the 
calculated cash flow revenue rate frontier. Thus, one could conclude that the 
ISH work exclusively efficiently. But if the inputs used in the ISH operations are 
estimated at market prices the picture changes entirely. Two thirds of the ISH 
move to the negative side (see Figure 8). The initial "positive" cash flow 
revenue rate, thus proved to be illusory in most cases. 
                                           
5  These are the sum of revenues and costs according to all 90 households of the sample. 
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Source:  Own presentation based on NEDOBOROVSKYY (2000). 
This means that when purchasing their inputs on markets instead of taking them 
from LAE, only those ISH which are above the cash flow revenue rate frontier 
(see Figure 4) could operate under market conditions. The other ISH mainly 
depend on employment at LAE. In future, in the case of increasing input prices, 
lower on-farm production of inputs (compounded feed, grain) and the 
improvement of control-management in LAE, the output production in the ISH 
could significantly dwindle, although exact forecasts are difficult. It may be 
expected, as far as there are no income alternatives and employment possibilities 
in rural areas, the ISH will specialise in labour-intensive production such as 
animal keeping and vegetable production. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
•  The ISH are the most important source of agricultural products for the rural 
population. 
•  The large amount of labour employed by the ISH points to the high hidden 
unemployment in LAE. 
•  Household income depends on the income of the ISH up to 100%. Currently, 
the ISH are the most important (and to a large extent the only) source of cash 
income in rural areas. 
•  The efficiency of ISH is strongly affected by employment in LAE. These 
enterprises act as a source of low-cost inputs for the ISH. 
•  Over 66% of the households prove a low cash flow revenue rate when 
calculated under market conditions.  
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MODELING SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE IN RUSSIA: EFFECTS OF TOTAL 
PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES AND REDUCTION OF MARKETING MARGINS  
 
 




1 THE CHANGING ROLE OF SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURE IN RUSSIA'S 
TRANSITION PROCESS 
The transition process in Russia, which started vigorously at the beginning of 
the 1990s, has yielded negative economic growth rates for almost a decade, with 
the exceptions of 1997 and 1999. Agriculture and domestic food industries in 
particular have suffered from the ongoing transition process and the associated 
restructuring of the economy. During the first transition decade the share of 
agriculture in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from more than 16% in 
1990 to about 7% in 1998. Structural and institutional changes have significantly 
altered the performance of Russia's agriculture in the past and will continue to 
do so in the years to come. In the 1990s, for instance, the economic performance 
of the former kolkhozi and sovkhozi, the former collective and large-scale farms, 
deteriorated significantly. In fact, only 'soft budget constraints' exercised by 
regional administrations kept many of the large-scale crop and livestock farms 
alive at the end to the 1990s. Parallel to the decline of the large-scale sector, a 
shift in agricultural production has taken place towards private subsidiary plots 
(in Russian they are called Lichnie Podsobnie Khozyaistva (LPH)), the 
subsistence-oriented production units of the rural populace. By 1998, about half 
of Russia's agricultural production was produced by this sector.  
Output contraction in the domestic agro-food sectors stabilized or even stopped 
in 1997 but continued in most sectors in 1998 due to the financial crisis. The 
devaluation of the ruble following the crisis in mid-1998 opened a 'window of 
                                           
1  Research fellows at the Centre for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, and International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, D.C., respectively. WEHRHEIM acknowledges financial 
support for the project by the Volkswagen-Foundation, Germany. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee 
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opportunity' by increasing the competitiveness of domestic industries (SEROVA 
et al. 1999). In fact, the degree of import substitution following the devaluation 
was greatest in industries that produce consumer goods and was particularly true 
for food products.  
However, despite the fact that a major share of today's gross agricultural output 
is produced on private subsidiary plots, agricultural policy makers in Russia 
tended to understate the relevance of household production for income 
generation and food consumption in the late 1990s (VON  BRAUN  and  QAIM 
1999). Agricultural policy in Russia resisted enhancing the production 
possibilities of this sector through state interventions. However, in June 1999, the 
GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2000) acknowledged the importance of 
the small-scale sector by discussing potential steps to stimulate the 
commercialization of this sector.  
Against the background of the increased relative importance of subsistence 
agriculture in Russia with respect to production, consumption, and its improved 
recognition by policy makers, it is of interest to include this sector into 
quantitative policy analysis. Specifically, we are interested in how exogenous 
shocks like the financial crisis and the concomitant real devaluation have 
affected the economic situation of large-scale and subsistence agriculture. By 
addressing this question we will also discuss the specific relationship between 
subsistence agriculture and the formal economy. Ever since GADDY and ICKES 
(1999) presented a formal, theoretical model of the virtual economy in Russia, 
this issue has been much debated. While we do not attempt to model the whole 
virtual economy in our model, we specifically focus on the inclusion of 
subsistence agriculture into a formal and applied model of the Russian economy. 
The objective is to address the effects of the poor commercialization of 
subsistence agriculture in Russia within the logic of such an economy-wide 
modeling framework. We intend to look at the effects of past economic events 
and forward-looking economic events on subsistence agriculture. We will 
discuss these questions within an applied Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model, specified for 1994.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 2 provides a non-technical 
description of the modeling framework. In particular, those features of the 
model will be stressed which turn it into a structural CGE model that allows 
unemployment to occur. Chapter 3 discusses the data base and puts emphasis on 
the steps involved in the compilation of the data for the various agricultural 
sectors and how the distinctive features of the various types of agricultural 
producers are reflected in the data base. Chapter 4 presents the results of four 
sequential and path-dependent simulations. We combine an improvement in 
total factor productivity in agriculture, a devaluation of the exchange rate, and a 
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reductions of transaction costs. In Chapter 5 we discuss the policy and research 
conclusions that can be drawn from the results obtained. 
2 NON-TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MODELING APPROACH  
2.1  The Core Elements of the Model: Producers, Consumers, the 
Government, and Prices 
The CGE-model for Russia is developed along the lines of models as described 
in DEVARAJAN et al. (1994). To reflect some of the features characteristic for the 
Russian economy in transition, we have modified the standard model by 
reducing the full mobility of all economic resources such that it represents a 
structural rather than a neoclassical model economy. The most essential features 
of the model follow.  
2.1.1 Supply  Side 
Producers minimize their costs under the conditions of a neoclassical production 
function (see Figure A-1). All intermediates are used according to sectorally 
specified and fixed Input Output Coefficients (IOC) for each unit of output; due 
to that the empirical determination of the IOC from the IO table is essential. 
Substitution between different types of labor and capital is specified with a 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function. Value-added prices are 
determined as the difference between unit sectoral revenues and unit costs for 
intermediates. Furthermore, it is assumed that producers maximize their 
revenues from domestic sales and exports under the restriction of a Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function.  
2.1.2 Demand  Side 
The commodity markets are specified as CES functions that allow for 
substitution between imported and domestic products to form composite goods 
(see Figure A-1). Domestic prices for imported commodities are determined by 
respective world market prices, the exchange rate and tariffs. The model 
assumes a perfectly elastic import supply (small country assumption). Consumer 
prices are the weighted average of domestic product and import prices. 
Consumers maximize their utility over the composite good of each sector under 
the restriction of a budget constraint. Own-household consumption and 
marketed household demand for all goods is determined through a Linear 
Expenditure System (LES) using fixed minimum expenditure quantities and 
fixed marginal expenditure shares.
2  
                                           
2  The model does not allow for direct substitution between own-household consumption and marketed 
consumption. However, depending on relative producer and consumer prices at which the two consumption 
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2.1.3 Government 
Government receives revenues from import tariffs, export taxes, and indirect 
production taxes, as well as direct income taxes. Government demand is 
determined using fixed shares of aggregate real spending, respectively; the 
budget surplus is defined as the difference between revenues and government 
demand for goods.  
2.1.4 Prices 
World market prices are exogenous and domestic import and export prices 
depend on world market prices, tariff and export tax rates, as well as the 
exchange rate; prices for the composite demand and output goods are 
determined by the weighted prices for imports and domestic goods and for 
exports and products for the domestic market. Changes in relative prices and 
substitution possibilities determine supply, demand and trade. If relative prices 
change because the model is shocked, substitution can take place between 
factors of production, export supply and domestic supply, imports and 
domestically produced imperfect substitutes, and different commodities in 
demand. Export demand is price elastic, which is particularly important for 
Russia's energy exports. Export prices depend on the fob-price in foreign 
currency (USD), the export subsidy and the exchange rate. All prices in the 
model are determined as relative prices and no monetary market is explicitly 
modeled. Out of n prices in each sector (e.g., import price, producer price, etc.) 
n-1 prices are linear dependent from other prices. Hence, prices have to be 
defined in relation to some exogenously determined price. Generally, any price 
can be used as an exogenously predetermined numeraire. Here, the domestic 
sales price index is kept constant and used as the numeraire.  
2.2 Structuralist  Features of the Model 
2.2.1  Factor Market Closures 
The Russian economy in transition reveals several structural rigidities which 
would not be taken into account in a purely neoclassical CGE model. Therefore, 
we modified the modeling framework by changing the degree of mobility of 
primary factors. Labor and capital are the primary factors – land is part of 
capital in the agricultural sectors. On the one hand, sectoral capital stocks are 
held constant, reflecting the relatively weak intersectoral mobility of capital 
during the transition period. The capital stock of agriculture used in the pre-
transition period, for instance, could not be transferred from large-scale to small-
scale agriculture. On the other hand, we allow for unemployment in labor 
markets. Nominal wage rates are fixed and excess supply of labor permits to hire 
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employment is determined by demand, instead of being determined exogenously 
as it is the case in the neoclassical fixed (full) employment specification.  
2.2.2 Closure  Rules 
The model is completed by supply-demand balances for commodities, factors 
and foreign exchange, the government budget constraint and the savings-
investments identity. The commodity markets are cleared if total (domestically 
and imported) supply equals demand. The equilibrium variables are sectoral 
prices. Domestic demand comprises household and government demand, 
intermediate demand, as well as investment demand. With a perfectly elastic 
supply of labor at given nominal wages, total employment is determined 
endogenously by labor demand. Government consumption and investment 
demand are fixed shares of total absorption, which implies that final household 
demand is a fixed share of absorption as well. This so-called "balanced" closure 
is particularly desirable for the kind of analysis conducted here for the following 
reason: private, government, and investment demand are forced to share the 
economic burden (change in total absorption) of the imposed policy shock. 
Consequently, this helps to avoid extreme behavior, for example, that total 
household demand decreases, while government spending increases. To keep the 
savings-investments identity balanced the marginal propensity to save of 
nongovernmental domestic institutions (enterprises and households) adjust 
proportionately. Finally, the trade balance has been kept constant reflecting 
Russia's limited access to foreign capital. In our base closure specification, we 
have a flexible exchange rate that adjusts in order to keep the current account 
balance/trade balance fixed. However, depending on the experiment design this 
closure can be changed to represent a fixed exchange rate model with adjusting 
foreign trade balance. 
3 THE DATA BASE OF THE MODEL 
3.1  Major Differences in the Data Base in Comparison to Older Model 
Versions 
The data base of the model is based on a consistent data set for 1994. It is an 
update of an earlier version of the model in which Input-Output-Coefficients 
(IOC) were calculated based on an Input-Output-Table (IOT) from 1990, while 
the data for the macro-economic totals referred to 1994 (WEHRHEIM 2000). In 
comparison to the earlier version of the model, a second major change is the fact 
that the agricultural sector has been disaggregated. In the data set used for 
previous model simulations, 17 sectors were distinguished, among them only 
one agricultural sector. In our data base we distinguish a total number of 20 
sectors, among them four different agricultural sectors, or, more specifically, 
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this model is different from older applications by making an explicit distinction 
between the sectoral 'commodity' and 'activity' accounts. While the activity 
account can be perceived as an account for the 'production unit' of the respective 
sector, the commodity account can be perceived as the 'market place' through 
which the output of the respective sector is channeled from the producer to 
consumption. Hence, this feature allows to model one important behavioral 
peculiarity of the subsistence sector: the commodity produced in the small-scale 
agricultural sector and consumed by households does not reach the market, 
represented by the commodity account, but households directly 'buy' the 
commodity. In our model they get it directly from the activity account. Thus, no 
marketing wedge comes between the activity and the consumption location in 
the case of the good produced by the subsistence-oriented, small-scale 
agricultural sector, which, therefore, can be consumed directly by households.  
3.2  Overview of the Structure of the Economy 
Tables A-1 to A-3 (see Appendix of the paper) provide a snapshot of the 
structure of the Russian economy in the base period of the model. Table A-1 
shows the share of the individual sectors in GDP at factors costs, in total 
national production, the sectoral share in the total labor force, and in the total 
capital stock available in the economy. The distribution of GDP and of total 
production indicates the high importance of the two service sectors. Second 
most important is the construction sector, followed only in fourth place by the 
fuel industry, which represents the raw energy-extracting sector. The four 
agricultural sectors together contribute only a share of about 10% to GDP and an 
even lower share to total domestic production (8%). 
The distribution of the labor force among the different sectors of the economy 
follows a similar pattern. The two service sectors together employ roughly 50% 
of the total Russian labor force and slightly less than 40% of total capital 
available in the economy. The construction sector is also still very labor-
intensive and employs about 18% of the national labor force. While the figures 
indicate that the industrial sectors have relatively low labor intensities, the 
capital share employed by the fuel industry reveals a high demand for capital-
intensive equipment needed by this sector. The primary agricultural sectors 
together employ a share of about 8% of the national labor force and about 11% 
of the capital available in the economy.  
Table A-2 reveals the trade structure and the structure of total absorption in our 
model. A first view indicates that there are some non-tradable sectors in the 
Russian economy. The construction sector imports but does not export. The 
service sector, the animal feed sector, and the two small-scale agricultural 
sectors are pure non-tradable sectors. This is relevant because in a comparative 
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With more than 40% of total exports, the fuel industry was Russia's major 
exporting sector in 1994. In fact, this sector was responsible for most of the 
current account surplus of the Russian Federation in the 1990s. The food 
industries and agriculture together contributed only 4%, and hence only a minor 
share of total national exports. The reverse holds true for imports, even though 
these are generally more evenly spread over various sectors. The total share of 
imports in agriculture and the food industries was, with almost 40% of total 
imports, very high and reflects the high import dependence of these sectors in 
the transition period.  
The spread of absorption over all sectors is even more distinct. However, the 
figures in Table A-2 indicate that the two service sectors, the construction 
sector, and all industrial sectors have higher shares in total absorption than any 
single agro-food sector. Hence, the total share of all agro-food sectors is only 
17%.  
Table A-3 reveals some additional structural features of each sector. The second 
and third columns show the share of labor and capital in total use of primary 
production factors, respectively. The fourth column indicates the share of 
intermediates in the total production costs of each sector. The labor share is 
relatively low in the raw material industries, while it is highest in the 
construction sector. It is also very high in the service sector and in the large-
scale livestock sector. A surprisingly low share of labor is revealed for the 
agricultural subsistence-sector (Agri-LPH), with only 23%. In contrast, this 
sector uses a very high share of capital, which reflects the fact that the economic 
rent extracted from this sector are profits rather than formal wage payments. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the capital share is above average in all 
food industries, indicating that these sectors need substantial capital to produce 
the sectoral good. At the same time, the food industries are very dependent on 
intermediates from other sectors; the share of intermediates used is above 
average in each food industry.  
The production elasticities are shown in the fifth column of Table A-3. They are 
synthetic in as far as they were not estimated empirically, but instead are based 
on values used in other studies for comparable countries. They are lowest in the 
raw material producing industries and highest in the machinery, light 
manufacturing industry and in the construction sector. An average value of 1.2 
has been chosen for all other sectors.  
Finally, the last three columns of Table A-3 show the sector-specific marketing 
margin coefficients. Similarly to the production elasticities, these coefficients 
were not estimated empirically. In contrast to the production elasticities, they 
were not based on other studies but are estimates based on our background 
knowledge of the country. Again, more precise empirical information on the 
respective values is missing; therefore they are open to discussion – more so 
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These margins effectively drive a wedge between the producer price and the 
price of either the good which is exported or sold domestically, or in the case of 
imports, a wedge between the cif-import price and the domestic consumer price. 
They directly relate to the good which in previous model versions was provided 
as a homogenous good from the 'trade and transport' no matter what kind of 
transactions were involved (cf. WEHRHEIM 2000).  
We now differentiate between marketing activities on domestic markets, import, 
and export markets. Because of the size of the domestic market, about 80% of 
the value of the goods in previous model versions were allocated to domestic 
trade activities. Therefore, depending on the relative weight we attributed to the 
specific marketing components, sectorally different coefficients were obtained 
(Table A-3).
3 For instance, the coefficient for imports in the food industries and 
in agriculture is much lower than the one for the domestic good in the same 
sector, which effectively discriminates against domestically produced 
commodities. This distinction was chosen because of the observation that 
institutional impediments hinder the marketing of domestic food products while 
it has been much easier for importers to ship imported food commodities to the 
most peripheral consumers within Russia. Hence, these margins can also be 
interpreted as transaction costs. Another interesting stylized fact that can be 
incorporated into the model with this mechanism is the impediments to 
commercialization of the small-scale agricultural sectors. Both sectors are 
discriminated against with the highest domestic marketing margin (of 0.39) 
when marketing their sectoral output to the domestic markets.  
3.3  Disaggregation of Agriculture into Large-scale and Small-scale Sectors 
As mentioned above, the empirical representation of the agricultural sector in 
the current version of the Russian model was adjusted in comparison to older 
versions of the model to more realistically represent the subsistence sector in the 
data base for 1994. Therefore, we distinguish four agricultural sectors in the 
1994 model version. This is still much lower compared to other CGE country 
studies which focus on agriculture, but it is restricted by the limited availability 
of data for the various sub-sectors of Russian agriculture.
4  
To better address the issues linked with self-subsistence agriculture in Russia, 
the agricultural sector has not been disaggregated by products but according to 
farm types. More specifically, the following four sectors are represented in the 
model: one crop and one livestock sector, each representing the Large 
Agricultural Enterprises (LAE) and, hence, the former collective farms. The 
LAE were highly specialized during the era of central planning and in most 
                                           
3  Here we follow an approach which WOBST (2000) has also applied to a CGE-model for Tanzania.  
4 W OBST (1998) presented a micro-SAM for Tanzania in which 21 out of 56 sectors belonged to agriculture. 
Such a high level of disaggregation is useful if the underlying data set reveals sufficient variation between the 
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cases continued to produce either livestock or crop products during the transition 
period. Additionally, we represent the two other types of agricultural producers 
that have become relevant in the transition period: the household sector and 
privatized farms. In the following, we will elaborate on how we arrived at the 
specific representation of these four sectors in our model.  
We started out with the data that represented the aggregate sector 'agriculture' in 
the 1990 version of the model. The respective IO coefficients were calculated 
with the data from a 1990 IO table. The IO coefficients for the agricultural 
sector were split into the four above-mentioned agricultural sub-sectors 
according to their shares in total agricultural output in 1994, as reported by 
Goskomstat. While large-scale agricultural enterprises produced approximately 
80% of total agricultural output in 1990, this share dropped to about 53% in 
1994 (GOSKOMSTAT 1999b). By 1994, the subsistence-oriented small-scale 
producers, mostly referred to as household plots or private subsidiary plots 
(LPH), produced another major share of agricultural output (approximately 
44%). The total number of such small-scale agricultural producers in Russia was 
16.5 million in 1994 (GOSKOMSTAT 1999b, p. 217). 
Additionally, most urban households maintain a private individual family garden 
on the outskirts of the cities, the well-known datchas, where substantial amounts 
of food are produced. Nevertheless, Goskomstat does not consider this 
production when calculating total agricultural output, as production from these 
private gardens is used purely for the self-subsistence of urban families. 
According to official GOSKOMSTAT (1999b, p. 217) estimates, the total number 
of such family gardens in 1994 was about 22.4 million. In fact, the number of 
households running small-scale plots varies significantly across regions in 
Russia and across towns of different sizes. In a household survey of three 
Russian oblasts (Orel, Pskov, and Rostov), the share of households with access 
to a private garden in the capital of the region was much lower (77, 36, and 
30%, respectively) than in other urban dwellings in the region (87, 58, and 
54%). In rural areas, almost all households had either access to a household plot 
or a private garden in all three regions (99, 97, and 100%) (SEETH 1997, p. 140).  
A third type of relevant agricultural producers in Russia emerged from reforms 
in the early transition period: the fully privatized and newly created private 
farms, 270,000 of which were operating mostly as family farms in 1994 
(GOSKOMSTAT 1999a).
5 In the IO table, its share in total national output reached 
less than 1%. In fact, after 1994 the number of private farms stagnated, which 
meant that the officially reported share of private farms in gross agricultural 
                                           
5  The restructuring of Russia's farm sector has received much attention and is discussed in various 
publications. Background information on the early pattern of agricultural restructuring can be found, for 
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output also remained at about the same level it had already reached in 1994 
(3%).  
3.4  Specific Features of Subsistence Agriculture in the Data Base of the 
Model 
After splitting up the original input-output quantities between the four 
agricultural sectors, they had to be adapted to the situation in 1994. The 
underlying data is again synthetic in that it originates from various primary and 
secondary data sources and was adapted to make it economically consistent. The 
input-output structures of the two sectors representing the large agricultural 
enterprises relate closely to those presented in the IO table for 1990. While the 
absolute value of expenditures for single intermediates was reduced in 
proportion to the decline in output of the LAE, the structure of the IOC 
remained more or less constant.  
The definition of input-output relations for the two small-scale sectors has been 
driven by the following observations. The small-scale subsistence or the LPH 
sector is not only typical for Russia but also for other CIS countries such as the 
Ukraine. AMELINA  (2000) showed that in Russia overt and covert benefits 
explain why Russian peasants remain in collective farms. KOESTER and STRIEWE 
(1999) argue that LPH producers in the Ukraine are actually 'cross-subsidized' 
because they obtain industrial and on-farm inputs from the collective farms in 
substantial amounts. For Russia, this close link has been confirmed with case-
study surveys of LPH producers in three Russian oblasts (Pskov, Orel, and 
Rostov). In fact, the close link between the private subsidiary plots and the large 
agricultural enterprises is one of the most distinct features of Russian agriculture 
in the transition period. A stylized representation has been used to indicate the 
input-output-relations between the four farm types, departing from the revealed 
input-output structure in the IO table for 1990: both sectors representing the 
LAE make significant payments to the LPH sector. For crop-producing LAE, 
these expenditures make up 6.6% of the sector's total production costs, while 
these transfers amount to almost 10% in the case of an LAE specialized in 
livestock production. The idea is to represent one obvious feature of Russia's 
rural economy in transition in the data base: while the LAE crop producers make 
payments in kind to their associated private subsidiary plots by leasing 
machines, transferring fertilizer and seeds, the LAE livestock producers are 
using feed as one major form of payment in kind to reimburse their workers for 
foregone cash income. These expenditures are a burden on the LAE and are 
likely to contribute to the high share of unprofitable LAE. Such expenditures are 
normally based on informal contracts between the two parties: the recipients are 
in many cases both workers and members of the LAE, many of which have 're-
registered' as cooperatives. While average wages for agricultural workers are 
among the lowest compared to all other sectors in the Russian economy, LAE Modeling Subsistence Agriculture in Russia  199
use payments in kind to their workers as compensation. It is this inter-
relationship that is represented with the respective IOC.  
There are a few other distinct features of the four agricultural sectors in the 
Russian model that have been taken into account in the compilation of the 
individual sectors' IOC. In general, the share of intermediates is much higher in 
the two sectors representing the LAE. This reveals the fact that these enterprises 
are more market-oriented, also with respect to inputs, at least when compared to 
the small-scale producers in the household sector and the private farms, which 
often suffer from insufficient access to input-markets due to various market 
imperfections (e.g., for the Ukraine: PERROTTA 1999). At only 20%, the share of 
intermediates in total production costs is the lowest in the LPH sector. In 
addition, about half of the intermediate inputs (10.9% of total production costs) 
used in this sector's production process stem from the sector itself. This high 
dependence on inputs produced within the same sector reveals the fact that this 
sector is to a considerable extent a self-subsistence sector and hardly relies on 
commercial inputs, for which the household plot owners would need to pay with 
cash they do not have. In contrast, there are at least some private farms that 
attempted early on in the transition period to improve their efficiency by buying 
inputs and new machines from the market. This is indicated with the respective 
values of the IOC of the private farm sector for inputs originating from the 
chemicals industry, light manufacturing, and mechanical engineering sectors as 
well as from the power industry. In addition to the distinct sectoral input 
relationships of these four agricultural production sectors, they also use rather 
different marketing channels for selling their product. The sugar industry 
receives 45% of its raw materials, in monetary terms, from the LAE crop sector. 
The meat processing industry buys substantial amounts of the raw materials it 
processes from the LAE livestock sector (amounting to 36% of its expenditures 
for intermediates). The share of inputs the meat processing industry is able to 
collect from the household plot sector makes up only 6% of the sector's total 
expenditures for intermediates, despite the fact that this sector represents more 
than 40% of total agricultural output in the model's data base and in fact 
produces substantial shares not only of crop but also of livestock products.  
Summing up, the agricultural sector in the Russian model is represented by four 
types of producers, each of which has a characteristic production structure 
and/or typical levels of market orientation with respect to both inputs and 
outputs. While we differentiate between two small-scale agricultural sectors, we 
refer to the LPH-sector as being the only sector that is predominantly a 
subsistence-oriented sector. The forward and backward linkages of this sector 
reveal the lowest degree of commercialization of this sector compared with all 
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3.5 Household  Demand 
Macroeconomic reforms in the transition process have had substantial 
microeconomic repercussions. Liberalization of prices and trade, for instance, 
resulted in a significant restructuring in the composition of household demand. 
Additionally, high inflation and declining real wages induced a restructuring of 
expenditure patterns. One of the most distinct features is the increase in the 
average share of total expenditures Russian households spend on food. The data 
in the IO table for 1990 shows a share of approximately 37% of total household 
expenditures spent on food. Data from the household survey carried out in three 
Russian oblasts in 1995 indicates that the average Russian household's share of 
food expenditure increased significantly in the transition period (cf. VON BRAUN 
and QAIM 1999). Taking into consideration market demand for food products 
only, the share of household expenditures for food averaged about 56%. If 
subsistence production is taken into consideration, this share increases to almost 
80%. Official Russian statistics indicate for 1995 (1996) a share of 49% (47%) 
of total expenditures spent on food (GOSKOMSTAT 1998).  
Therefore, household demand had to be updated to more realistically represent 
households' behavior in the model. The structure of private consumption was 
adjusted to the revealed expenditure shares for market demand only as they were 
obtained from the household survey. However, in some cases this data cannot be 
considered fully representative for Russia as a whole.  
The share of expenditures for food in the 1994 IO table is significantly higher as 
compared to the respective share in the IO table for 1990 (51.1% versus 36.8%). 
It still seems to be rather low if it is compared to the respective expenditure 
share that has been calculated from the household survey. However, it has to be 
borne in mind that it is very difficult to take subsistence production in Russia 
and, hence, one part of the 'virtual economy' with all the associated difficulties 
of evaluating non-monetary transactions, fully into account in the model's data 
base. A second feature of household expenditures in the 1994 IO table is the 
major share of food households 'buy' from small-scale and, hence, from 
subsistence agriculture. In our model a share of 10.5% of total household 
expenditures and thereby a share of 20% of total expenditures used for the 
purchase of food products stems from the LPH sector.  
Furthermore, because of the distinction we made between activities and 
commodities, households have two choices for where to get agricultural 
commodities from: Households can consume the good from formal markets (i.e. 
'marketed household consumption') or they can consume the good from 
subsistence production (i.e., 'own-household consumption') and hence, from the 
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3.6  Consistency Tests of the Model 
The complex structure of the model means that inconsistencies cannot be 
excluded a priori when the model is calibrated and solved. Hence, it seems to be 
a requirement to carry out various tests with such models. A test for 
homogeneity can be a simple but powerful device, as it quickly reveals whether 
the theoretical and empirical parts of the model are consistent. This test is a first 
simulation with the model in which the central price index, in our case the GDP 
deflator, is – ceteris paribus – altered exogenously. Here, it was raised by 10%. 
The underlying concept of homogeneity implies that all real variables are 
homogenous to the degree 0 with respect to price changes. Additionally, it has to 
be expected that all endogenous prices are changing to the same extent, while 
relative prices do not change. Indeed, the solution of this experiment yielded 
changes in all prices and nominal variables by 10%. All real and all exogenously 
determined variables (depending on closure rules, for instance factor supply, 
total government demand, etc.) remained constant.  
Another essential check for theoretical and empirical consistency of the model is 
to ensure that the model is "square". "Theoretical squareness" refers to Walras' 
law, which stipulates that the number of equations in the model is the same as 
the number of variables.  
Furthermore, sensitivity tests are commonly carried out to test whether the 
model is sensitive to changes in the base run of the model. Therefore, sensitivity 
tests can generally consist of two different alterations: either changes in the data 
base or changes in the economic features of the model. We restricted our 
sensitivity tests to one commonly used option: changing the value of trade 
parameters. The sensitivity tests showed that the model responds adequately to 
changes in the value of trade elasticities (CES and CET). Furthermore, the 
sensitivity tests indicated that the higher the elasticity values, the higher is the 
degree of restructuring that follows exogenous shocks.  
Finally, validity tests are based on the question as to what extent the model can 
actually replicate the economy-wide effects of real world developments ex post. 
The underlying idea is to ask whether the model is able to replicate ex post 
economic developments that were observed in the past as a result of external 
shocks. For instance, we will expose the model exogenously to some shocks that 
have occurred in the 1990s and contributed to structural changes in Russia's 
agricultural sector. We will then ask how realistic the model responses are and if 
these responses comply with real world developments.  
The model is comparative static; parameters such as trade elasticities are set 
exogenously low. Therefore, and because of the specific factor market and 
closure rules which determine the key behavior of the model, the results should 
be interpreted as reflecting short run responses, which is another feature typical 
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4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1 Experiment  Design 
With the model discussed above, we are now in a position to carry out various 
simulations addressing some of the economic changes which have been 
observed in the course of Russia's transition process. We simulated three types 
of rather different economic changes which together affected the economic 
situation of both large-scale and subsistence agriculture in the 1990s. The 
transition process did not take place in a planned manner and, consequently, the 
sequencing of reforms and related economic events was sub-optimal. We 
attempt to replicate some of the most influential economic developments, which 
have had an effect on the various agricultural sectors in the past decade and 
combine these backward-looking experiments with forward-looking experiments.  
Experiment 1. One of the most typical results of the transition process for 
Russian agriculture has been the output decline in large-scale agriculture and the 
increasing importance of subsistence agriculture. We replicate this development 
in Experiment 1 by simulating a negative (inward) shift of the production 
function in both large-scale agricultural sectors and a positive (outward) shift of 
the production function in the subsistence-oriented LPH-sector. This shift of the 
supply curve is simulated by decreasing (increasing) the total factor productivity 
in large-scale (subsistence-oriented) agricultural sector by 10%.  
Experiment 2. With the second experiment we add another important economic 
event which affected Russia's agricultural sector in the recent past. In the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis the real exchange rate of the ruble was 
strongly devalued. Therefore, we expose the economy to a 10% devaluation of 
the real exchange rate in this consecutive (cumulative) second experiment.  
Experiments 3 and 4. In the third and fourth experiment the previous two 
experiments are combined with two forward-looking simulations assessing the 
effects of an economy wide 25% decline in foreign trade and domestic 
marketing margins. Because the absolute importance of the domestic margins is 
much higher, a change of the same relative magnitude as in the foreign trade 
margins should yield higher changes of various economic indicators.  
4.2  Discussion of Results 
The effects of the four simulations on various macroeconomic indicators are 
shown in Table A-4. The effects on quantities in the four primary agricultural 
sectors are shown in the consecutive table (A-5). In the second column of these 
tables the absolute value of the respective indicator in the base period is shown. 
The values in the following columns that report the experiment results give the 
percentage change of the respective indicator with respect to its base value. 
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equilibrium solution is the initial equilibrium for the following experiment. 
Therefore, to identify the marginal change caused by each experiment one needs 
to deduct the percentage change reported for the previous experiment. 
Experiment 1. The two counter-acting productivity changes for large-scale and 
small-scale agriculture simulated in Experiment 1 result in a 0.5% decrease of 
GDP at factor costs (Table A-4) which implies that the output increase in the 
subsistence sector is not sufficient to compensate for the declining output in the 
two large-scale agricultural sectors (Table A-5). In fact, this replicates the 
restructuring of Russian agriculture that took place in the 1990s. Because of the 
slight devaluation, which is induced by the contraction of the economy, we 
observe some restructuring of foreign trade and slightly more exports than 
before. Because we keep foreign savings constant in this experiment, imports 
have to increase as well to preserve the existing trade balance. The economic 
contraction reduces total commodities available in the economy (absorption) 
because of which government consumption and investments demand decline 
accordingly. The relative increase of the government budget deficit is with about 
3% more pronounced.  
Table A-5 shows that total household consumption increases by 0.8%. Prices 
increase slightly for both exports and imports for the goods traded by the two 
large-scale sectors. Exports plummet in the large-scale crop sector (-26.9%) 
while imports increase in both large-scale agricultural sectors (6.7% and 8.6%, 
for crops and livestock, respectively). These effects on agricultural trade are 
induced by the declining factor productivity and the associated output decline in 
both large-scale sectors. The decrease of domestic production in the two sectors 
increases their domestic supply and export prices. Consequently, restructuring 
takes place towards the internationally traded substitutes which in fact are one of 
the developments that were observable for most of the transition period in the 
1990s.  
Effects on agriculture. The overall effect on small-scale production is positive 
(1.2%) although the 10% increase in total factor productivity is dampened 
substantially. Table A-3 shows that the input share of the LPH sector is only 
23.6% and thus a 10% increase in total factor productivity would-ceteris 
paribus-lead to a 7.6% increase in production (this is [100.0-23.6]*0.1). 
However, general equilibrium effects account for inelastic national demand as 
well as labor shifts into the larger agricultural sectors that suffer from a 
productivity decrease. Consequently, value-added prices in small-scale 
agriculture decline drastically (29.1%). Hence, we observe a more moderate 
positive development of production, while 'wages' in this sector fall. On the 
consumption side, we observe an over-proportional increase in marketed 
household consumption of the small-scale agriculture commodity. Although 
total household income declines by 1.3%, overall consumption of small-scale 
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comprises a 1.0% increase in own-household consumption and a 6.9% increase 
of marketed consumption, which constitutes 11.5% of the combined own-
household and marketed consumption of small-scale agriculture in the base.  
Experiment 2. W i t h  t h i s  e x p e r i m e n t  a n  additional event was simulated 
exogenously which, in the course of transition, overlapped with the changes 
discussed in Experiment 1. While the financial crisis coincided with a nominal 
devaluation of the Russian ruble of about 80% and a real devaluation of more 
than 50% we are not attempting to replicate the extent of this shock but only its 
direction-imposing a 10% devaluation of the real exchange rate. The devaluation 
causes GDP at factor costs to decline by an additional 1.8% with respect to the 
base to an overall decline of 2.3% for Experiment 1 and 2 combined.
6 This 
decline is only possible because the economy in our structural model world can 
release labor (employment declines by 4.0% [-4.8%]). This is in spite of 
significant restructuring of domestic production towards exports and away from 
producing for the domestic market, which is induced by the real devaluation. In 
fact, exports increase by 11.7% and the increase of import prices, which is 
caused by the devaluation results in a parallel decline of imports of 8.6%. 
However, this restructuring is not significant enough to induce domestic growth. 
Part of the explanation for this reaction is the fact that under a flexible capital 
account system, a significant part of the marginal profit that is obtained from 
export expansion is exported to the rest of the world, or putting it more bluntly, 
results in significantly increased capital flight (129%). This response can be seen 
as a validation of the model because such behavior in fact has been observed in 
the 1990s in Russia, when the earnings from the raw material exports were not 
reinvested into domestic industries but instead were withdrawn from the Russian 
economy and invested elsewhere. If the flexibility within the economy would be 
greater, the incentives to invest into import substituting domestic industries 
should have been bigger.  
Effects on agriculture. The response of the agricultural sectors to the real 
devaluation is mixed. The increased competitiveness of domestic production 
does not result in sufficient restructuring that would induce overall growth in 
agricultural sectors. Given the short run response of our model, only the large-
scale crop sector benefits, in as far as it can expand export production.
7 The 
                                           
6  For Experiment 2, 3, and 4 we report on the incremental changes caused by the respective experiment in 
percent of the base values (not with respect to the previous experiment solution). Cumulative results (as 
percentage change from the base) are reported in Tables A4 and A5 and occasionally in parentheses, e.g., in 
the case of GDP at factor costs in Experiment 2 the incremental decline is 1.8% while the cumulative effect is 
[-2.3%], i.e., 0.5% decline from Experiment 1 plus a 1.8% decline from Experiment 2. This allows us to 
report on the effects of the current experiment and the overall effect of the experiment series up to the 
experiment under consideration simultaneously. 
7  A related argument, however, referring to the real appreciation of the ruble prior to the crisis is put forward in 
an empirical paper by DYNNIKOVA (1999). She presents results of cointegration analysis for the RF on the 
causality between the exchange rate, imports, and domestic production of various (food) commodities. The 
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marginal effect of this experiment on domestic production, however, is negative 
in all four agricultural sectors. The positive effects on the subsistence sector of 
the increased factor productivity (output increase of 1.2% in Experiment 1) are 
overcompensated by the negative effects in Experiment 2 which results in an 
output decline of 2.7% [-1.5%]. The major force driving this output decline is 
the reduction in national income and the concomitant decline in total private 
consumption of 7.1 [-7.8%]. This shift in demand has been the immediate 
response to the real devaluation simulated in this experiment. The total income 
decline of 1.0% [-2.3%] fed into a reduction of consumption of both, marketed 
and non-marketed commodities from all four agricultural sectors. Because of the 
increase in marketed household consumption from subsistence agriculture in 
Experiment 1 the cumulative effect of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was a 
decline in marketed consumption in this sector by 2.2% only. For the same 
reason (the increase of own household consumption by 1% in Experiment 1) the 
cumulative effect of both experiments on own household consumption is nil, 
while it declined in all other sectors. However, the incremental changes of 
households' consumption from formal and non-formal markets, as well as the 
incremental changes of domestic output in Experiment 2 are most significant in 
the case of the subsistence sector when compared with all other agricultural 
sectors. This result is driven by the different exposure of subsistence agriculture 
and large-scale agriculture to foreign trade. The large-scale crop and livestock 
agricultural sectors benefit to some extent from the devaluation and increase in 
exports by 28.4 and 2.3%, respectively [1.5 and -0.9%]. This is a partial 
compensation for the decline in domestic demand because of which output 
prices in both large-scale sectors decline more moderately than in the 
subsistence sector. In contrast, the subsistence-oriented agricultural sector 
suffers from overall income decline and, therefore, is hit most by the 
devaluation, which was simulated in Experiment 2. In fact, in the aftermath of 
Russia's financial crisis in 1998 and the concomitant devaluation of the ruble, 
the large-scale agricultural sector increased output, while output from 
subsistence agriculture remained more or less constant.  
However, one important question that arises from the results obtained in 
Experiment 2 is how the overall negative effect of the devaluation on domestic 
agricultural sectors could be reversed, given the high inflexibility of the Russian 
economy? To explore this question we carried out the following two 
simulations.  
Experiment 3. A 25% reduction of the foreign trade margins has a positive effect 
on GDP (0.8%) and employment (2.0%) but does not turn the negative effects of 
                                                                                                                                    
imported goods cheaper, induced an additional short-run increase in non-CIS imports, but only for meat, 
which crowded out at least parts of the increase in domestic meat production. In contrast, the adjustment in 
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Experiment 1 and 2 into growth. Reducing import and export trade margins 
favors both total imports and total exports, which increase by 3.0% and 2.6%, 
respectively.  
Effects on agriculture. Sectorally, effects are significant for the large-scale 
agricultural sectors in which the reduction of the trade margin yields 6.6% 
export growth in the crop sector [8.1%] and overcompensates for the negative 
effects on exports in the livestock sectors, which were caused by the output in 
total factor productivity simulated with Experiment 1 (3.1% [2.2%]). However, 
it is obvious that the absolute size of trade effects on large-scale agriculture are 
very limited in this short run model, particularly because of the low level of 
agricultural exports in the base-period. Similar to Experiment 2, this openness to 
trade in the large-scale agricultural sectors results in a positive output increase in 
the large-scale agricultural crop sector (3.5%). However, the positive effect of 
this experiment on total national income (1.6%) also yields significant effects on 
all agricultural sectors. While the incremental increase in income does not affect 
own household consumption from all four agricultural sectors significantly, it 
feeds into higher demand for all agricultural commodities from formal markets. 
The respective incremental increase in demand is, with 1.9%, lowest in the case 
of the large-scale crop sector, followed by the large-scale livestock sector 
(2.1%), and is highest for marketed products from the subsistence sector. First, 
this is due to the fact, that in the base period the share of household expenditures 
for marketed household consumption from the subsistence sector has been 
highest. Secondly, relative price changes explain these differences. While the 
increased export demand for the goods from the large-scale crop sector results in 
a slight increase in the domestic composite commodity price the respective price 
for the goods marketed by the subsistence sector remains stable.  
Summing it up, the effects of reducing foreign trade margins yielded overall 
positive effects for the Russian economy. Subsistence agriculture also benefited 
from the reduction in trade margins because of the associated overall income 
gains, which fed into increased demand for the good subsistence producers are 
selling in formal markets. The next interesting question is how a reduction in the 
domestic marketing margin of the same magnitude would change the results.  
Experiment 4. Because of the size of the domestic market, the major share of the 
marketing margin (79.3%) applies to domestic and not to foreign trade-related 
transactions. Therefore, it is not surprising that a 25% reduction of the domestic 
marketing margin yields much higher positive effects on the Russian economy. 
In fact, this exogenously introduced shock increases overall economic output 
and yields an incremental increase in GDP and total employment of 2.8% and 
7.6%, respectively. This increase in GDP and employment leads to a 5.8% 
increase of total national income. The positive effects of reducing the domestic 
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decrease and devaluation leading to a 1.4% GDP at factor costs growth with 
respect to the base period at 4.8% increased employment.  
Effects on agriculture. Effects of this reduction in domestic costs of marketing 
are particular positive for all agricultural sectors because of the relative 
importance of marketing costs for the bulk commodity produced by each of 
these sectors. This simulation indicates that large-scale and small-scale 
agricultural sectors alike would benefit from measures that reduce the domestic 
marketing margins. The marginal increase in output is, with more than 9%, most 
distinct in the two large-scale agricultural sectors. The LPH-sector also increases 
output by about 8%, while the respective increase is more moderate in the small-
scale private farm sector (3.8%). In other words, the effects on subsistence 
agriculture are quite significant if the domestic trade margins are reduced. 
Again, this is due to demand side factors. On the one hand, demand of 
households for the subsistence good from this sector increases by 0.9% in 
comparison to the base and by 0.7 percentage points in comparison to 
Experiment 3 only. However, because of the overall positive effect on the 
economy, the demand of households for the marketed product from this sector 
increases by almost 12% against the base and 11.5 percentage points compared 
to Experiment 3. In fact, the goods from the LPH-sector, which are mostly 
consumed directly (in a subsistence manner), shifts towards the marketed 
economy because of the reduction in the domestic marketing margin. Obviously, 
this is the result of the model set-up: marginal budget shares for the subsistence 
part of the LES demand system are relatively small, which more or less locks 
total sectoral subsistence consumption to its initial minimum consumption. In 
contrast, the marginal budget shares of the marketed consumption in the LES are 
much bigger and, therefore, marketed consumption of small-scale agriculture 
produce is much more responsive to relative price changes. 
5 POLICY AND RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
We analyze some characteristic developments of Russia's economic transition 
period in the mid- to late-1990s applying a trade-focused general equilibrium 
model. The agricultural sector in this model is disaggregated such that the 
effects of various economic changes on the subsistence-oriented agricultural 
sector can be traced. The transition process in Russia did not take place in a 
carefully-planned fashion; because of this we simulated a sequence of four path-
dependent exogenous economic changes. We started out with an increase 
(decrease) of total factor productivity in small-scale (large-scale) agriculture; 
subsequently, we simulated a real depreciation of the ruble and then added an 
exogenous reduction of foreign trade margins, as well as domestic marketing 
margins. The latter is meant to simulate a reduction of transaction costs, which 
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All these experiments were simulated under the assumption of a relatively 
inflexible and short run model economy in which production was not able to 
restructure in a neoclassical way to exogenous shocks. Instead, this structural 
model specifies unemployment permitting the increase and decrease of the 
initial labor force given by the base data. Consequently, demand side responses 
to the economic shocks imposed are relatively more important as compared with 
pure neo-classical models.  
This model specification permitted to simulate economic developments of the 
Russian economy during the 1990s related to structural and institutional 
changes. These experiments yielded distinct responses that were actually 
observable during the economic transition period:  
•  We showed how to replicate the response of subsistence agriculture in Russia 
in the transition period with a formal and applied economic model: the 
increased production in small-scale agricultural yields increased subsistence 
consumption in spite of overall economic contraction (Experiment 1). In fact, 
this backs the view of other studies, which have stressed that the increased 
consumption from subsistence production has been one important buffer 
against more severe poverty in Russia in the 1990s (THO SEETH et al. 1997; 
STONEMAN 2000). At the same time, the analysis highlights that the relative 
importance of Russia's small-scale agriculture is not sufficient to fully 
compensate for the losses in the large-scale agricultural sectors. Hence, a 
forward-looking agricultural policy strategy would need to address both 
small-scale and large-scale farms.  
•  A 10% real devaluation of the ruble was not sufficient to induce economic 
growth by itself (Experiment 2). In our simulations the overall income 
decline following the devaluation affected output in all agricultural sectors 
negatively. However, because of the openness to trade both large-scale 
agricultural sectors were able to redirect parts of their production towards 
exports. In contrast, the negative income effects of the devaluation were not 
buffered in the case of the two small-scale agricultural sectors. The low 
flexibility with which the Russian economy adapts to exogenous shocks 
contributes to the insufficient restructuring towards import substituting 
economic activities which could induce overall economic growth. This 
indicates that macroeconomic adjustments such as exchange rate alterations 
by themselves will not be sufficient to enhance the long run growth potential 
of either Russia's agro-food sectors or the economy as a whole. Instead such 
macroeconomic reforms should be complemented by urgently needed 
institutional reforms (SEROVA et al. 1999; BERGLÖFT and VAITLINGAM 1999). 
•  A reduction in domestic marketing margins is likely to be more beneficial 
compared to a reduction of marketing margins related to foreign trade 
activities (Experiment 3 and 4). In agriculture the latter would induce 
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agricultural sectors would either decline or remain at its previous levels. A 
reduction in domestic marketing margins would induce substantial overall 
growth in the Russian economy. The additional income in the economy 
would translate into higher domestic demand for the goods from all four 
agricultural sectors that are marketed through formal channels. Small-scale 
and large-scale agricultural sectors alike would benefit more than 
proportionately from any policies, which contribute to a reduction in 
domestic marketing margins. Again, these results imply that institutional 
reforms which reduce transaction costs and foster the efficiency of the food 
marketing system should receive high priority in Russia. This objective could 
be reached by general measures such as enhancing contract security, but also 
by sector-specific policy-measures such as improved food wholesale and 
retail marketing facilities, which need to be provided on a regional level. 
Furthermore, the simulations indicate that a reduction of domestic marketing 
margins would be particularly beneficial for subsistence agriculture, as it 
would stimulate the commercialization of this important segment of Russia's 
agricultural sector to a significant extent.  
The discussion of the simulation results shows that the presented model can be a 
helpful tool for analyzing the links between Russia's subsistence-oriented 
agriculture and the rest of the economy. However, one remaining research task 
will be to estimate the effects of specific institutional mechanisms, particularly 
the reduction in marketing costs, which were determined in our simulations ad 
hoc, by means of microeconomic analyses. While we were able to show the 
economy-wide effects such changes might have, the objective of this paper was 
not to address the 'how' and 'why' these changes came about. In fact, this 
remains an open and promising field for future research.  Peter Wehrheim, Peter Wobst  210 
APPENDIX 
Table A-1:  Structure of the Russian Economy by Activity, in 1994, in 
percent 
GDP at Factor 
Costs 
Total Production Labor Force  Capital  Sectors
a) 
in % of National Total 
1 Aelecpower  3.4 3.7 1.1 5.3 
2 Afuelindu  9.4 7.8 3.1  14.4 
3 Ametallin  2.7 5.7 1.5 3.6 
4 Achemical  1.8 3.0 1.5 2.0 
5 Amachinei  7.8 11.5  9.2  6.7 
6 Awoodindu  2.1 2.6 2.1 2.1 
7 Alightman  3.7 7.1 3.2 4.1 
8 Aconstruc  12.1 11.9 17.6  7.9 
9 Ashugarref  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
10 Aflourmil  0.3 1.8 0.3 0.4 
11 Ameatproc  0.3 1.7 0.2 0.5 
12 Adairypro  0.8 1.0 0.4 1.1 
13 Aotherfood  1.4 2.4 0.8 1.9 
14 Aanimfeed  0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 
15 AagriCrop  2.6 2.2 2.7 2.5 
16 Aagrilive  2.0 2.1 2.8 1.3 
17 AAgriLPHs  4.8 3.5 2.5 6.7 
18 AagriPriv  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
19 AtradeAgc  17.7 12.9 13.9 20.6 
20 Aservices  26.6 18.2 36.9 18.5 
TOTAGR
b)  9.7 8.1 8.3  10.8 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes:  a) Names of Sectors: 1 Electric power; 2 Fuel industry; 3 Metal industry; 4 Chemicals industry; 
5  Mechanical engineering; 6 Wood industry; 7 Light manufacturing; 8 Construction; 9 Sugar 
refinery; 10 Flour milling; 11 Meat processing; 12 Dairy processing; 13 Other food industry; 
14 Animal feed; 15 Large-scale farms: crop production; 16 Large-scale farms: livestock production; 
17 Small-scale farms: private subsidiary plots (LPH); 18 Small-scale farms: private farmers; 
19 Trade & transportation; 20 Services;  
b) TOTAGR Total share of primary agricultural sectors.  
Source:  Own calculations from underlying SAM structure. 
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Table A-2:  Trade Structure of the Russian Economy in 1994 by 
Commodity in percent and Elasticities  
 Composition  (%)
a) Ratios  (%)
b) Elasticities 
Sectors
c) Exports  Imports  Absorp.  Exports Imports  CES  CET 
1 Celecpowe  3.5 0.5 3.4  12.9 2.7 3.0 0.6 
2 Cfuelindu  40.2 4.8 7.6  70.2  17.2 3.0 0.6 
3 Cmetallin  18.2 4.9 5.7  43.5  15.5 3.0 0.6 
4 Cchemical  13.7 11.5  4.0 63.3 53.4  3.0  0.6 
5 Cmachinei  12.8 19.2 13.1 15.3 20.6  3.0  0.6 
6 Cwoodindu  4.0 1.7 2.6  21.4 9.5 3.0 0.6 
7 Clightman  2.6  13.9 8.4 5.1  22.2 3.0 0.6 
8 Cconstruc  0 2.5  10.9  --  --  -- 0.6 
9 Csugarref  0.1 6.7 0.9 4.2  78.4 3.0 1.5 
10 Cflourmil  0.2 7.7 2.5 1.3  31.4 3.0 1.5 
11 Cmeatproc  0.2 8.4 2.3 1.5  38.1 2.0 1.5 
12 Cdairypro  0.1 7.2 1.7 2.0  47.8 3.0 1.5 
13 Cothefood  2.9 6.0 2.8  17.2  25.2 3.0 1.5 
14 Canimfeed  0 0  0.3 -- --     
15 CagriCrop  0.4 1.5 2.4 2.4 8.6 3.0 1.1 
16 Cagrilive  0.3 2.0 2.2 2.0  13.0  3  2 
17 CAgriLPHs  0 0  1.5 -- -- -- -- 
18 CagriPriv  0 0  0.3 -- -- -- -- 
19 CtradeAgc  0.8 1.5  10.8 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 
20 Cservices  -- --  16.3 -- -- -- -- 
Totagro-food
d)  4.2  39.5  16.9     
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 -- -- -- -- 
Notes:  a) Shares of sectoral exports (imports, absorption) in national total;  
b) Ratios indicate the share of exports (imports) in total sectoral production (absorption);  
c) See notes on Table A-1 for names of sectors;  
d) Cumulative share of agricultural sectors and food industries.  
Source:  Own calculations from underlying SAM structure. 
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Table A-3:  Composition of Sectors and Marketing Margins, in 1994 
Composition of Sectors  Marketing Margin Coefficients
Labor Capital Input Elast-p  Domestic Exports  Imports 
Sectors
a) 
In % of Total Factor 
Costs 
In % of 
Total Costs
      
1 Aelecpowe  14.5 85.5 48.5  0.8  0.09  0.05  0.08 
2 Afuelindu  14.3 85.7 33.5  0.8  0.07  0.05  0.12 
3 Ametallin  24.0 76.0 74.2  0.8  0.08  0.05  0.12 
4 Achemical  37.7 62.3 66.4  0.5  0.08  0.05  0.12 
5 Amachinei  51.7 48.3 62.5  1.5  0.13  0.08  0.19 
6 Awoodindu  43.9 56.1 53.8  0.5  0.13  0.10  0.19 
7 Alightman  37.5 62.5 70.5  1.5  0.13  0.14  0.18 
8 Aconstruc  63.5 36.5 43.8  1.5  0.08  --  -- 
9 Asugarref  20.2 79.8 70.4  1.2  0.22  0.15  0.05 
10 Aflourmil  38.5 61.5 90.1  1.2  0.22  0.15  0.05 
11 Ameatproc  25.3 74.7 88.6  1.2  0.13  0.15  0.05 
12 Adairypro  23.9 76.1 58.1  1.2  0.13  0.15  0.04 
13 Aothefood  24.2 75.8 67.8  1.2  0.13  0.14  0.05 
14 Aanimfeed  28.1 71.9 90.6  1.2  0.04  --  -- 
15 AagriCrop  45.9 54.1 41.9  1.2  0.22  0.12  0.04 
16 Aagilive  62.9 37.1 55.6  1.2  0.13  0.30  0.03 
17 AAgriLPHs  22.6 77.4 23.6  1.2  0.39  --  -- 
18 AagriPriv  38.7 61.3 39.7  1.2  0.39  --  -- 
19 AtradeAgc  34.5 65.5 24.1  1.2  --  --  -- 
20 Aservices  60.9 39.1 19.2  1.2  0.09  --  -- 
AVERAGE  43.9 56.1 56.1         
Note:  a) See notes on Table A-1 for names of sectors. 
Source:  Own calculations from underlying SAM structure. 
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Figure A-1:  Theoretical Structure of the Model 
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Table A-4:  Macroeconomic Results of Experiments, Changes Relative to 
Base, in percent 










(Exp. 4 w-r-t  
Exp. 3) 





b)  EXP. 2  EXP. 3  EXP. 4  Deviation 
GDPfc 
a)  611.7 -0.5 -2.3 -1.5  1.4  2.8 
EXPORTS  152.4  0.4 12.1 14.7 18.0  3.3 
IMPORTS  130.0  0.5 -8.1 -5.1 -1.2  3.9 
PRVCON  227.1  0.8 -7.8 -5.7  1.4  7.0 
INV  181.6 -1.1 -7.6 -5.5  1.9  7.4 
GOVCON  173.4 -1.5 -7.1 -5.3  1.8  7.1 
NETITAX  12.5  1.1 -7.3 -4.2 -0.4  3.9 
GDPMP1  604.5 -0.5 -2.4 -0.5  6.4  6.9 
Macro 
Variables 
       
CPIXP  1.136 0.2 2.3 1.9 0.6  -1.2 
DPIXP  1.000       
EXRXP  1.000  0.3 10.4 10.1 12.3  2.2 
EGXP  173.4 -1.3 -7.5 -5.8 -0.1  5.8 
GSAVXP  -66.7  -2.8 -20.9 -19.3 -13.1  6.1 
FSAVXP  -22.4   129.4 129.4 129.4  0.0 
IADJXP  1.0 -1.1 -7.6 -5.5  1.9  7.4 
MPSXP  0.5  -0.1 5.0 4.8 4.6  -0.2 
QFSXP 
FCAP 
343.3 fixed fixed fixed fixed  -- 
QFSXP 
FLAP 
268.4 -0.8 -4.8 -2.8  4.8  7.6 
Household 
Inciators 
       
QHTTXP  200.4  0.7 -7.8 -5.7  1.4  7.0 
QAHTTXP  30.1 0.8  -0.1 0.1 0.8  0.7 
QHTTTXP  230.6  0.7 -6.8 -4.9  1.3  6.2 
YIXP  611.7 -1.3 -2.3 -0.7  5.1  5.8 
Notes:  a) TFP = Total Factor Productivity. GDPFC = GDP at factor costs; PRVCON = Private 
consumption; INV = Investment demand; GOVCON = Government consumption; NETTAX = Net 
tax revenues; GDPMP = GDP at market prices; CIP = Consumer price index; DPI = Domestic sales 
price index; EXR = Real exchange rate; EG = Government expenditure; GSAV = Government 
savings; FSAV = Foreign savings; IADJ = Fixed investment scaling factor; MPS = Marginal 
propensity to save of households; QFSXP FCAP = Factor supply capital; QFSXP FLAB = Factor 
supply labor; QHTT = Total consumption of all commodities by households; QAHTT = 
Consumption of all activities by households; QHTTT = Total consumption of households; YIXP = 
National income. b) Experiment 1: shift of the supply curve by decreasing (increasing) the total 
factor productivity in large-scale (subsistence-oriented) agricultural sector by 10%. Experiment 2: 
the economy is exposed to a 10% devaluation of the real exchange rate in this consecutive 
(cumulative) experiment. Experiment 3: 25% decline in foreign trade margins. Experiment 4: 25% 
decline in domestic trade margins. 
Source:  Results from policy scenarios. 
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Table A-5:  Quantity Effects of Experiments for Agricultural Sectors, 




















(Exp. 4 w-r-t 
Exp. 3) 
(Cumulative) Change in Comparison to Base in % 
Variables Sectors
a) 
  EXP. 1 EXP. 2  EXP. 3  EXP. 4   
CagriCrop 0.5  -26.9  1.5  8.1  13.6  5.5  Exports 
Cagrilive 0.4  -3.2 -0.9  2.2  13.2  11.0 
CagriCrop 2.3  6.7  -6.0  -3.1  2.1  5.2  Imports 
Cagrilive 3.4 8.6  -11.4  -8.7  -9.4  -0.7 
CagriCrop 24.4  -2.8  -3.7  -0.2  7.1  9.1 
Cagrilive 23.2 -1.8  -2.7  -1.2  8.3  9.5 
CagriLPHs 14.6  1.2  -1.5  0.1  7.9  7.8 
CagriPriv 2.7  -0.4  -2.1  -1.3  2.4  3.8 
Domestic 
Output 
CtradeAgc 143.3  -0.4  -2.4  -4.9  -15.5  -10.5 
CagriCrop 26.2  -1.5  -4.0  -2.3  6.5  8.8 
Cagrilive 26.2 -0.5  -3.9  -2.3  5.8  8.1 
CagriLPHs 14.6  1.2  -1.5  0.1  7.9  7.8 
CagriPriv 2.7  -0.4  -2.1  -1.3  2.4  3.8 
Domestic Sales 
CtradeAgc 144.6  -0.4  -2.6  -5.1  -15.8  -10.7 
CagriCrop 1.6 -1.3  -8.9  -7.0  -0.3  6.6 
Cagrilive 5.1  -0.5 -8.5  -6.4  0.7  7.2 




CagriPriv 0.1 0.9  -7.1  -4.8  4.7  9.5 
AagriCrop 0.1 -0.2  -0.9  -0.8  -0.3  0.5 
Aagrilive 0.6  -0.1  -0.9  -0.7  0  0.6 




AagriPriv 0.3 0.1  -0.7  -0.5  0.1  0.6 
Note:  a) See notes on Table A-1 for names of sectors. 
Source:  Results from policy scenarios. 
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